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C. K. McCoy
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January 26, 1996

LCV-0738-A

Docket No. 50-424
50-425

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Ladies and Gentlemen:

**VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT
REPLY TO A NOTICE OF VIOLATION**

Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, Georgia Power Company submits the enclosed information for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) in response to violations identified in Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspection Reports 50-424,425/95-29, which documents the inspection conducted from November 27, 1995, through December 1, 1995.

Should you have any questions feel free to contact this office.

Sincerely,

C.K. McCoy
C. K. McCoy

CKM

Enclosure: Reply to NOV 50-424,425/ 95-29-01, -02, -03

cc: Georgia Power Company
Mr. J. B. Beasley, Jr.
Mr. M. Sheibani
NORMS

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mr. S. D. Ebnetter, Regional Administrator
Mr. L. L. Wheeler, Licensing Project Manager, NRR
Mr. C. L. Ogle, Senior Resident Inspector, Vogtle

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ENCLOSURE

VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 REPLY TO A NOTICE OF VIOLATION NRC INSPECTION REPORTS (50-424;425/ 95-29)

VIOLATION A, (50-424;425/ 95-29-01)

The following is a transcription of the violation A as cited in the Notice of Violation (NOV):

"During the NRC safeguards inspection conducted on November 27 - December 1, 1995, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the 'General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions,' (60 FR 34381; June 30, 1995), a violation is listed below:

- A. 10 CFR 73.70(e) states that documentation of all routine security tours and inspections, and of all tests, inspections and maintenance performed . . . shall be retained by the licensee for three years.

The site Physical Security Plan, Paragraph 5.6.1. requires records of Maintenance and Testing of physical barriers and lighting be maintained onsite. Paragraph 5.7.5.D and Paragraph 6.8, require Maintenance and Testing records be retained for three years.

Security Procedure 90105-C, Paragraph 4.3.3 requires the retention of Maintenance and Testing documents for three years.

Contrary to the above, during a random review of testing and maintenance documents, four quarterly inspection documents were not retained.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement III)."

RESPONSE TO VIOLATION A, (50-424;425/ 95-29-01)

Admission or Denial of the Violation:

This violation occurred as stated in the notice of violation.

Reason for the Violation:

This violation was a result of personnel error.

A VEGP administrative assistant at the Document Control records retention facility, in the process of identifying security maintenance and testing documents for destruction, inadvertently listed the four cited quarterly inspection documents as available to be destroyed. These security documents along with other similar type security documents were routinely stored in a common folder, regardless of the age of the documents. The administrative assistant failed to follow the applicable procedure concerning proper identification and destruction of documents and did not closely examine all of the documents in the folder. Subsequently the current as well as the expired quarterly inspection documents were listed as available to be destroyed.

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Corrective Steps Which Have Been Taken and the Results Achieved:

1. All VEGP Document Control Department administrative assistants have been counseled on the proper destruction of documents and the applicable procedural requirements.
2. A filing method has been established at VEGP for storing security documents in order of date received, with each year's respective documents filed together and labeled accordingly.

Corrective Steps Which Will Be Taken to Avoid Further Violations:

Other security documents identified on the original document destruction list, will be examined to verify that no documents were inadvertently listed that should not be destroyed. Estimated completion date is March 1, 1996.

Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved:

Full compliance was achieved on January 15, 1996, when a "Records Correction Notice", documenting that the four quarterly inspections were conducted, was placed in the records retention file.

VIOLATION B, (50-424;425/ 95-29-02)

The following is a transcription of the violation B as cited in the Notice of Violation (NOV):

"During the NRC safeguards inspection conducted on November 27 - December 1, 1995, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the 'General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions,' (60 FR 34381; June 30, 1995), a violation is listed below:

- B. 10 CFR 73.21(d) (1) and (2) states that Safeguards Information shall be under the control of an authorized individual while in use. While unattended, Safeguards Information shall be stored in a locked security storage container.

Contrary to the above, on October 14, 1995, an unsecured and unattended Safeguards Information container was found in the Vogtle Project fileroom at the Southern Company Services office in Birmingham, Alabama. Container logs indicated that the container had been unsecured for 11 days.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement III)."

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RESPONSE TO VIOLATION B, (50-424;425/ 95-29-02)

Admission or Denial of the Violation:

This violation occurred as stated in the notice of violation.

Reason for the Violation:

The violation was a result of personnel error.

