

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Joseph M. Farley - Unit 1										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 4 8 1					PAGE (3) OF 0 2	
TITLE (4) Unsealed Gaps Above Masonry Fire Walls																
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)						
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)			
0 2	1 4	8 5	8 5	0 0 1	0 0	0 3	2 2	8 5	J. M. Farley -Unit 2				0 5 0 0 0 3 6 4			
OPERATING MODE (9) 1			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENT OF 10 CFR 8: (Check one or more of the following) (11)													
POWER LEVEL (10) 1 1 0 1 0			20.402(b)				20.405(c)				50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)	
			20.405(a)(1)(i)				50.36(c)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)	
			20.405(a)(1)(ii)				50.36(c)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)	
			20.405(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)				Report per Tech. Spec. 3.7.12	
			20.405(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)					
			20.405(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(ix)					
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																
NAME J. D. Woodard										TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 2 0 1 5 8 9 1 9 1 - 1 5 1 1 5 1 6						
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC						
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)												<input type="checkbox"/> NO		0 5	0 1	8 5
ABSTRACT (16) 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines (16)																

Gaps along portions of the tops of two fire walls were not sealed within seven days as required by Technical Specification 3.7.12. At approximately 1500 on 2-14-85 it was discovered that unsealed gaps existed between the tops of two masonry fire walls and the ceilings of the rooms. These gaps were located above portions of the west wall of the cable spreading room of both Unit 1 and Unit 2. Design drawings showed that these gaps should have had steel angle running on both sides of the gap with the steel angle anchored to the ceiling and RTV sealant between the steel angle and the wall. The design was not implemented fully due to physical constraints. At the time of installation, engineering evaluations had been performed to justify the absence of the steel angle. However, these evaluations were based on structural considerations and did not address fire protection considerations.

A plantwide walkdown of three-hour rated masonry fire walls revealed eighteen unsealed gaps at the tops of fire walls. Firewatch patrols were established as required in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.12. Design changes are being developed for sealing these gaps. A supplemental report will be provided when the implementation schedule is available. Health/safety of the public was not affected.

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
Joseph M. Farley - Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 3 4 8 8 5	—	0 0 1	— 0 0	0 2	OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 368A's) (17)

Gaps along portions of the tops of two fire walls were not sealed within seven days as required by Technical Specification 3.7.12. At approximately 1500 on 2-14-85 it was discovered that unsealed gaps existed between the tops of two masonry fire walls and the ceilings of the rooms. These gaps are located above portions of the west wall of the cable spreading room of both Unit 1 and Unit 2. The gaps between the wall and the ceiling ranged from less than one-half inch to two inches in height.

It was not possible to close the gaps found on 2-14-85 per the original design because the tops of the walls were inaccessible. A review of design documents indicated that these gaps should have had steel angle running on both sides of the gap with the steel angle anchored to the ceiling and RTV sealant between the steel angle and the wall. Further investigation revealed that the gap between the wall and ceiling existed for seismic considerations and that the purpose of the steel angle was to limit horizontal movement of the wall during a seismic event. The absence of the steel angle was approved by the design organization. However, this approval was based on structural considerations. The design organization was not able to determine the basis for accepting this design as a three-hour rated fire wall.

Design changes to modify the Farley Nuclear Plant masonry walls to be in compliance with IE Bulletin 80-11 were issued by the design organization in 1980. Design procedures in effect at that time required the design organization to review any design changes for conformance to ANSI N45.2.11 which requires the design review to include the effect of the design change on fire protection and fire resistance. A review of design records does not indicate that fire protection considerations were addressed in the review of the design changes for the interface between the wall and the ceiling. The design for this interface was part of the original design of the walls.

In December 1983, APCo issued instructions to the design organization to provide further assurance that fire protection and fire resistance was evaluated for each design change. These instructions require the designer to determine, as a part of each safety evaluation checklist, if the Fire Protection Program Reevaluation or Appendix R requirements are affected. This action provides increased assurance that design changes will be evaluated for their adequacy relative to fire protection and resistance.

When it was determined that the design did not meet the requirements for a three-hour rated fire wall, a plantwide walkdown of three-hour rated masonry fire walls was initiated. This walkdown was completed on 2-21-85 and found eighteen unsealed gaps at the tops of masonry firewalls. Firewatch patrols were established as required in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.12.

Designs are currently being developed to upgrade affected walls to three-hour fire wall status. An implementation schedule will be developed when the new designs are available. A supplemental report will be provided when the implementation schedule is available.

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R. P. McDonald  
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March 22, 1985

Docket No. 348


Document Control Desk  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Licensee Event Report No. LER 85-001-00 is forwarded in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.12 requirements to provide 30 day written notification of the occurrence.

If you have any questions, please advise.

Yours very truly,



R. P. McDonald

RPM/DSM:sam

Enclosure

xc: IE, Region II

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11