

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Dresden Nuclear Power Station Unit 3										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 4 9 1 OF 0 2				PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2			
TITLE (4) Torus Water Sample Line Found Open																	
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)							
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME			DOCKET NUMBER(S)					
0 3	0 2	8 5	8 5	0 0 7	0 0	0 3	2 6	8 5	N/A			0 5 0 0 0					
										N/A			0 5 0 0 0				
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11)															
N		20.402(b)				20.406(e)				90.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)			
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.406(a)(1)(i)				90.38(a)(1)				90.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(e)			
0 9 8		20.406(a)(1)(ii)				90.38(a)(2)				90.73(a)(2)(vi)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 306A)			
		20.406(a)(1)(iii)				90.73(a)(2)(i)				90.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)							
		20.406(a)(1)(iv)				90.73(a)(2)(ii)				90.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)							
		20.406(a)(1)(v)				90.73(a)(2)(iii)				90.73(a)(2)(x)							
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																	
NAME Tim Wojtulewicz (X-529)										TELEPHONE NUMBER 8 1 5 9 4 2 - 2 9 2 0							
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																	
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC							
A				N													
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR	
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)												X NO					

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

During normal unit operation, the Shift Foreman discovered two normally closed torus water sample valves open. Torus water was draining through these valves into the west corner room sump via a length of 3/8 inch reinforced tygon tubing. Unit 3 torus water is sampled from the minimum flow line of the emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) jockey pump. The valves were immediately closed and later locked closed. This event was a violation of primary containment integrity Technical Specification 3.7.A.2. The cause of this event was personnel error, however, it is not known who opened the valves. Torus water sampling procedures will be changed to reflect the existence of locks; an Operator will be in attendance to unlock these valves when this sample is pulled, and close and lock them after the sample is taken. A walkdown of accessible portions of ECCS systems will be performed to determine if locks must be added to other locations. This event was of minimal safety significance since torus level was being maintained within the Technical Specification limits. Also, the sample flow occurred below the torus water level through a small fitting directly to a sump inside the secondary containment. Similar occurrence reported by R.O. #85-9 on Docket #050249.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3	0 5 0 0 0 2 4 9	8 5	0 0 7	0 0	0 2	OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 368A's) (17)

During normal unit operation, the Shift Foreman discovered two normally closed torus water sample valves open. Torus water was draining through these valves into the west corner room sump via a length of 3/8 inch reinforced tygon tubing. Unit 3 torus water is sampled from the minimum flow line of the ECCS jockey pump. The valves were immediately closed and later locked closed. This event was a violation of primary containment integrity Technical Specification 3.7.A.2.

An investigation into the cause of this event produced the following facts: The 3B reactor building floor drain sump integrator log indicated increased pumpage on Shift 2 of March 1, which indicates that the valves were probably opened late Shift 3 on February 28 or early Shift 1 on March 1st. The last monthly torus water sample (DCP 1600-10) was taken on February 11, 1985 and another was not required until March 11th. Average per shift pumpage indicates that these valves were not left open since February 11th. The sampling of the containment cooling service water (CCSW) also requires that a Radiation Chemistry Technician (RCT) performs valving in this area. However, none of the CCSW samples taken indicate activity of the magnitude of torus water. This fact indicates that an RCT could not have pulled samples at the wrong location. The RCT who pulled the CCSW sample on February 28 indicates that he properly pulled the sample. A thorough walkdown of all ECCS systems in the area showed no other abnormalities; therefore the reason for the valves being opened is personnel error. The Station Security Administrator was involved in the investigation.

Torus water sampling procedures will be changed (DCP 1600-9 and 10) to reflect the existence of locks on Units 2 and 3. The Unit 2 torus sample location will be changed to the jockey pump minimum flow line instead of the torus drain line. Operating checklists will be changed to reflect the existence of locks. A walkdown of accessible portions of ECCS systems will be performed to determine if other valves require independent verification.

This event was of minimal safety significance since torus water level was being maintained within the Technical Specification limits. Also, the sample flow occurred through a small 3/8 inch fitting directly to the corner room submersible pump sump. Each corner room sump has two pumps; each pump can deliver an estimated 70 gpm at 45 feet of discharge head. Rough calculations indicate that a maximum of 40 gpm could be blown down through this flow path from the torus during a design basis accident. This water would be pumped into the reactor building floor drain sump in the torus basement which is inside secondary containment. TMI modifications have required that the reactor building floor drain sumps cannot be pumped during a Group 2 isolation, therefore all sump inputs would remain within secondary containment. The flood protection for the LPCI and core spray pumps also would remain intact since the capacity of the sump pumps exceed the maximum postulated leakage through the open torus water sample valves. In addition the sample line is below the torus water level which eliminated a possible gaseous release. Similar occurrence was reported by R.O. #85-9 on Docket #050249.



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DJS Ltr #85-341

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
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Licensee Event Report #85-007-0, Docket #050249 is being submitted as required by Technical Specification 6.6, NUREG 1022 and 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B).

D.J. Scott
Station Manager
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

DJS/kjl

Enclosure

cc: J.G. Keppeler, Regional Administrator, Region III
File/NRC
File/Numerical

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