



Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379-2000

February 29, 1996

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Gentlemen:

In the Matter of)
Tennessee Valley Authority)

Docket No. 50-327

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - UNIT 1 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE
DF-77 - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) 3.7.12 - SPECIAL REPORT 96-01

The enclosed special report provides details concerning a Unit 2 auxiliary building pipe sleeve penetration that is nonfunctional as a fire barrier. This fire barrier was intentionally removed from service to facilitate the installation of a drain line through this penetration. The sleeve penetration was nonfunctional as a fire barrier for a time period greater than the TS allowable timeframe.

This report is being submitted in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a).

If you have any questions regarding this submittal, please telephone S. D. Gilley at (423) 843-7427.

Sincerely,

R. H. Shell
R. H. Shell

Enclosure
cc: See page 2

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cc (Enclosure):

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ENCLOSURE

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 96-01

Description of Condition

On January 31, 1996, the auxiliary building pipe sleeve, Mark No. 1860 (A), located on Floor Elevation 669 was breached. This fire barrier was intentionally removed from service to support the installation of a drain line through this penetration. The penetration was breached in excess of the technical specification (TS) allowable timeframe of seven days. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a).

Cause of Condition

The penetration was breached in order to install a 1-1/2 inch drain line through the penetration. This drain line was installed as part of a steam generator blowdown sample panel installation. Because of inclement weather in which nonessential personnel could not reach the site, the penetration was not resealed within the seven-day timeframe required by technical specifications.

Corrective Action

In accordance with Limiting Condition for Operation Action Statement 3.7.12(a), a roving fire watch was established after the fire detectors on one side of the penetration were verified operable. A roving fire watch was initiated and was maintained until the fire barrier was reestablished. The penetration was resealed and the fire barrier was reestablished on February 16, 1996.