

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) EDWIN I. HATCH, UNIT II										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 6 6										PAGE (3) 1 OF 4																																										
TITLE (4) Failure to Fully Document Reactor Scrams																																																														
EVENT DATE (5)						LER NUMBER (6)						REPORT DATE (7)						OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)																																												
MONTH			DAY			YEAR			YEAR			SEQUENTIAL NUMBER			REVISION NUMBER			MONTH			DAY			YEAR			FACILITY NAMES						DOCKET NUMBER(S)																													
1			2			1			3			8			4			8			4			0			3			3			0			2			0			3			2			9			8			4			0 5 0 0 0					
OPERATING MODE (9) 1						THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																73.71(b)																																								
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 9 9						20.402(b)						20.406(c)						<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)						73.71(c)																																						
						20.406(a)(1)(i)						50.38(c)(1)						50.73(a)(2)(v)						73.71(c)																																						
						20.406(a)(1)(ii)						50.38(c)(2)						50.73(a)(2)(vii)						OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)																																						
						20.406(a)(1)(iii)						50.73(a)(2)(i)						50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)																																												
						20.406(a)(1)(iv)						50.73(a)(2)(ii)						50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)																																												
						20.406(a)(1)(v)						50.73(a)(2)(iii)						50.73(a)(2)(ix)																																												
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																																																														
NAME Steven B. Tipps, Superintendent of Regulatory Compliance																TELEPHONE NUMBER 9 1 2 3 6 7 - 7 8 5 1																																														
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																																																														
CAUSE		SYSTEM		COMPONENT		MANUFACTURER		REPORTABLE TO NRC				CAUSE		SYSTEM		COMPONENT		MANUFACTURER		REPORTABLE TO NRC																																										
X		B/H		R/L		Y		H/O		8/O		Y																																																		
X		A/D		S/I		C/G		O		8/O		Y																																																		
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)																EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH		DAY		YEAR																																								
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)																<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO																																														
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)																																																														
<p>This 30 day LER is required by 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) because these events show that the reactor protection system (RPS), which is an engineering safety feature (ESF), experienced unplanned actuations.</p> <p>On 09-30-84, a loss of condenser vacuum resulted in the closing of the turbine stop valves and a reactor scram.</p> <p>On 10/20/84, a reactor low water level condition caused an unplanned actuation of the RPS logic (i.e., not a scram because all of the control rods were still inserted after an earlier preplanned scram).</p> <p>On 11/17/84, a reactor recirculation pump (2P31-C001B) ran up to its high speed stop and caused a reactor scram.</p> <p>On 12/30/84, a MSR high level caused a reactor scram.</p> <p>Events 1 and 3 resulted from material failure. Event 2 was due to miscellaneous operating factors that happened at the same time which resulted in a reactor low water level condition (NOTE: See narrative for details). The cause of event 4 is unknown. In all 4 events, deficiency reports were not initiated in a timely manner as required by the "DEFICIENCY CONTROL SYSTEM" procedure (HNP-444).</p>																																																														
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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104  
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)  EDWIN I. HATCH, UNIT II	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0 5 0 0 0 3 6 6 8 4	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
			- 0 3 3	- 0 2 0	2	OF 0 4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

This 30 day LER is required by 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) because these events show that the reactor protection system (RPS), which is an engineering safety feature (ESF) experienced unplanned actuations. Additionally, the first, second, and third events were not reported (via an LER) within 30 days as required by 10CFR50.73(a)(1).

On 09/30/84, (i.e., the first event's date) at approximately 1145 CST, with the reactor operating at 2431 MWt (approximately 99% power), a loss in condenser vacuum resulted in the closing of the turbine stop valves and a reactor scram.

On 10/20/84, (i.e., the second event's date) at approximately 1317 CST, with reactor power at 0 MWt, following a pre-planned reactor scram at approximately 1211 CST, an unplanned logic actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) occurred due to a reactor low water level signal.

On 11-17-84, (i.e., the third event's date) at approximately 0013 CST, the reactor was in operation at a reduced power level of 1453 MWt (approximately 59% power) for the performance of the "TURBINE CONTROL VALVE FAST CLOSURE INSTRUMENT F.T" procedure (HNP-2-3007). At approximately 0400 CST reactor recirculation pump 2B31-C001B went into an overspeed condition and caused the reactor to scram.

On 12/30/84, (i.e., the fourth event's date), at approximately 1624 CST, with the reactor operating at 2436 MWt (100% power) a reactor scram occurred due to the "C" moisture separator reheater's having a high level. For each of these events 1 hour notification was made to the NRC.

During investigation of 1984 scrams, the senior STA discovered that neither the first nor the third event had been reported in a deficiency report as required by the "DEFICIENCY CONTROL SYSTEM" procedure (HNP-444); consequently, LER's were not previously submitted. He wrote a deficiency on 12/13/84 to document his findings.

