

I-MOSBA-242

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION	
Docket No. 50-424/425-OL-1	EXHIBIT NO. II-242
In the matter of Georgia Power Co. et al., Vogtle Units 1 & 2	
<input type="checkbox"/> Staff <input type="checkbox"/> Applicant <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Intervenor <input type="checkbox"/> Other	DOCKETED
<input type="checkbox"/> Identified <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Received <input type="checkbox"/> Rejected	Reporter SD RC
Date 9/15/95	Witness Ken Stokes

MEETING MINUTES AUGUST 17, 1995

'95 OCT 20 P4:36

MEETING WITH BILL BURMEISTER, KENNY STOKES 7:50 A.M.

I explained that I had been requested by Georgia Power upper management to look into an issue which had arisen in the context of the license amendment proceeding. I explained to Mr. Stokes that I was not representing him in our discussions and that no attorney-client privilege applied between us. I also stated that Georgia Power may waive any attorney-client privileges which the Company had associated with our discussions. I further explained that Georgia Power had an affirmative obligation to inform Licensing Boards of certain matters which the licensee becomes aware of during the course of proceedings, including inaccuracies in testimony. I did not tell Mr. Stokes that his testimony was in question.

I explained that the purpose of my meeting was to determine whether such an issue was present. Bill Burmeister was present to represent Georgia Power management in our discussions. I then explained that, if he desired, he could retain legal counsel of his own prior to discussion of matters with me. His response was that he did not see a need for any attorney because he had told the truth at the license amendment proceeding.

I then asked Mr. Stokes the same questions that are contained in the hearing transcript of June 5, 1995 at pages 7284;

Q. Have you yourself ever found any water in the diesel pneumatic system at Vogtle?

Sub. II-242

Q. And have you ever been made aware that anybody else has found any water within that system?

Mr. Stokes gave me the same answers that he had provided in the Licensing Board hearing, "no."

Mr. Burmeister, apparently with independent knowledge, then asked about the "bubble test" introduction event. Mr. Stokes explained that he knew about the bubble test event and had disclosed this in his testimony at the hearing.

I then asked the following question:

Q. During the last Unit 2 outage, were you made aware that anyone else found any water within the diesel pneumatic system?

In response, Mr. Stokes said that Robert Johnston or one of the other engineers mentioned water coming out of gauges, that he (the engineer) noticed spray as he was doing whatever test they would do. No one seemed to be very concerned about this at the time. The moisture was in a "dead area" and wouldn't pass into the pneumatic system, Mr. Stokes explained. He said that the Cooper engineer had said that he (Cooper) was "used to finding it there" at plants.

I then asked "Is that water in the diesel pneumatic system?" Stokes response was "Yes, in a dead portion of the system. It doesn't, even if there's leakage [of moisture into that space],

travel anywhere." He explained that if you do the same test (meaning "activity") at the "instrument valve" (meaning 0-100 psi valve after the pressure regulator) he understood from the engineer that you wouldn't get the same phenomenon. He explained "I haven't seen it" and that, according to Johnston or whoever told him about it, it was "normal" to have this phenomenon at the 250 psi line gauge.

I asked him whether the pressure at the gauge where the moisture was found was actually 250 or 60 psi. He stated that he wasn't absolutely sure and would have to confirm with a drawing.

I asked him about the exact location where Johnston made his observations. Stokes said he thought Johnston said on the "back of the gauges", but he wasn't sure. He thought it was the 250 psi gauges for starting air. He said he wasn't sure, that he didn't specifically remember. I asked Mr. Stokes whether that location was normally isolated from the control air system. He said he would have to look at a drawing. If the air was at 250 psi, it would go through the regulator and reduce to 60 psi. Mr. Stokes asked whether I knew if it was 250 or 60 psi. I said I wasn't sure, I hadn't yet talked to anyone involved and no one had testified about it. Mr. Stokes then volunteered to get a drawing. [While Mr. Stokes went to obtain a drawing, Mr. Burmeister suggested that Mr. Stokes frame of mind in answering the questions which I had initially read might have been related to operational

activities rather than non-operational "maintenance/outage" activities. Mr. Burmeister said that Mr. Stokes didn't see the issue as a safety issue. He [Mr. Stokes] didn't consider, with his technical judgment, that this was a "water" issue for the pneumatic system.]

Note: During our initial discussions Mr. Stokes referred to Johnston's observations as "water on the back side of the gauges" on several occasions.

When Mr. Stokes returned with his drawing he identified the location as associated with the "T" between the isolation valve and the 0-300 psi pressure gauge coming off the starting air supply line.

I asked whether Mr. Stokes recalled the issue of water in the gauge when he was questioned by the Board or the Intervenor. He said that he did not recall it in either instance. His explanation was that he did not recall it because it seemed insignificant at the time of the event and, therefore, the event did not make an impression which he would recall later at the hearings.

