

OPPD

Omaha Public Power District
1623 Harney Omaha, Nebraska 68102
402/536-4000

November 27, 1984
LIC-84-408

Mr. Robert D. Martin
Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region IV
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
Arlington, TX 76011

Reference: Docket No. 50-285

Dear Mr. Martin:

IE Bulletin 84-03,
Refueling Water Cavity Seal

On August 29, 1984, the Omaha Public Power District received the subject Bulletin which described the failure of the refueling cavity water seal at the Haddam Neck plant. The Bulletin requested each recipient evaluated the potential for and consequences of a refueling cavity water seal failure and provide a summary report of the evaluation by: 1. August 31, 1984 if refueling was in progress when the Bulletin was received or; 2. prior to beginning refueling or within 90 days of receipt of the Bulletin, whichever was sooner.

The District has completed the requested evaluation and the results are presented in Attachment 1. Because the District received the bulletin forty-seven (47) days after startup from the 1984 Refueling Outage at Fort Calhoun, the response is hereby provided 90 days after receipt of the Bulletin.

This response is submitted under oath or affirmation under provisions of Section 182a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

Sincerely,



R. L. Andrews
Division Manager
Nuclear Production

8412050175 841127
PDR ADOCK 05000285
Q PDR

RLA/dao

Attachment

cc: LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae
1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

Mr. E. G. Tourigny
Mr. L. A. Yandell


IE 11
1/1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

In the Matter of)
)
Omaha Public Power District) Docket No. 50-285
(Fort Calhoun Station,)
Unit No. 1))

AFFIDAVIT


R. L. Andrews, being duly sworn, hereby deposes and says that he is Division Manager - Nuclear Production of the Omaha Public Power District; that he is duly authorized to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission the attached response to IE Bulletin 84-03 dated August 24, 1984; that he is familiar with the content thereof; and that the matters set forth therein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.




R. L. Andrews
Division Manager
Nuclear Production

STATE OF NEBRASKA)
) ss
COUNTY OF DOUGLAS)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public in and for the State of Nebraska on this 28th day of November, 1984.




Notary Public

ATTACHMENT 1

Action to be Taken by Plants Currently in Refueling:

1. Evaluate the potential for and consequences of a refueling cavity water seal failure and provide a summary report of these actions by August 31, 1984.

District Response

This time frame was not applicable to OPPD because the Bulletin was received forty-seven (47) days after scartup from the 1984 refueling outage at Fort Calhoun.

Action to be Taken by Plants Prior to Beginning Refueling or Within 90 Days of Receipt of this Bulletin, Whichever is Sooner:

2. Evaluate the potential for and consequences of a refueling cavity water seal failure and provide a summary report of these actions.

District Response

Drawings of the Fort Calhoun reactor cavity water seal demonstrate that it is significantly different than the type of seal discussed in this Bulletin. Figure 1 is a sketch of the Fort Calhoun seal arrangement and shows that rather than an (active) inflatable pneumatic seal, it has four concentric grooves in which continuous silicon rubber gasket rings are compressed by a stainless steel ring bolted into place to form the seal (a passive seal). This figure demonstrates that a gross failure of the type discussed in this Bulletin is impossible based on our engineering judgment. Due to the configuration of the Fort Calhoun passive seal, and the presence of the two compressed gasket rings at each pressure boundary, it is apparent that leakage would be negligible in the event of a faulty gasket ring. To further ensure a positive seal, these gasket rings are replaced each outage and are inspected for leakage as soon as filling of the upper cavity is commenced.

Therefore, since the Fort Calhoun refueling cavity seal is a passive seal and significantly different than the seal discussed in IE Bulletin 84-03, gross failure of the type discussed in this Bulletin is impossible. This completes the District's action in response to IE Bulletin 84-03.

FIGURE 1

