

February 20, 1996

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
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Subject: Arkansas Nuclear One - Units 1 and 2
Docket Nos. 50-313 & 50-368
License Nos. DPR-51 & NPF-6
Fitness-For-Duty Program Performance Data

Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10CFR26.71(d), attached is the Arkansas Nuclear One fitness-for-duty program performance data for the period of July-December 1995.

Very truly yours,



Dwight C. Mims
Director, Nuclear Safety

DCM/RMC
attachments

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U. S. NRC

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cc:

Mr. Leonard J. Callan
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region IV
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400
Arlington, TX 76011-8064

NRC Senior Resident
Arkansas Nuclear One
1448 S. R. 333
Russellville, AR 72801

Mr. George Kalman
NRR Project Manager, Region IV/ANO-1
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRR Mail Stop 13-H-3
One White Flint North
11555 Rockville Pike
Rockville, MD 20852

FITNESS FOR DUTY PROGRAM **PERFORMANCE DATA** **PERSONNEL SUBJECT TO 10CFR26**

Entergy Operations, Inc. - Arkansas Nuclear One Company	December 1995 6 Month Ending
1448 S. R. 333, Russellville, AR 72801-0137 Location	
Kenneth D. Jeffrey, Coordinator, FFD Contact Name	(501) 858-3253 Phone
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> Cutoffs: Screen/Confirmation (ng/ml) Marijuana 50/15 Amphetamine 1000/500 Cocaine 300/150 Phencyclidine 25/25 Opiates 300/300 Alcohol (%BAC) 0.04% </div> <div style="text-align: right;"> <input type="checkbox"/> Appendix A to 10CFR26 <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around; width: 100%;"> <div style="text-align: center;"> <div style="border-bottom: 1px solid black; width: 100px; margin: 0 auto;">N/A</div> <div style="text-align: center;">N/A</div> </div> <div style="text-align: center;"> <div style="border-bottom: 1px solid black; width: 100px; margin: 0 auto;">N/A</div> <div style="text-align: center;">N/A</div> </div> <div style="text-align: center;"> <div style="border-bottom: 1px solid black; width: 100px; margin: 0 auto;">N/A</div> <div style="text-align: center;">N/A</div> </div> </div> </div> </div>	

Testing Results	Licensee Employees		Long-Term Contractor Personnel		Short-Term Contractor Personnel	
Average Number with Unescorted Access	1347		N/A		576	
Categories	# Tested	# Positive	# Tested	# Positive	# Tested	# Positive
Pre-Access	44	0	N/A	N/A	918	10/4
For-Cause Post Accident	0	0	N/A	N/A	0	0
For-Cause Observed Behavior	4	2	N/A	N/A	3	1/0
Random	312	0	N/A	N/A	88	1/0
Follow-up	40	0	N/A	N/A	18	0
Other	0	0	N/A	N/A	0	0
Total	400	2	N/A	N/A	1027	12/4

BREAKDOWN OF CONFIRMED POSITIVE TESTS FOR SPECIFIC SUBSTANCES

	Marijuana	Cocaine	Opiates	Amphetamine	Phencyclidine	Alcohol	Refusal To Test	1	2	3	4	5	
Licensee Employees	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
Long-Term Contractors	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
Short-Term Contractors	4/4	1	0	4	0	3	1	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	A
Total	4/4	1	0	4	0	5	1	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	19

SUMMARY OF MANAGEMENT ACTIONS

General Information

During the period July through December 1995, the average population granted unescorted access to Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) was 1923. During this period a total of 400 random tests were performed which represents a testing rate of 20.8%. Combined with testing statistics documented for the first six-month period of 1995, the yearly average population granted unescorted access to ANO was 2090. For the year, 1197 random tests were performed resulting in a yearly random testing rate of 57.3%.

On July 7, 1995, it was discovered that a June 28, 1995, software upgrade to the random number generator contained an error in the software code. The error caused the failure of the software program to activate into the selection pool all individuals with unescorted access to the ANO protected area. Upon discovery of the error, the individuals granted unescorted access to the ANO protected area were manually placed into the random selection pool. The software vendor was contacted and corrections were made to the software code.

