

Nebraska Public Power District

COOPER NUCLEAR STATION
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NLS950245


December 26, 1995

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

Cooper Nuclear Station Licensee Event Report 95-019 is forwarded as an attachment to this letter.

Sincerely,


J. T. Herron
Plant Manager

/bv

Attachment

cc: L. J. Callan
G. R. Horn
J. H. Mueller
R. G. Jones
R. A. Sessoms
K. C. Walden
N. E. Champlin
INPO Records Center
NRC Resident Inspector
W. Turnbull
CNS Training
CNS Quality Assurance

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PDR ADOCK 05000298
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of
digits/characters for each block)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION
COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO
THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING
BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33),
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE
PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

COOPER NUCLEAR STATION

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

05000298

PAGE (3)

1 OF 3

TITLE (4)

Control Room Emergency Filter System Inoperability Due to Unavailability of Emergency Diesel Generator.

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
11	24	95	95	-- 019	-- 00	12	26	95	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
OPERATING MODE (9)		N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more) (11)							
POWER LEVEL (10)		000	20.2201(b)		20.2203(a)(2)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)	
			20.2203(a)(1)		20.2203(a)(3)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)	
			20.2203(a)(2)(i)		20.2203(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		73.71	
			20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		20.2203(a)(4)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		OTHER	
			20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		50.36(c)(1)		X 50.73(a)(2)(v)		Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A	
			20.2203(a)(2)(iv)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)			

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME: William R. Victor, Licensing and Compliance Specialist
TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code): (402) 825-3811

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	X NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On November 24, 1995, the Control Room Emergency Filter System (CREFS) was declared inoperable after recognizing that it was not aligned to the operable emergency onsite power source. CREFS is a single train system whose operability is credited with mitigating the design basis fuel handling accident. Activities were in progress on the Refueling Floor that required CREFS to be operable. One of the conditions for CREFS operability is that emergency onsite power be available to power the system. Operability was restored within the time period allowed by the Cooper Nuclear Station Technical Specifications.

The cause of this condition is personnel error [NUREG-1022 CAUSE CODE A]. An Outage Scheduling error contributed to this event. CREFS was restored to operability by returning its alignment to the divisional buses that could be powered by an operable diesel generator. Additional corrective actions are to conduct operator training on this reportable event, and to provide better programmatic tools to alert Control Room personnel of this configuration.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL	REVISION	
COOPER NUCLEAR STATION	05000298	95	-- 019	-- 00	2 OF 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

PLANT STATUS

The plant was in a scheduled refueling outage (RE16). The Reactor Mode Switch [EIS: HS] in REFUEL with Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) [RPV] reassembly in progress following the completion of refueling.

EVENT DESCRIPTION

Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) Technical Specification (TS) 3.12.A.1 requires that the Control Room Emergency Filter System (CREFS) [VI] (and its associated diesel generator (DG) [DG]) be operable whenever Secondary Containment [NG] Integrity is required. Secondary Containment Integrity had been established per the Technical Specifications to support refueling floor activities. On November 22, 1995, DG2 was taken out of service as part of pre-planned maintenance. However, this was performed without manually transferring power for the CREFS Exhaust Booster Fan [FAN] and Emergency Booster Fan to DG1, leaving the fans powered by offsite power [FK] solely. On November 24, 1995, this condition was recognized and CREFS was declared inoperable. Although operability was restored within the seven days allowed by T.S. 3.12.A.2, CREFS is a single train system that is credited with mitigating the design basis fuel handling accident. The CREFS inoperability was not planned as part of the scheduled DG2 maintenance. Accordingly, a 4-hour ENS notification was made that day to the NRC Operations Center pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(2)iii.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

CREFS is credited with mitigating the consequences of a refueling accident. A refueling accident is postulated: a) when handling irradiated fuel in the Secondary Containment, or b) when handling loads that could potentially damage irradiated fuel in the Secondary Containment. During the period of inoperability no fuel handling was taking place; however, the Steam Dryer [DRY] and RPV Head were being reinstalled. A May 1993 study for CNS by General Electric concluded that dropping the RPV head, Steam Separator [MSR], or Steam Dryer during RPV disassembly/reassembly would not cause damage to irradiated fuel in the reactor [RCT]. Therefore, the safety significance of this event with respect to the refueling floor activities that actually occurred is considered minimal.

CNS recognizes that the potential existed for this type of event to occur during periods of greater safety significance (such as fuel movements). This is mitigated to a degree by the normal availability of offsite power to CREFS.

CAUSE

This condition occurred because Control Room personnel failed to ensure that CREFS remained configured with an operable divisional emergency power source in the midst of scheduled divisional power inoperability. However, a contributing factor was a maintenance scheduling error which resulted in not sequencing the related outage activities in the manner that had been intended to preclude the potential for this condition.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

CORRECTIVE ACTION

CREFS was restored to operability by aligning the system fans to divisional buses that could be powered by an operable diesel generator. The Shift Supervisor who authorized the DG2 inoperability performed a root cause evaluation of the event which was critiqued by plant management as part of the CNS Corrective Action Program.

The following additional corrective actions will be taken:

1. Training will be conducted with Operations personnel on this reportable occurrence.
2. The Control Room's Technical Specification tracking system will be modified to better identify to the Shift Supervisor when the removal of a diesel generator from service may impact the operability of CREFS.
3. The CNS Outage Risk Assessment and Management software will be adjusted to promptly alert the user when the operability of CREFS is affected by taking a diesel generator out of service. This will provide a more effective Outage Scheduling barrier.

SIMILAR EVENTS

- LER 93-001 Potential For Insufficient Component Cooling During a Design Basis Accident Due To Design Discrepancies With the Service Water and Reactor Equipment Cooling Systems.
- LER 93-007 ECCS Pump Compartment Cooler Power Supply Design Deficiencies Could Have Prevented Adequate Containment Heat Removal.

Correspondence No: NLS950245

The following table identifies those actions committed to by the District in this document. Any other actions discussed in the submittal represent intended or planned actions by the District. They are described to the NRC for the NRC's information and are not regulatory commitments. Please notify the Licensing Manager at Cooper Nuclear Station of any questions regarding this document or any associated regulatory commitments.

COMMITMENT	COMMITTED DATE OR OUTAGE
Training will be conducted with Operations personnel on this reportable occurrence.	None
The Control Room's Technical Specification tracking system will be modified to better identify to the Shift Supervisor when the removal of a diesel generator from service may impact the operability of CREFS.	None
The CNS Outage Risk Assessment and Management software will be adjusted to promptly alert the user when the operability of CREFS is affected by taking a diesel generator out of service.	None