The second event (i.e., the actuation of RPS) was not noted during the STA's investigation of 1984 scrams. The second event was documented in the "SCRAM/TRANSIENT RESPONSE" procedure (HNP-426) for scram number 2-84-6; however, the STA failed to note its inclusion due to its being obscured in HNP-426.

On 01/11/85, the plant's Senior Shift Technical Advisor notified Regulatory Compliance personnel that an unplanned reactor scram had occurred on 12/30/84 (i.e., the fourth event's date), and that a deficiency report had not been written as required by the "DEFICIENCY CONTROL SYSTEM" procedure (HNP-444). The required deficiency report was written on 01/11/85.

On 02/27/85, Quality Assurance personnel notified Regulatory Compliance personnel that an unplanned actuation of the RPS logic had occurred on 10/20/84 (i.e., the second event's date), and that a deficiency report had not been written as required by the "DEFICIENCY CONTROL SYSTEM" procedure (HNP-444). The required deficiency report was written on 02/27/85.

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104  
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)  EDWIN I. HATCH, UNIT II	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0 5 0 0 0 3 6 6 8 4	LER NUMBER (8)			PAGE (3)		
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 368A's) (17)

During an investigation of the first event, plant personnel determined that the off gas condenser (2N62-B002) had accumulated sufficient water to restrict the steam jet air ejector's discharge flow which resulted in a low condenser vacuum; consequently, the turbine stop valves closed and caused a reactor scram. After further investigation, plant personnel determined that the off gas condenser's moisture drain valve 2N62-F019A was not opening to drain accumulated moisture because the drain valve's solenoid power relay (2N62-K3) had failed. The off gas condenser's drain valve solenoid relay (2N62-K3a) was replaced, and the drain valve (2N62-F019A) was then satisfactorily functionally tested. Normal reactor startup began, and control rod withdrawal commenced on 09/30/84 at approximately 1950 CDT. This event is the result of component (2N62-K3) failure.

In the second event, reactor pressure increased to approximately 1027 psig due to decay heat with the MSIV's closed. The "A" SRV was manually opened coincident with having a half scram on high pressure. Reactor pressure was high enough to cause the low low set SRV's (i.e., "B", "D", "F", and "G") to lift. Reactor water level then decreased rapidly to approximately -20" (reference instrument zero) which resulted in the actuation of RPS logic (i.e., not a scram because all of the control rods were still inserted after the 1211 CST scram), and a group 2 isolation. Both HPCI and RCIC were manually initiated and injected to control reactor water level.

In the third event, the reactor recirculation pump's (2B21-C001B) motor generator scoop tube was locked in position for repair of the recirculation pump speed limit controller (2B31-K634B). After the speed limit controller was repaired, the recirculation pump's motor generator scoop tube was unlocked. At that time the reactor recirculation pump ran up to its high speed stop and caused the reactor to scram. After further investigation plant personnel determined that the percent speed demand indicator (2B31-R621-001B) was out of calibration and it was also giving a nonlinear indication. Operating personnel were relying on this indicator to accurately balance the motor generator's scoop tube position with the percent speed demand indicator's percent signal before unlocking the motor generator's scoop tube position. This resulted in the recirculation pump's overspeed which caused the reactor scram. The percent speed demand indicator was replaced and satisfactorily functionally tested per the "G.E. TYPE 180 INDICATOR" procedure (HNP-2-5233) on 11/17/84. This event is the result of component (2B31-R621-001b) failure.

In the fourth event, plant personnel observed that the purge flow for the MSR level instrumentation was at zero. Plant personnel then commenced to restore flow. The sudden increase in purge flow caused the transmitter to have a low tank level input which closed the normal and high level dump valves. The MSR level increased causing a turbine trip on "C" MSR high level and a reactor scram on turbine stop valve fast closure. The cause of the MSR high level was attributed to the high level dump valve positioner sticking, causing the high level dump valve to remain closed.

No actual or potential safety consequences or implications resulted from these events. These events had no impact on any other system in Unit 2, or Unit 1. The health and safety of the public were not affected by these non-repetitive events.

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)  EDWIN I. HATCH, UNIT II	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0500036684	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
			033	020	4	04

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

The "SCRAM/TRANSIENT RESPONSE" procedure (HNP-426) will be revised to ensure that deficiencies are written when unplanned scrams occur. Additionally, an investigation will be performed to assure that all RPS actuations from 01/01/84 to present have been, or will be, reported as required by 10CFR50.73.

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Georgia Power


Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant

March 29, 1985  
GM-85-244

PLANT E. I. HATCH  
Licensee Event Report  
Docket No. 50-366

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Attached is Licensee Event Report No. 50-366/1984-033, Rev. 2. This report is required by 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).

  
H. C. Nix  
General Manager

HCN/SBT/vlz

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