

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)

LaSalle County Station

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

050003741 OF 03

PAGE 13

TITLE (4)

VR Isolation Damper Closure on Wrong Unit

EVENT DATE (6)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
10	29	84	84	072	00	11	26	84	Unit 1		05000373
											05000

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §. (Check one or more of the following) (11)

OPERATING MODE (9)	20.402(b)	20.405(a)(1)(i)	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	20.405(a)(1)(v)	20.406(e)	30.36(a)(1)	30.36(a)(2)	30.73(a)(2)(i)	30.73(a)(2)(ii)	30.73(a)(2)(iii)	30.73(a)(2)(iv)	30.73(a)(2)(v)	30.73(a)(2)(vi)	30.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)	30.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)	30.73(a)(2)(ix)	73.71(b)	73.71(e)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 385A)
1										X											
POWER LEVEL (10)	17.3																				

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Charles K. Sprunger, extension 779	AREA CODE 815 357-6761

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC
A	V1A	Z1Z1Z1Z	Z1Z1Z1Z	N					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
	X				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 10/29/84 at 1952 hours an Equipment Attendant closed the Unit 2 Reactor Building isolation dampers instead of the Unit 1 Reactor Building isolation dampers as instructed. This caused Unit 2 Reactor Building Ventilation System to trip and for a period of one minute, all ventilation in the Reactor Building was shutdown. Secondary Containment was required and Reactor Building differential pressure was restored within the time clock allowed by the Technical Specifications. The Unit 2 dampers were reopened and the Unit 2 Reactor Building Ventilation system was restarted at 1953 hours.

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)  LaSalle County Station	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0 5 0 0 0 3 7 4	LER NUMBER (4)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		8 4	— 0 7 2	— 0 0 0	2	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 386A's) (17)

I. EVENT DESCRIPTION

On 10/29/84 at 1952 hours an Equipment Attendant (nonlicensed operator) closed the Unit 2 Reactor Building Ventilation (VA, VR) isolation dampers 2VR04YB and 2VR05YA. This caused the Unit 2 Reactor Building Ventilation system to shutdown. The Equipment Attendant had been instructed to open the Unit 1 Reactor Building Ventilation dampers 1VR04YA, 1VR04YB, 1VR05YA, and 1VR05YB but inadvertently closed dampers on the other unit. The Unit 2 dampers were reopened and the Unit 2 Reactor Building Ventilation system was restarted at 1953 hours.

II. CAUSE

At the time of the incident Unit 1 was in cold shutdown and Unit 2 was in the "Run" mode at 73% power. The Reactor Building differential pressure with respect to outdoors was being maintained by Unit 2 VR. Unit 1 VR had been shutdown so that LaSalle Operating Procedure LOP-RP-01 could be performed. This was used so electrical power could be transferred from Reactor Protection System (EE, RPS) "B" Motor Generator Set to Alternate Power. As a precaution against momentarily losing power to Unit 1 RPS the Unit 1 VR system was shutdown and secondary containment isolation dampers 1VR04YA, 1VR04YB, 1VR05YA, and 1VR05YB closed. If power were to be momentarily lost to the damper actuators during the transfer the isolation dampers would fail closed and shut.

After the power had been successfully transferred the Unit 1 Control Room Operator (NSO) instructed an Equipment Attendant (EA) to open the Unit 1 VR isolation dampers so the system could be restarted. The EA inadvertently went to the Unit 2 isolation damper control panel 2PL27JB located in the Auxiliary Building (NF) and closed dampers 2VR04YB and 2VR05YA. The dampers promptly closed shut causing Unit 2 VR to shutdown. The EA still in the Auxiliary Building called the NSO who informed him that he had closed the dampers on Unit 2 instead of opening the dampers on Unit 1. The NSO told the EA to open the Unit 2 dampers and then go over to the Unit 1 isolation damper control panel and open the Unit 1 dampers. The EA opened the Unit 2 dampers and Unit 2 VR was restarted at 1953 hours. The EA then went over to the Unit 1 VR damper control panels 1PL27JA and 1PL27JB and opened dampers 1VR04YA, 1VR04YB, 1VR05YA, and 1VR05YB as originally instructed. Unit 1 VR was then started up at approximately 2000 hours.

III. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCES

Unit 1 and Unit 2 VR systems are normally both in operation maintaining the Reactor Building (NG) at a negative pressure with respect to the outdoors. The two systems share the common area of the Refueling Floor so if one system is shutdown the other will maintain the proper building differential pressure.

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

III. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCES (continued from Page 2)

Secondary Containment was required at the time of the incident. Unit 1 VR was shutdown and Unit 2 VR was running maintaining the proper building differential pressure. When Unit 2 VR was inadvertently shutdown for a period of approximately one minute, the Reactor Building differential pressure became less negative. However the proper differential pressure was restored in less than one hour as required by Technical Specifications 4.6.5.1.a.#. This incident would not be expected to be worse under other plant conditions.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The Unit 2 VR isolation dampers were reopened in less than a minute after they were closed. The Unit 2 VR system was restarted approximately one minute after it tripped.

The station initiated an investigation and determined the incident was the result of an error made by the Equipment Attendant when he closed the dampers on the wrong unit. The damper control panels were labeled correctly and did not contribute to the error made.

V. PREVIOUS EVENTS

None.

VI. NAME AND TELEPHONE NUMBER OF THE PREPARER

Charles K. Sprunger, 815/357-6761, extension 779.



**Commonwealth Edison**  
LaSalle County Nuclear Station  
Rural Route #1, Box 220  
Marseilles, Illinois 61341  
Telephone 815/357-6761

November 27, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

Reportable Occurrence Report #84-072-00, Docket #050-374 is being submitted to your office in accordance with 10CFR 50.73.

G. J. Diederich  
Superintendent  
LaSalle County Station

GJD/MLD/lrw

Enclosure

xc: NRC, Regional Director  
INPO-Repords Center  
File/NRC

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