On July 26, 1995, an ANO maintenance worker was called out to work by his supervisor during the evening shift. During the callout conversation the maintenance worker informed the supervisor that he had consumed alcohol within the preceding five hours and the supervisor requested that he report to work, if possible. Upon arrival at ANO, the maintenance worker did not notify ANO security that he had consumed alcohol within the past five hours as required, and was issued his security badge. However, prior to the individual entering the protected area, an alert security officer detected the odor of alcohol and blocked his entry. The maintenance worker stated that he did not need to enter the plant if he could make a telephone call. While discussing options for corrective action, the maintenance worker left site before a breath test was performed. A condition report identifying the incident was issued, a root cause evaluation performed and corrective actions implemented. Some of the completed corrective actions included counseling of the maintenance worker and supervisor, Quality Assurance performed a surveillance and determined that the overall knowledge level of supervisors of FFD program requirements was adequate and enhancements to the FFD program were completed to provide assurance that this type incident did not recur.

On August 2, 1995, a for-cause drug test was performed on a contract employee following an off-site drug related arrest. The contract individual's access was temporarily suspended pending the final test result which was subsequently confirmed positive for THC. This individual's unescorted access has been suspended for a minimum of three years.

On September 1, 1995, a for-cause drug test was performed on a contract painter who inadvertently stepped on sensitive plant equipment causing the trip of ANO Unit 2. The individual's unescorted access was temporarily suspended pending receipt of the final test result which was subsequently determined to be negative. The individual's unescorted access was subsequently reinstated.

On September 11, 1995, a for-cause drug test was performed on an ANO employee at the request of the employee's supervisor. The employee's breath and blood tests were positive for alcohol. The employee's unescorted access to the protected area was suspended pending completion of the Employee Assistance Program (EAP) evaluation recommendations. The employee's unescorted access has been reinstated and the employee participates in the follow-up drug testing program.

On September 28, 1995, a for-cause drug test was performed on a contract employee who was involved in a near miss industrial type accident outside of the protected area. The drug test was negative.

On October 1, 1995, the odor of alcohol was detected on a licensee employee as he was entering the protected area. Security was notified who in turn notified the employee's supervisor. The supervisor observed the employee and requested a for-cause breath test which was positive for alcohol. The employee's unescorted access to the protected area was temporarily suspended pending an evaluation and recommendations for improvement by the EAP provider. On October 2, 1995, during the administration of the MMPI test, the odor of alcohol was detected on this same employee. A for-cause breath test was administered and was negative. The employee was not allowed to complete the MMPI test and was instructed to return on October 3, 1995, to take the test. On October 3, 1995, the employee returned to take the MMPI and once again the odor of alcohol was detected. A for-cause breath test was administered and was negative. At the request of the EAP provider, the employee was placed under observation and breath tested until his alcohol level was zero. The employee then completed the MMPI and EAP evaluation. The employee has subsequently returned to work and was placed in the follow-up drug testing program.

On October 17, 1995, a contract employee who was selected for random drug testing failed to report to ANO Medical for the test. The employee's unescorted access to the protected area was subsequently denied.

It was discovered on December 7 and 12, 1995, that two individuals with unescorted access to the protected area had not been included in the random drug testing selection pool. An investigation revealed that due to a personnel error, two contract employees had not been entered into the Security Qualification and Tracking System (SQTS). SQTS is the population vehicle used for random drug testing selection. Corrective actions included immediately adding the individuals to the SQTS database and counseling the personnel involved to follow established procedures.

Program Initiatives

Enhancements to the FFD data management program were implemented that combined data entry into the ANO access authorization SQTS data base and into the Integrated Nuclear Data Exchange (INDEX) from a single data entry point.

Appeals

No appeals occurred during this reporting period.

NRC Reportable Events

On July 26, 1995, ANO reported via telephone to the NRC Operations Center that a licensee employee who occasionally serves as a supervisor in the role of a Temporary Foreman had been arrested for public intoxication and could not report for scheduled work. The incident was conservatively reported per 10CFR26.73(a)(2)(iv).

On September 15, 1995, ANO reported via telephone to the NRC Operations Center that a contract employee had been granted unescorted access to the ANO protected area with a screened positive drug test that had not been reviewed by the ANO Medical Review Officer (MRO). Upon discovery of the error, the contract employee was escorted off-site and the employee's unescorted access was temporarily suspended. The MRO determined that the screened positive drug test was due to legally prescribed medications and ruled that the drug test was negative. The contract employee's unescorted access was subsequently reinstated. Further details and corrective actions performed are documented in ANO letter 0CAN109501 dated October 10, 1995 (Safeguards Event Report 95-SO2).