

NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 0	PAGE (3)		
		1	OF	0 3

TITLE (4)
INOPERABLE CO₂

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)	
1 0	2 8	8 4	8 4	0 2 1		0 0 1	1 2 7	8 4		0 5 0 0 0	
										0 5 0 0 0	

OPERATING MODE (9) N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)									
	20.402(b)		20.405(c)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)			
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0	20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)			
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)			
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)					
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)					
	20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(ix)					

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)									
NAME R. F. SAUNDERS, STATION MANAGER								TELEPHONE NUMBER	
								AREA CODE 8 0 4	3 5 7 - 3 1 8 4

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)									
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)					EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)								
NO								

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On October 28, 1984, at 0540 hours, with unit 1 at cold shutdown, and unit 2 at 100% power, an operator performing a walkdown of unit #1 cable tunnel area discovered that an assigned fire watch was not present and the CO₂ system for the area was locked out.

During the time between the completion of work by contract workers (= 0300 hours) and the unit #1 cable tunnel walkdown, performed by operations at 0540 hours, no fire watch was present in the area as required by Technical Specifications.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
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SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT 1	0 5 0 0 0 2 8 0	8 4	— 0 2 1	— 0 0 0	2	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

1. Description of the Event

On October 27, 1984 at 2050, the CO₂ system for zone 5 (unit #1 cable tunnel) was isolated for construction. The request for locking out the system was made by a contract electrical helper without his foreman's knowledge.

At approximately 0300 on 10-28-84, the contract worker informed the operating shift supervisor that work in a penetration located in unit #1 cable tunnel was complete. The operating shift then satisfactorily completed a maintenance procedure to verify the control room and relay area pressure envelope (MOP-21.3).

At 0540 hours on 10-28-84, an operator performing a walkdown of unit #1 cable tunnel area discovered that the assigned fire watch was not present and the CO₂ system for the area was locked out.

During the time between the completion of work by contract workers (≈ 0300 hours) and the unit #1 cable tunnel walkdown, performed by operations at 0540, no fire watch was present in the area as required by Technical Specifications.

2. Safety Consequences and Implications

The operability of the CO₂ fire suppression system ensures that adequate fire suppression capability is available to confine and extinguish fires occurring in any portion of the facility where safety related equipment is located. Since all other fire warning and suppression systems were operable during this event, this did not constitute an unreviewed safety question nor affect the health and safety of the public.

3. Cause

The fire watch was discontinued prior to returning CO₂ system to normal due to an error by construction personnel.

4. Immediate Corrective Action

The CO₂ fire suppression system was restored to operation.

5. Additional Corrective Action

None.

6. Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

The following corrective actions have been taken:

1. The contract personnel involved have been reprimanded.

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(9-83)

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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FACILITY NAME (1) SURREY POWER STATION, UNIT 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 0	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
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2. The importance of a proper fire watch was emphasized to contract supervisory personnel.

3. The operating shifts have been informed to tag out systems only to contract supervisory personnel.

7. Generic Implications

None.



NOV 27 1984

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
Surry Power Station
P. O. Box 315
Surry, Virginia 23883

Serial No: 84-036

Docket No: 50-280

License No: DPR-32

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
016 Phillips Building
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specifications, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report for Surry Unit 1.

REPORT NUMBER

84-021-00

This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be reviewed by Safety Evaluation and Control.

Very truly yours,

R. F. Saunders for

R. F. Saunders
Station Manager

Enclosure

cc: Mr. James P. O'Reilly
Regional Administrator
Suite 2900
101 Marietta Street, NW
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

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