

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 6 1 1	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)

## SPURIOUS TOXIC GAS ISOLATION SYSTEM (TGIS) ACTUATIONS

EVENT DATE (5)				LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQ. NUMBER	REV. NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER (8)	
11	01	84	84	0615	0011	12	98	14	SONGS UNIT 3	0 5 0 0 0 3 6 1 2	
THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)											
OPERATING MODE (9)		6		20.402(b)		20.405(c)		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)	
POWER LEVEL (10)		0 0 0		20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)	
				20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)	
				20.405(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)			
				20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)			
				20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)			

## LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
J. G. HAYNES, STATION MANAGER	7 1 1 4 4 9 2 - 7 7 0 0

## COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC

## SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

Abstract (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On November 1, 1984, at 0657, with Unit 2 in Mode 6 and Unit 3 in Mode 5, a spurious Toxic Gas Isolation System (TGIS) Train 'A' actuation occurred. Subsequent to this date, spurious Train 'A' actuations occurred on November 3, 8, 10, and 13. The Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup System (CREACUS) actuated as required. For each occurrence, the actuation was verified to be spurious by confirming that the meter indications on the TGIS panel were less than their respective setpoints, and TGIS was immediately reset. See also LERs 84-006, 012, 021, 026, 032, 037, 042, 052 and 055 (Docket No. 50-361).

Spurious TGIS actuations have been a recurring event, and have been the result of one or more of the following conditions: overly conservative alarm setpoints; electrical noise; rapid temperature and pressure changes; radio transmissions; vibration; and dust and dirt accumulation. Implementation of corrective actions has reduced the number of spurious TGIS actuations from an average of thirty for each of the two previous quarters to eight through this quarter.

There are no reasonable or credible circumstances which could have increased the severity of these events. Neither the health and safety of plant personnel nor the public were affected.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQ. NUMBER	REV. NUMBER		
SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 6 1	8 4	- 0 6 5	- 0 0	0 2	OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On November 1, 1984, at 0657, with Unit 2 in Mode 6 and Unit 3 in Mode 5, a spurious Toxic Gas Isolation System (TGIS) Train 'A' (EIIS System Identifier JF) actuation occurred. Subsequent to this date, spurious Train 'A' actuations occurred on November 3, 8, 10, and 13. The Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup System (CREACUS) (EIIS System Identifier VI) actuated as required. For each occurrence, the actuation was verified to be spurious by confirming that the meter indications on the TGIS panel were less than their respective setpoints, and TGIS was immediately reset. No plant systems or components failed as a result of these events. See also LERs 84-006, 012, 021, 026, 032, 037, 042, 052 and 055 (Docket No. 50-361).

Spurious TGIS actuations have been a recurring event, and have been the result of one or more of the following conditions: overly conservative alarm setpoints; electrical noise levels; rapid temperature and pressure changes; radio transmissions; vibration; and dust and dirt accumulation.

Several corrective actions were implemented in 1983 that were effective in reducing, but not eliminating, the spurious TGIS actuations. These actions include: sealing the door in the corridor housing the TGIS, which has reduced rapid temperature and pressure changes and dust accumulation; banning radios in the area; and reducing calibration and surveillance intervals on the TGIS analyzers. In September 1984, the time delay for the ammonia and carbon dioxide analyzers was increased, which has been effective in reducing the number of spurious actuations from an average of thirty for each of the two previous quarters to eight through this quarter. A proposed Technical Specification amendment was submitted on April 27, 1984, requesting more appropriate TGIS setpoints. This should further reduce the number of spurious actuations.

There are no reasonable or credible circumstances which could have increased the severity of these events. Neither the health and safety of plant personnel nor the public were affected.

*Southern California Edison Company*

**SCE**

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

P.O. BOX 128

SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA 92672

J. G. HAYNES  
STATION MANAGER

TELEPHONE  
(714) 492-7700

November 29, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Docket No. 50-361  
30 Day Report  
Licensee Event Report No. 84-065  
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), this submittal provides the required 30-day written Licensee Event Report (LER) for five occurrences involving the actuation of the Toxic Gas Isolation System (TGIS). Since these events involved shared systems between Units 2 and 3, these events have been combined into a single report in accordance with NUREG-1022. Neither the health and safety of plant personnel nor the public were affected by these events.

If you require any additional information, please so advise.

Sincerely,

*J. G. Haynes/HEM*

Enclosure: LER No. 84-065

cc: F. R. Huey (USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, Units 1, 2 and 3)  
J. P. Stewart (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 2 and 3)

J. B. Martin (Regional Administrator, NRC Region V)

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)

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