Mr. Stokes went on to say that while he still considers the Johnson observations insignificant, he wanted to make it clear that someone had reported it to him. He stated that the comment to him was in the nature of an "oh, by the way" comment.

I asked him whether there was a technical reason why he did not remember the observation, such as the isolation valve being closed during operation. Mr. Stokes said the only technical reason that he can think of as to why he did not remember it was that the observation was insignificant. Mr. Stokes said that today he would say "yes, moisture water was found in the Unit 2 pneumatic control system."

In response to further questioning, he stated that either Robert Johnston or a Mr. Woodford (?) were the two individuals who may have told him about this. He was unaware of any maintenance work order or deficiency card being generated. As presented to him, the moisture on the back of the gauges was viewed by the engineers as a "no never mind." Mr. Stokes said that he still never has seen anything on filters or in the "bowl" [60 psi] or signs which would cause "us" concerns. Also, no water or moisture had been observed historically in the receiver.

He explained that the location in issue was a "stagnate place." He speculated that maybe a little leak in the gauges might have been a source of moisture, but stated that he did not know why moisture would end up at the location.

In response to further questioning, Mr. Stokes said, again, that his understanding, from Johnston or whomever brought it to his attention was that this phenomenon was a general occurrence

everywhere at the gauges. He then said that the water or moisture "was not getting into the system." It will be back within 18 months based upon Mr. Johnston's statements, according to Mr. Stokes, and it is not a DC condition.

Stokes said that the only other person he is aware of associated with the licensing proceeding who was made aware of this observation was Ken Burr; he commented that Burr worked the same shifts as he. He does not remember how he was told, but both were made aware of the observation. [Bill Burmeister asked why he didn't think of this instance at the licensing proceeding. Mr. Stokes said that he was concentrating on the time frame when events occurred that the licensing proceeding was concerned about and that he "just didn't recall" this 1995 report to him.]

I asked Mr. Stokes that, with the knowledge of the Licensing Board proceeding and the issues involved in it, why didn't he think this observation was significant. He explained that on a day-to-day basis he does not relate to the Licensing Board activities -- he deals with technical issues as they come up. As he views it, this observation is a separate technical issue. He offered that he was "at ease with our technical actions" in this instance.

I asked whether he would like to amend his prior testimony in the proceeding. He said yes, if he made a blanket statement in response to a question like I read initially.

In response to a question about "how much water" was observed and reported to him, Mr. Stokes stated that he did not remember the exact words used, but that he had the impression that it was a "fog or mist." He said at the time that he "almost didn't believe it [the report]."

Stokes does not recall exactly why Robert Johnston was performing work; he speculated that it was not likely the first time that this location was opened, but that he didn't know the frequency of testing the gauges for accuracy. Either Mr. Burmeister or Mr. Stokes suggested that the frequency and results would be a matter of record.

Mr. Stokes said that the isolation valves in the gauge line are normally open. The valves are located about six to eight inches or less "off the back of the meter [meaning gauge]." He speculated that a five year frequency of opening the "T" was likely. [Mr. Burmeister observed that the T was on a leg without continuous flow, or any flow, in contrast to some flow of pressurized air during diesel operation activities through other air lines.]

Mr. Stokes did not know where the moisture comes from. He then speculated that the source could be a small leak to the atmosphere in the pressure gauge. He said there is no evidence of

water "upstream" [towards the receivers] and no evidence of moisture at the "downstream" 60 psi locations.

When asked, once again, why he did not recall the event during the hearings, Mr. Stokes said that he does not know why he did not mention it, except that it didn't stand out in his mind. "Like so many other things in the case," he stated, "this event is irrelevant, but they'll take it as highly relevant, since Allen's (Mosbaugh) whole case is meandering around moisture in the system." He concluded "moisture still wasn't in the system." The location of the gauge is "downstream of where we do moisture checks, upstream of where we do moisture checks." Air flowing to the logic elements, to the board, and to the Calcon switches should still be believed to be free of moisture due to the checks Georgia Power performs for moisture.

Mr. Stokes again confirmed that he doesn't recall actually seeing the moisture; the moisture was reported to him.

When asked if the manner in which he became aware of this observation may have effected how he viewed it, Mr. Stokes again explained that "it was a no never mind in Johnston's mind, so it probably didn't make a huge impact on me. That lessened my thoughts of its significance."

[Bill Burmeister observed that if the system is opened at the T, and then the system was pressurized with atmosphere air, you might get water from that activity. In other words, the isolation valve in the line to the gauges would be closed, the "T" opened, and the isolation valve: gauge line repressurized with atmosphere air which had not been dried. This could condense moisture in the stub line during the test. In other words, liquid would be formed from high humidity/non-dried air. The liquid would stay in the line after the "T" was capped. Upon reopening the moisture would have been there since the last time of gauge testing.]

Mr. Stokes did not recall other occurrences and he didn't recall similar reports on other diesel trains. Either he or Mr. Burmeister suggested that in the future the line could be purged with dried air after calibration/calibration verification of the pressure gauge. [Burmeister then stated that, based upon what Mr. Stokes said, this was not a large amount of moisture which would be a problem for operability.]

