NRC FORM 366 (7-77) U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [1] [6] (1) UPDATE REPORT - PREVIOUS REPORT DATE AUGUST 20, 1982 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

7 8	9 LICENSEE CODE 14	15 LICENSE NUMBER 25	26 LICENSE TYPE 30	57 CAT 58
0 1	S C H B R 2 (2)	0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3)	4 1 1 1 1 (4)	(5)

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7 8	60 REPORT SOURCE	61 DOCKET NUMBER 68	69 EVENT DATE 74	75 REPORT DATE 80
0 1	L (6)	0 5 0 0 0 2 6 1 (7)	0 1 1 3 8 1 (8)	1 2 0 6 8 4 (9)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 During normal operation on 1/13/81, a review of the Service Water System revealed a
0 3 potential unmonitored release path to the environment. This is due to the lack of
0 4 radiation monitoring on the service water return lines from containment for the
0 5 four HVH motor coolers (fan cooler returns are monitored). An unmonitored release
0 6 could result if post accident containment pressure is above Service Water System
0 7 pressure and there exists a system leak inside containment. This condition is
0 8 considered reportable pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2.a(9).

7 8	SYSTEM CODE 9 10	CAUSE CODE 11	CAUSE SUBCODE 12	COMPONENT CODE 13 18	COMP. SUBCODE 19	VALVE SUBCODE 20
0 9	W A (11)	B (12)	A (13)	Z Z Z Z Z Z (14)	Z (15)	Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER: EVENT YEAR 21 22 | — 23 | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 24 26 | / 27 | OCCURRENCE CODE 28 29 | REPORT TYPE 30 | — 31 | REVISION NO. 32

8 1 | — | 0 0 2 | / | 0 1 | T | — | 3

33 ACTION TAKEN	34 FUTURE ACTION	35 EFFECT ON PLANT	36 SHUTDOWN METHOD	37 40 HOURS (22)	41 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	42 NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	43 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	44 47 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
F (18)	Z (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	0 0 0 0	Y (23)	N (24)	Z (25)	Z 9 9 9 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The above configuration is a result of the original system design. As a short term
1 1 corrective action, the Service Water System inside containment was inspected daily,
1 2 when above 200°F, for leaks. As a permanent corrective action, the HVH motor cooler
1 3 discharge lines were modified to permit monitoring for radioactivity. The return
1 4 lines from both the HVH motor coolers and fan coolers are now monitored for radio-
activity.

7 8	9 FACILITY STATUS	10 % POWER 12	13 OTHER STATUS (30) 44	45 METHOD OF DISCOVERY	46 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) 80
1 5	E (28)	1 0 0 (29)	N/A	C (31)	Review of System

7 8	9 ACTIVITY RELEASED	10 CONTENT OF RELEASE 11	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) 44	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) 45 80
1 6	Z (33)	Z (34)	N/A	N/A

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

7 8	9 NUMBER 11	12 TYPE	13 DESCRIPTION (39) 80
1 7	0 0 0 (37)	Z (38)	N/A

8412140468 841206
PDR ADOCK 05000261
S PDR

PERSONNEL INJURIES

7 8	9 NUMBER 11	12 DESCRIPTION (41) 80
1 8	0 0 0 (40)	N/A

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

7 8	9 TYPE	10 DESCRIPTION 80
1 9	Z (42)	N/A

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PUBLICITY

7 8	9 ISSUED	10 DESCRIPTION (45) 68	69 80 NRC USE ONLY
2 0	(44)	N/A	

NAME OF PREPARER Carson L. Wright PHONE (803) 383-4524

8012-365

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

FOR

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 81-003, UPDATE REPORT

1. Cause Description and Analysis

On 1/9/81, Carolina Power and Light was informed by Westinghouse of a potential safety problem that had been reported to the NRC. This concerned the lack of radiation monitoring on the service water return lines from containment for the HVH motor coolers at Indian Point 2 (Consolidated Edison). Robinson 2 has a similar configuration. A review of the H. B. Robinson Service Water System was undertaken, and a special test was performed to verify service water pressure in the HVH motor cooler lines inside containment. The results of the special test found pressure in portions of the Service Water System to be below containment post accident design pressure (42 psig). Therefore, a potential unmonitored release path from containment could exist in an accident condition. On 1/13/81, it was determined that with a leak in the SW System inside the containment vessel and the lack of radiation monitoring on the HVH motor cooler discharge piping, coupled with the service water pressure inside containment being lower than design basis accident pressure, an undetected activity release path could exist during post accident conditions. This condition is reportable pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2.a(9).

2. Corrective Action

Service water piping inside containment is being inspected daily for leaks. Should a leak occur, it will be considered a degradation of a containment boundary, and the requirements of Plant Operating Procedures and Technical Specifications will be applied. Operations personnel were instructed of the consequences of a Service Water System leak inside containment prior to February 2, 1981.

3. Corrective Action to Prevent Recurrence

A review of the Service Water System was made which resulted in a modification of the HVH motor cooler return lines. Sample lines were installed from each HVH motor cooler return line to an existing radiation monitor. This radiation monitor now samples both the HVH motor cooler and fan cooler return lines.

CP&L
Carolina Power & Light Company

ROBINSON NUCLEAR PROJECT DEPARTMENT
POST OFFICE BOX 790
HARTSVILLE, SOUTH CAROLINA 29550

DEC - 6 1984

Robinson File No: 13510C

Serial: RSEP/84-984

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

ROBINSON NUCLEAR PROJECT DEPARTMENT, UNIT NO. 2
DOCKET NO. 50-261
LICENSE NO. DPR-23
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 81-002 REVISION 3

Dear Sir:

In accordance with Section 6.9.2 of the Technical Specifications for the H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. The previous report, dated August 20, 1982, described a potential unmonitored release path to the environment through the Service Water System. This revision should replace all existing copies of the previous report. (The supplemental information has been barred for your convenience.)

Very truly yours,

R. E. Morgan
General Manager
H. B. Robinson S.E. Plant

CLW/ml

Enclosure

cc: INPO
H. E. P. Krug
J. P. O'Reilly

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