

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) DIABLO CANYON, UNIT 1										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0										PAGE (3) 1 OF 2																																				
TITLE (4) GASEOUS RADWASTE OXYGEN CONCENTRATION EXCEEDS LCO																																																								
EVENT DATE (5)						LER NUMBER (6)						REPORT DATE (7)						OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)																																						
MONTH			DAY			YEAR			YEAR			SEQUENTIAL NUMBER			REVISION NUMBER			MONTH			DAY			YEAR			FACILITY NAMES						DOCKET NUMBER(S)																							
1			0			2			6			8			4			8			4			-			0			2			7			-			0			0			DIABLO CANYON UNIT 2						0 5 0 0 0 0 3 2 3					
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OPERATING MODE (9) 5						THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																																																		
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0						20.402(b)						20.405(c)						50.73(a)(2)(iv)						73.71(b)																																
						20.405(a)(1)(i)						50.36(c)(1)						50.73(a)(2)(v)						73.71(c)																																
						20.405(a)(1)(ii)						50.36(c)(2)						50.73(a)(2)(vii)						X OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form JDBA)																																
						20.405(a)(1)(iii)						50.73(a)(2)(i)						50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)																																						
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20.405(a)(1)(v)						50.73(a)(2)(iii)						50.73(a)(2)(ix)																																												
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																						TELEPHONE NUMBER																																		
NAME DAVID P. SISK, REGULATORY COMPLIANCE ENGINEER																						AREA CODE 8 0 5 5 9 5 - 7 3 5 1																																		
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																																																								
CAUSE		SYSTEM		COMPONENT		MANUFACTURER		REPORTABLE TO NRC				CAUSE		SYSTEM		COMPONENT		MANUFACTURER		REPORTABLE TO NRC																																				
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)																EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)				MONTH		DAY		YEAR																																
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)																X NO																																								

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

While in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown), the concentration of oxygen in the Gaseous Radwaste System exceeded 4 percent by volume for 1 hour and 55 minutes. This exceeded the 1 hour limiting condition for operation of Technical Specification 3.11.2.5 action item b.

This event was the result of a failure by Unit 2 operational personnel to coordinate the operation of a common system with Unit 1 operational personnel as required by Operating Orders. During Unit 2 hot functional tests, the Low Pressure Nitrogen System (LPNS) was inadvertently depressurized and a slight vacuum was drawn on the system. The LPNS is a system shared by Units 1 and 2. With the LPNS under a slight vacuum, air was drawn into the system. Since the LPNS supplies cover gas to certain tanks which vent to the Gaseous Radwaste System, air was introduced into the Gaseous Radwaste System causing the oxygen concentration to increase.

Immediate corrective action was taken by repressurizing the LPNS with nitrogen, hence, diluting the oxygen in the Gaseous Radwaste System to a level below two percent.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1	0 5 0 0 0 2 7 5 8 4	—	0 2 7	—	0 0	0 2	OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On October 26, 1984, at 0111 PDT, the 1 hour action statement of Technical Specification 3.11.2.5, action b was exceeded. Action b requires that if the oxygen concentration in the Gaseous Radwaste System (WE) is found to be greater than 4 percent by volume, immediately suspend all additions of waste gases to the system and reduce the concentration to less than or equal to 4 percent within 1 hour and 2 percent within 48 hours after initially exceeding 2 percent. Though no measurable gaseous radwaste was present in the system at the time of the incident, action was taken suspending further additions to the system. Monitor ANI 76, which samples the waste gas compressor discharge header, indicated an oxygen concentration greater than 4 percent for 1 hour and 55 minutes and greater than 2 percent for 2 hours and 5 minutes.

This event was caused by Unit 2 nonlicensed operational personnel failing to coordinate an operation of a common system with Unit 1 operational personnel as required by Operating Orders. During Unit 2 hot functional tests, the Low Pressure Nitrogen System (LK) was inadvertently depressurized and a slight vacuum was drawn on the system. With the LPNS under a slight vacuum, air was drawn into the system. Since the LPNS supplies cover gas to certain tanks which vent to the Gaseous Radwaste System, the air was introduced into the Gaseous Radwaste System causing the oxygen concentration to increase.

The immediate corrective action was to repressurize the LPNS with nitrogen and dilute the oxygen in the Gaseous Radwaste System to a level below two percent.

A contributing factor was that due to the higher than normal use of nitrogen during startup and functional testing of Unit 2, the normal LPNS supply is bypassed, and bulk storage liquid nitrogen is used in its place. This temporary configuration bypasses the normal low pressure alarm that warns operators of low nitrogen supply in this common system. This configuration will be normalized prior to Unit 2 startup following fuel loading.

To prevent recurrence, all Unit 1 and Unit 2 operations personnel have reviewed the causes of the event. This review reemphasized the importance of Unit 1 and Unit 2 personnel interfacing with each other during the operation of common systems.

This event had no safety consequences and in no way affected the health and safety of the public since the Gaseous Radwaste System contained no measurable radioactivity at the time of the incident. Had this event occurred at full power, the health and safety of the public would not be adversely affected. This is a previously analyzed accident (see FSAR Section 15.5.24).

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

PG&E



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JAMES D. SHIFFER
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION

November 26, 1984

PGandE Letter No.: DCL-84-356

Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Re: Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-80
Diablo Canyon Unit 1
Licensee Event Report 84-027-00
Gaseous Radwaste Oxygen Concentration

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i), PGandE is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report concerning an event where the Gaseous Radwaste System oxygen concentration was not within the allowable limits of the Technical Specifications.

This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.

Sincerely,

Enclosure

cc: J. B. Martin
Service List

IE22
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