

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Sequoyah, Unit 2										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 8				PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 3		
TITLE (4) Debris Inside Containment																
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)						
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES			DOCKET NUMBER(S)				
0 2	1 2	8 5	8 5	0 0 5	0 0 3	1 4	3 5					0 5 0 0 0				
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)														
1		20.402(b)				20.406(c)				50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)		
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.406(a)(1)(i)				50.36(c)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)		
1 0 0		20.406(a)(1)(ii)				50.36(c)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)		
		20.406(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)						
		20.406(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)						
		20.406(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(ix)						
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																
NAME David P. Ormsby, Compliance Section Engineer										TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 6 1 5 8 7 0 - 6 1 4 6						
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS						
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) XX NO																

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)

On February 12, 1985, at 0118 CST, a routine inspection of the unit 2 upper containment resulted in the discovery of loose equipment and debris. This material was removed by 0212 CST; however, subsequent review indicated that some of the material had been inside of the upper compartment for more than five days. This condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1)(B).

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1) Sequoyah, Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 8	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On February 12, 1985, with unit 2 in mode 1 at 100 percent power, a routine inspection of containment was conducted. At 0118 CST, it was discovered that loose equipment and miscellaneous debris had been left inside the containment upper compartment. This material included three bags of ice and a drop light found inside of the ice condenser upper plenum on the ledge between the end wall door and intermediate deck doors. Also found on the grating just outside of the end wall door were two bags of foam insulation, small hand tools (pliers, screwdriver, and wrench), a flashlight, two jars of glue, three pairs of cold weather clothing, two strips of metal, paper, and tape. This debris was removed by 0212 CST.

On Monday, February 4, 1985, day shift maintenance personnel (steamfitters, sheetmetal workers, insulators, laborers, and electricians) entered the ice condenser to begin work on air handling units (AHU). All necessary tools and materials including ice condenser clothing and a drop light were carried up to the ice condenser upper plenum. All tools and material were removed from the ice condenser at the end of the day shift except tools and clothing which were left outside the end wall door to allow the evening shift steamfitters to continue work on the AHUs. At the end of the evening shift, steamfitters carried all tools and material out of containment except the ice condenser clothing which was left outside the end wall door.

On Tuesday, February 5, 1985, day shift steamfitters and insulators returned to the ice condenser primarily to complete the drain line repairs on the AHUs. Electricians were unable to return to the ice condenser due to other work. Steamfitters completed the drain line repairs and removed all material, tools, and clothing from containment except for three pairs of cold weather clothing and a drop light, which were left for completing the heat tracing and insulating of the drain lines. Insulators did not use the cold weather clothing since most of their work was done outside the ice condenser. They would cut pieces of insulation, enter the ice condenser and install, and then exit as quickly as possible. They also did not use the drop light, but used a flashlight instead. Upon completion of their work, except insulating the AHUs which still required heat tracing prior to insulating, the insulators exited containment, leaving their insulating material outside the ice condenser on the grating. The drop light was still inside the ice condenser, and the cold weather clothing was left on the grating outside the end wall door. On the evening shift, two sheetmetal workers entered the ice condenser to install sheetmetal panels on the AHUs. They carried nut drivers in and out and used no cold weather clothing.

On Monday, February 11, 1985, electricians returned to the ice condenser to continue work on AHUs, including heat tracing of the drain lines. Insulators also returned to install insulation over these heat-traced lines. The 12A and 12B AHUs were placed in service, and the drain lines burst. The insulators were informed of this prior to returning to the ice condenser after lunch; therefore, they left their material, two bags of foam insulation, hand tools, flashlight, and two jars of glue on the grating outside the ice condensers in anticipation of returning after the 12A and 12B drain lines were repaired. The electricians completed their work, which included chipping three bags of ice, and exited the ice condenser leaving the drop light and three bags of ice on the ledge just inside the end wall door. The electricians informed their foreman about the bags of ice. The foreman tried to reach the labor foreman to have the bags removed, but he was unsuccessful until the following morning.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Administrative Instruction (AI) 8 requires that personnel inspect their work area and the path to and from the work area to ensure that no debris is left behind when exiting containment. The employees involved believed that material and equipment was not considered to be debris and could be left inside containment until completion of the maintenance activity. As a result, their equipment and material and any other equipment or material found during the AI-8 inspection was left inside containment. Maintenance personnel have been reinstructed in AI-8 compliance and have been informed that all materials must be removed from containment, if unattended, unless it is properly secured (i.e., stored in an approved storage container). Additional emphasis was placed on the requirement to remove any and all waste material including ice upon exiting containment.

Upon discovery, a cursory evaluation of the possible impact of the debris on plant operations was performed. This evaluation was based on the assumption that the debris could be transported to the containment sump and could restrict pump operation. Since this could result in inoperability of containment spray (CS) and emergency core cooling systems (ECCS), limiting conditions for operation (LCO) 3.5.2, 3.6.2.1, and 3.0.3 were entered. NRC notification was made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iii) four-hour phone call criteria.

Subsequent evaluation has disclosed that the subject debris would remain in the upper compartment. The only available path to the sump is through the two 14-inch refueling canal drains, and debris would be trapped by the drain vortex suppressors or cover the drain entrances. This would result in a worse case situation of plugging of the refueling canal drains and entry into LCO 3.6.5.8 and 3.0.3. Therefore, this event is reportable per 10 CFR 73(a)(2)(i)(B).

Previous occurrences - none.

There was no effect on public health and safety.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant
Post Office Box 2000
Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379

March 14, 1985

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555


Gentlemen:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 - DOCKET NO.
50-328 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-79 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT
SQRO-50-328/85005

The enclosed licensee event report provides details concerning debris
inside containment. This event is reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73,
paragraph a.2.i.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



P. R. Wallace
Plant Manager

Enclosure
cc (Enclosure):

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NRC Inspector, NUC PR, Sequoyah