

ATTACHMENT B

PROPOSED CHANGES TO APPENDIX A,  
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS OF FACILITY  
OPERATING LICENSES NPF-11 AND NPF-18

NPF-11

NPF-18

3/4 9-8

3/4 9-8

## REFUELING OPERATIONS

### 3/4.9.6 CRANE AND HOIST

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.6 All cranes and hoists used for handling fuel assemblies or control rods within the reactor pressure vessel shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: During handling of fuel assemblies or control rods within the reactor pressure vessel.

#### ACTION:

With the requirements for crane and hoist OPERABILITY not satisfied, suspend use of any inoperable crane or hoist from operations involving the handling of control rods and fuel assemblies within the reactor pressure vessel after placing the load in a safe condition.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.6 Each crane or hoist used for handling of control rods or fuel assemblies within the reactor pressure vessel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE within 7 days prior to the start of such operations with that crane or hoist by:

- a. Demonstrating operation of the overload cutoff when the load exceeds:

INSERT 'A'

1. 1200  $\pm$  50 pounds for the fuel hoist.
2. 1000  $\pm$  50 pounds for the auxiliary hoist.

- b. Demonstrating operation of the loaded interlock when the load exceeds:

INSERT 'B'

1. 485  $\pm$  50 pounds and 550  $\pm$  50 pounds for the fuel hoist.
2. 400  $\pm$  50 pounds for the auxiliary hoist.

- c. Demonstrating operation of the fuel hoist downtravel stop when downtravel exceeds 54 feet below the platform rails.
- d. Demonstrating operation of the fuel hoist and auxiliary hoist up-travel stops when the grapple is lower than or equal to 8 feet below the platform rails.
- e. Demonstrating operation of the fuel hoist slack cable cutoff when the hoist is unloaded.

#### INSERT A

1. For the fuel hoist:

- a) 1600  $\pm$ 100/-0 pounds with the NF500 mast.
- b) 1200  $\pm$ 50 pounds with the 762E974 mast.

#### INSERT B

1. For the fuel hoist:

- a) 700  $\pm$ 50/-0 pounds with the NF500 mast.
- b) 485  $\pm$ 50 pounds and 550  $\pm$ 50 pounds with the 762E974 mast.

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## ATTACHMENT C

### SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION

Commonwealth Edison has evaluated the proposed Technical Specification Amendment and determined that it does not represent a significant hazards consideration. Based on the criteria for defining a significant hazards consideration established in 10CFR50.92, operation of LaSalle County Station Units 1 and 2 in accordance with the proposed amendment will not:

- 1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because:

As discussed in UFSAR Section 15.7.4, a fuel handling accident (FHA) is postulated to occur as a consequence of a failure of the fuel assembly lifting mechanism resulting in the dropping of a raised fuel assembly onto other fuel bundles in the core. The accident which produces the largest number of failed spent fuel rods (including consideration of the drop of a fuel bundle onto the Unit 2 consolidated fuel storage pool) is the drop of a spent fuel bundle onto the reactor core when the vessel head is off. This accident is expected to occur with the frequency of a limiting fault.

This proposed change does not result in a change to any of the assumptions of the postulated FHA. The added weight of the NF500 mast is the only design change of safety significance. The refueling platform fuel hoist incorporates redundant lifting features (dual cables) so that no single component failure will result in a fuel bundle drop. The design of the grapple is not being changed as a result of this proposed change. The NF500 mast is similar in design and function to the presently installed triangular mast and meets or exceeds the design in all other aspects. There are no changes being made to interlocks on the platform which prevent unsafe operation over the reactor vessel during control rod movements, limit travel of the fuel grapple, and interlock grapple hook engagement with hoist power.

NUREG-0612, "Control of Heavy Loads of Nuclear Power Plants," was reviewed and is not applicable to the installation of the NF500 mast because the NUREG defines a Heavy Load as: "Any load, carried in a given area after a plant becomes operational, that weighs more than the combined weight of a single spent fuel assembly and its associated handling tool for the specific plant in question." Therefore, the NF500 mast is bounded by the FHA analysis.

