

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)  
EDWIN I. HATCH, UNIT IDOCKET NUMBER (2)  
0 5 0 0 0 3 2 1 1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)

## Unplanned Actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)								
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)						
1	1	0	6	8	4	8	4	0	2	3	0	5	0	0	0		
1	1	0	6	8	4	8	4	0	2	3	0	5	0	0	0		

OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)															
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 0 0	20.402(b)		20.406(c)		X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)								
		20.406(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)			50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)								
		20.406(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)								
		20.406(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)										
		20.406(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)										
		20.406(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(ix)										

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
AREA CODE	
T. L. Elton, Acting Superintendent of Regulatory Compliance	9 1 2 3 6 7 1 7 8 5 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
	X				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 11/06/84 at approximately 2115 CST and on 11/07/84 at approximately 1911 CST, while no fuel was in the vessel, non-licensed plant personnel were removing soldered wires from the socket of a Potter and Brumfield relay per a GE Service Information Letter and a maintenance work order. While performing this work, the personnel accidentally shorted a power wire to ground. This caused a fuse to open, which in turn caused the following actions: a) automatically started the "B" Stand-by Gas Treatment System (SBGT), b) caused a "Group 2" isolation, and c) caused a 1/2 scram logic actuation.

Licensed plant personnel then began resetting the "Group 2" isolation (in order to remove the "B" SBGT system from service) and the 1/2 scram logic actuation signal. While they were doing this, a full Reactor Protection System (RPS) logic actuation occurred due to a noise trip from the Neutron Monitoring System (NMS) completing the other 1/2 of the scram logic actuation.

The personnel involved with shorting the wire understand the importance of the error, and no further corrective actions are required. The noise level in the NMS is negligible when there is fuel in the vessel.

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PDR ADDCK 05000321  
S PDR

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
EDWIN I. HATCH, UNIT I	0 5 0 0 0 3 2 1 8 4	—	0 2 3	—	0 0 0	2	OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)


This 30 day report is required by 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) due to this event resulting in the unplanned automatic actuation and logic actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature (i.e., the "B" SBT, a "Group 2" isolation, and RPS).

On 11/06/84 at approximately 2115 CST and on 11/07/84 at approximately 1911 CST, while no fuel was in the vessel, non-licensed plant personnel were removing soldered wires from the socket of a Potter and Brumfield relay per a GE Service Information Letter and a maintenance work order. While performing this work, the personnel accidentally shorted a power wire to ground. This caused a fuse to open, which in turn caused the following actions: a) automatically started the "B" Stand-by Gas Treatment System (SBGT), b) caused a "Group 2" isolation, and c) caused a 1/2 scram logic actuation.

Licensed plant personnel then began resetting the "Group 2" isolation (in order to remove the "B" SBT system from service) and the 1/2 scram logic actuation signal. While they were doing this, a full Reactor Protection System (RPS) logic actuation occurred due to a noise trip from the Neutron Monitoring System (NMS) completing the other 1/2 of the scram logic actuation.

The personnel involved with shorting the wire understand the importance of the error, and no further corrective actions are required. The noise level in the NMS is negligible when there is fuel in the vessel.

Georgia Power Company  
Post Office Box 439  
Baxley, Georgia 31513  
Telephone 912 367-7781  
912 537-9444




Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant

December 6, 1984  
GM-84-1079

PLANT E. I. HATCH  
Licensee Event Report  
Docket No. 50-321

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Attached is Licensee Event Report No. 50-321/1984-023. This report is required by 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).

  
H. E. Nix  
General Manager

*JCC*  
HCN/TLE/vlz

xc: R. J. Kelly  
R. E. Conway  
J. T. Beckham, Jr.  
P. D. Rice  
K. M. Gillespie  
Superintendent of Regulatory Compliance  
R. D. Baker  
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Document Control

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