

TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY
SKYWAY TOWER * 400 NORTH OLIVE STREET, L.B. 81 * DALLAS, TEXAS 75201

BILLY R. CLEMENTS
VICE PRESIDENT, NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

November 19, 1984
TXX-4364

Mr. D.R. Hunter, Chief
Reactor Project Branch 2
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
Arlington, TX 76012

Docket No.: 50-445
50-446

COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION
ROSEMOUNT TRANSMITTERS
QA FILE: CP-84-28, SDAR-153
FILE NO.: 10110

Dear Mr. Hunter:

In accordance with 10CFR50.55(e), we are submitting the enclosed report of actions taken to correct a deficiency regarding transmitters which could have a potential leakage path between the sensor module and housing which could cause the transmitters to be inoperable. We have submitted an interim report logged TXX-4334 dated October 12, 1984.

Supporting documentation is available at the CPSES site for your Inspector's review.

Very truly yours,

Billy R. Clements

BRC:tlg

Attachment

cc: NRC Region IV - (0 + 1 copy)

Director, Inspection & Enforcement (15 copies)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

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A DIVISION OF TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC COMPANY

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ATTACHMENT

ROSEMOUNT TRANSMITTERS

Description

During a periodic quality audit, the supplier (Rosemount) of pressure transmitters identified a potential leakage path in the seal of the threads between the sensor module and the electronics housing. As a result of this concern, additional production units were leak tested. Based upon the failures observed in these tests, the supplier notified TUGCO as required under the provisions 10CFR Part 21.

The leak path could allow moisture from the ambient surrounding environment to enter the electronics housing during abnormal operating conditions. This moisture could result in a malfunction of the transmitter.

The transmitters are installed in the post-accident sampling system which provides system monitoring during and after accident conditions.

Safety Implications

In the event the conditions had remained undetected, the ability of the operator to monitor system performance under accident conditions could not be assured.

Corrective Action

The above conditions and affected instruments have been documented on site non-conformance reports (NCR-I-84-100466-S for Unit 1 and NCR-I-84-200169 for Unit 2). The nonconformance reports have been dispositioned as requiring repair/rework. This rework was completed by the suppliers representative either in the field or by returning them to the suppliers facility. Instruments removed for repairs will be reinstalled prior to operation in accordance with the construction schedule.