The proposed fuel hoist overload cutoff setpoint ensures that excessive lifting forces are not applied to the top guide or fuel assemblies. The proposed fuel hoist loaded setpoint ensures that the associated fuel hoist loaded interlocks are initiated when the weight of a channeled fuel bundle is applied to the grapple.

Further, the maximum height from which a fuel bundle could be dropped remains unchanged as does the minimum required water level above stored irradiated fuel. The postulated number of fuel rod failures due to a bundle drop with the increased weight of a NF500 mast analyzed by General

ATTACHMENT C (continued)

Electric is 116 rods. This is bounded by the postulated failure of 125 rods in the current UFSAR analysis. The radiological release for the FHA with the NF500 mast as calculated by current approved methods is less than the release documented in the UFSAR. Therefore, this proposed change will not increase the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

- 2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because:

No new failure modes will be introduced as a result of this proposed change. The NF500 mast is similar in design and function to the currently installed mast and meets or exceeds all of the other design aspects so as not to introduce a new failure mode. The proposed fuel hoist overload cutoff setpoint ensures that excessive lifting force is not applied to the top guide or fuel assemblies. The proposed fuel hoist loaded setpoint ensures that the associated fuel hoist loaded interlocks are initiated when the weight of a channeled fuel assembly is applied to the grapple. Therefore, this proposed change does not create a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

- 3) Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety because:

The fuel hoist setpoints serve no safety function. These setpoints serve to prevent damage to reactor internals such as caused by a stuck fuel bundle. The setpoints are also designed to prevent the loading of fuel assemblies during core alterations when all control rods are not fully inserted. The proposed change in the fuel hoist overload cutoff and fuel hoist loaded interlock setpoints solely account for the increased weight of the NF500 mast. These setpoints provide approximately the same margin as the setpoints for the current triangular fuel mast (762E974). The proposed fuel hoist overload cutoff setpoint for the NF500 mast of 1600 +100/-0 pounds ensures that excessive lifting force is not applied to the top guide or fuel assemblies. The proposed fuel hoist loaded interlock setpoint of 700 +50/-0 pounds for the NF500 mast ensures that the associated hoist loaded interlocks are initiated when the weight of a channeled fuel assembly is applied to the grapple. The refueling platform mast design is not discussed in the bases of the Technical Specifications 3/4.9.6. As a result, there is no significant reduction in the margin of safety.

Guidance has been provided in "Final Procedures and Standards on No Significant Hazards Considerations," Final Rule, 51 FR 7744, for the application of standards to license change requests for determination of the existence of significant hazards considerations. This document provides examples of amendments which are and are not considered likely to involve significant hazards considerations. These proposed amendments most closely fit example e.(iv) of 51 FR 7751 where a change which may either result in some increase to the probability or consequences of a previously analyzed accident or may reduce in some way a safety margin, but where the results of the change are clearly within all acceptable criteria with respect to the system or component specified in the Standard Review Plan. The setpoints



ATTACHMENT C (continued)

added for the NF500 fuel mast and the original mast setpoints satisfy Sections 9.1.2 and 9.1.4 of the Standard Review Plan in that instrumentation and controls are the same as originally reviewed and the assumptions used to determine the setpoints for the NF500 fuel hoist are the same as the original fuel hoist mast.

This proposed amendment does not involve a significant relaxation of the criteria used to establish safety limits, a significant relaxation of the bases for the limiting safety system settings or a significant relaxation of the bases for the limiting conditions for operations. Therefore, based on the guidance provided in the Federal Register and the criteria established in 10CFR50.92(c), the proposed change does not constitute a significant hazards consideration.



## ATTACHMENT D

### **ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT STATEMENT APPLICABILITY REVIEW**

Commonwealth Edison has evaluated the proposed amendment against the criteria for the identification of licensing and regulatory actions requiring environmental assessment in accordance with 10 CFR 51.20. It has been determined that the proposed changes meet the criteria for a categorical exclusion as provided under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). This conclusion has been determined because the changes requested do not pose significant hazards consideration or do not involve a significant increase in the amounts, and no significant changes in the types, of any effluents that may be release offsite. Additionally, this request does not involve a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

ATTACHMENT E

SAFETY EVALUATION

FOR

LASALLE NUCLEAR STATION

NF500 CYLINDRICAL REFUELING MAST