

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 7 5					PAGE (3) 1 OF 2	
TITLE (4) ESF ACTUATION - SAFETY INJECTION																
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)						
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)			
0 2	1 3	8 5	8 5	0 0 9	0 0	0 3	1 3	8 5					0 5 0 0 0			
OPERATING MODE (9) 1			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 8: (Check one or more of the following) (11)													
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 7 5			20.402(b)				20.406(c)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)	
			20.406(a)(1)(i)				80.36(e)(1)				80.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)	
			20.406(a)(1)(ii)				80.36(e)(2)				80.73(a)(2)(vi)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)	
			20.406(a)(1)(iii)				80.73(a)(2)(i)				80.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)					
			20.406(a)(1)(iv)				80.73(a)(2)(ii)				80.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)					
			20.406(a)(1)(v)				80.73(a)(2)(iii)				80.73(a)(2)(viii)					
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																
NAME DAVID P. SISK, REGULATORY COMPLIANCE ENGINEER										TELEPHONE NUMBER						
										AREA CODE 8 0 5 5 9 5 - 7 3 5 1						
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC						
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)												<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

While in Mode 1 (power operation), Unit 1 received a steam line differential pressure safety injection signal. This resulted in a safety injection, turbine trip, and reactor trip. All automatic equipment responded as designed. The plant was stabilized in Mode 3 (hot standby) in accordance with procedures. All systems and equipment affected by this event were returned to normal operation.

Investigation showed that the event had been initiated by security (contractor) personnel using a portable radio transmitter in the area of main steam line 1-2's pressure transmitters. Radio frequency interference from a portable radio transmitter was demonstrated to cause a low pressure indication on nearby steam pressure transmitters only if their cabinet doors were open.

To prevent recurrence, the pipe racks located outside containment, the containment penetration areas, and inside containment have been posted as "No Radio Transmission" areas. In addition Operating Procedure OP K-9E, "Handie-Talkie Operation," has been revised to include these additional posted areas.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1	0500027585	—	009	—00	02	OF	02

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

At 0043 hours, February 13, 1985, while in Mode 1 (power operation), Unit 1 received a 1-2 steam line differential pressure safety injection signal (2 out of 3 coincident). This resulted in a safety injection, turbine trip, and reactor trip. All automatic equipment responded as designed. The plant was stabilized in Mode 3 (hot standby) in accordance with procedures. All systems and equipment affected by this event were returned to normal operation.

Investigation showed that the event had been initiated by security (contractor) personnel using a portable radio transmitter in the area of main steam line 1-2's pressure transmitters. Radio frequency interference (RFI) from a portable radio transmitter was demonstrated to cause a low pressure indication on nearby steam pressure transmitters. At that time, the metal cabinet doors were open for temporary startup test connections; with the doors closed, no spurious signals resulted.

Unit 1 was surveyed for areas sensitive to RFI in May 1981, as recommended in IE Circular 80-09. At that time, all Unit 1 areas found susceptible to RFIs were posted, and warnings of instrumentation susceptibility were added to general employee and security training.

The cause of this event was an inadequate RFI survey performed by plant engineering personnel in May 1981. The list of areas surveyed did not include the area around the steam line pressure transmitters; thus, there were no radio use warning signs posted in the area.

To prevent recurrence, the pipe racks located outside containment (at elevations 85 and 104 feet), the containment penetration areas (at elevations 85, 100, and 115 feet), and inside containment have been posted as "No Radio Transmission" areas. In addition, Operating Procedure OP K-9E, "Handie-Talkie Operation," has been revised to include these additional posted areas.

This event had no safety consequences and in no way affected the health and safety of the public. This was a previously analyzed Condition II event.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

PG&E

77 BEALE STREET • SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94106 • (415) 781-4211 • TWX 910-372-6587

JAMES D. SHIFFER
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION

March 13, 1985

PGandE Letter No.: DCL-85-106

Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Re: Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-80
Diablo Canyon Unit 1
Licensee Event Report 85-009-00
ESF Actuation - Safety Injection

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), PGandE is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report concerning the inadvertent actuation of an engineered safety feature (ESF), a safety injection caused by a spurious steam line differential pressure signal.

This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.

Kindly acknowledge receipt of this material on the enclosed copy of this letter and return it in the enclosed addressed envelope.

Sincerely,

JC Carroll for
J. D. Shiffer

Enclosure

cc: J. B. Martin
Service List

IE22
1/1