I then thanked Mr. Stokes and asked him if there was anything that he would like to add. He said no, that we had covered his knowledge of Johnston's observations. Our discussion ended at 8:50 a.m.

[After Mr. Stokes left I met briefly with Mr. Burmeister. Mr. Burmeister said that the licensing proceeding had not effected Mr.

Stokes' normal job approach. Although he had spent a lot of time in testifying he had remained level-headed in problem solving and focused on his assignments. He did not hesitate to continue to do good work and he had good technical judgment. He had not been adversely affected by the proceeding personally, even though it had placed a large demand on him. Mr. Burmeister stated his opinion that because Mr. Johnston's observations were not technically significant at the time, Mr. Stokes simply did not recall them except in response to a specific question that focused Mr. Stokes on a particular time frame.].

8-17-95 Bill Bernstein (CHAD) Larry Stiles

7:52 am

⑥ North-Clint / Clancy Board obligation to disclose / issue / with /

⑦ Asked Tr. 7284 Qs - same answer

actual, told +

⑧ Bill asked Qs about bubble test - resolution (same as Board)

⑨ Unit 2 outage - made aware of H₂O in dead pressure system? Robert Johnston or one of the engineers removed H₂O using a lot of gauges, noted spray as do whatever testing they would do. Moore seemed to be very concerned. Dead area, no air coming in, won't pass into system. Used to do it then.

⑩ Is hot water in the dead pressure system? yes, in a dead portion of the system.

It doesn't, even if there's leakage, doesn't travel anywhere. If you do some test at isolation valve, don't get any thing

⑪ "I haven't seen it!"

⑫ usual to have this pressure, per Johnston.

⑬ at 60 psi, well... not sure.

⑭ Clancy: think he said on back on gauges, I'm not sure. 250 psi gauges for static air, I'm not sure, I don't remember.

⑮ Clancy isolated from control air?

I'd like to look at drawing. If at 250 psi, then goes through regulator.

⑯ Q: AHD: Moore has talked about it. Larry with getting Bill - frame of mind - no knowledge (non-operational mode but). Larry doesn't see as safety issue. Didn't consider, with technical judgment, that

"Water on back side of gauges"

11. Did you recall this one of 17.0 - gauge when you were questioned by Board? Illness?

No. No. Seemed insignificant

12. Still is insignificant, but someone reported it to me. An "oh by the way"

13. Technical reason why didn't remember? important.

14. Today would say, yes. Water, moisture, U2 system

15. Other Disturbance or accident.

16. MWO? DC? No. As presented to me, backed the gauges - "no water and" Still never

seen anything on filter or bowl or signs what came up concerns. Was in

receive. Significant place. Little leak to atmosphere? Doesn't know why? No

17. A general awareness everywhere at gauges, "not getting into system, will be back within 18 mos, not a DC could be

18. Any other in procedure rule area?

Yes Burr (Henry) on same shift
Don't enter low field, but both rule area.

19. BB: Didn't think of instance? US: ~~concurrent~~ concurrent, on the floor when conversed about.
Just didn't recall.

20. With knowledge of ABB & issue, why didn't it think significant. Don't relate to ABB - separate technical issue. At ease with our technical actions.

... 7 ...

if bl-let stilet.

22. How much water? - "a fog or mist, do-4
remember ^{water} exactly". Almost didn't believe it.

23. Don't recall why Robinson is there; not likely
first time opened; don't know way of
return.

24. - Isolation valves normally open. Valves ~ 6-8 inches
or less off back of meter / gauge.

- 5 yr way of opening "T" likely

25. BB: on log about continuous flow.

26. Where did moisture come from? Spent time
could be small leak to atmosphere in
gauge. NO evidence of upstream. Also
at 60 psi position.

27. Don't know why mention it, didn't find it.
Like so many things in case, irrelevant; but
they'll take it as highly relevant - it's
whole case is revolving around moisture
in system. "Still wasn't in the system"

28. Downstream of where we do checks;
upstream of " " " "

As flowing to logic elements to board,
logic & Calcons should be believed
to be free of moisture due to
checks we do.

29. Don't recall actually seeing it; it was
reported.

30. ... of ... - ...

Johnson's and, probably didn't make huge impact; lessen my thoughts of significance

BB: ① Open system, then is flow, then pressure atmospheric air, H_2O from activity.

② isolate line, open \rightarrow repressure the atmosphere \rightarrow could induce moisture when opening. Been here since last time.

31. Don't call other sources, don't call other trans. Maybe should purge line after calibration with dry system air ~~after~~ purge. Not

BB: not large amount of moisture which would be problem

KS left. 2:30

BB: probably not affected his normal job - lot of time in testing - ~~level~~ beaded in problem-solving. Focused. Not drilled to do work; good technical judgment. Not personally adversely affected by pressure, even though demand.

Because not technically significant, did not call