The safeguards information (SGI) container custodian, an employee of VEGP's design architect/engineer (A/E) failed to close and lock the SGI container on October 3, 1995, when it was last logged as being opened. No log entry for the SGI container closure was made or verified until the container was discovered unsecured and unattended on October 14, 1995. The responsible individual was trained and fully cognizant of the requirements for proper SGI control and securing SGI containers.

Corrective Steps Which Have Been Taken and the Results Achieved:

1. An inventory of the unsecured SGI container was conducted on October 14, 1995, with no discrepancies noted and the container was properly secured.
2. A review of the container and its contents was conducted on October 16, 1995. No signs of forced entry or tampering could be detected. A review of the SGI information determined it would not have significantly assisted an individual in radiological sabotage or provided information that would have allowed unauthorized and undetected access to the protected or vital areas.
3. The responsible individual has been counseled on the procedural requirements for properly securing SGI containers. Additionally, other applicable design A/E employees have been made cognizant of this incident to heighten their awareness of handling and securing SGI containers properly.
4. Design A/E procedures have been revised to require independent verification for each SGI container access in order to assure that SGI containers are properly secured.
5. A new policy has been established for appropriate design A/E personnel to routinely verify SGI containers are properly secured at the close of each business work day.

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Corrective Steps Which Will Be Taken to Avoid Further Violations:

An independent assessment will be performed by the licensee's quality assurance department by June 30, 1996, to assure corrective actions have been adequately implemented.

Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved:

Full compliance was achieved on October 14, 1995, when the SGI container was properly secured and the audit of the container's inventory showed no discrepancies.

VIOLATION C, (50-424; 425/ 95-29-03)

The following is a transcription of the violation C as cited in the Notice of Violation (NOV):

"During the NRC inspection conducted on November 27 - December 1, 1995, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the 'General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions,' (60 FR 34381; June 30, 1995), the violation is listed below:

- C. 10 CFR 73.56 (b) (1) states that the licensee shall establish and maintain an access authorization program granting individuals unescorted access to protected and vital areas with the objective of providing high assurance that individuals granted unescorted access are trustworthy and reliable, and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the public including a potential to commit radiological sabotage.

Contrary to the above, on November 16, 1995, an individual, who had been on administrative hold and his access badge deactivated because of behavioral problems, was granted unescorted access to the site. His badge was reactivated granting him unescorted access to the protected and vital areas. The purpose of granting him access was to inform him within the protected area that his employment at the site was terminated.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement III)."

RESPONSE TO VIOLATION C, (50-424;425/ 95-29-03)

Admission or Denial of the Violation:

Georgia Power Company admits the violation with the following clarification noted. Although the individual was given access to the Protected Area (PA) by reactivating his unescorted access

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authorization badge, in order to assure the individual did not pose a security risk, the individual was accompanied at all times by a security department supervisor and made no entry to any Vital Areas (VA).

Reason for the Violation:

Georgia Power Company agrees that a strict interpretation of the plant procedure was not met when the individual was given his unescorted access authorization badge to enter the PA for employment termination. However, Georgia Power Company believes the intent of the regulation was met and that no access authorization program weaknesses exist. Georgia Power Company personnel did not interpret site procedures or federal regulations to require denial of PA access, whether escorted or unescorted, for individuals terminated for work performance problems. Nor did Georgia Power Company interpret the PA entry of this individual as Georgia Power Company granting unescorted access since the individual was continuously accompanied by a security department supervisor while inside the PA. The termination process for this individual was not the typical VEGP employment termination process described in procedures. This individual was allowed inside the PA only after a thorough management deliberation which decided that this was the best method for termination of this particular individual. Management concluded that the individual's PA entry would not constitute an unreasonable risk to the immediate or future health and safety of the public and/or plant employees. Therefore, on November 16, 1995, the individual was processed through PESB metal and explosive detection equipment which assured the individual was unarmed and proceeded inside the PA while continuously accompanied by a security department supervisor. The individual was informed of his termination, was allowed to gather personal belongings, made no VA entries, exited out of the PA, and left the VEGP site later that day without incident.

Corrective Steps That Have Been Taken and Results Achieved

The individual who was allowed PA access in order to be terminated on November 16, 1995, exited out of the PA and his badge was promptly deactivated.

Corrective Steps That Will Be Taken To Avoid Further Violations

In order to assure strict compliance of access authorization requirements associated with terminations "for-cause" in the future, applicable management and access authorization implementation personnel have been made aware of this violation and it's implications for compliance with requirements of 10 CFR 73.56.

Date When Full Compliance Achieved

Full compliance was achieved on November 16, 1995, when the terminated individual exited the PA and his associated badge was deactivated.