

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)  
Sequoyah, Unit 1

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

0 5 0 0 0 3 2 7 1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)

Essential Raw Cooling Water Valve Inoperable

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)		REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)							
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES						
1	0	2	3	8	4	8	4	-	0	5	0	0	0		
1	0	2	3	8	4	8	4	-	0	5	0	0	0		

OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5. (Check one or more of the following) (11)																						
POWER LEVEL (10)	1 0 0	20.402(b)	20.406(a)(1)(i)	20.406(a)(1)(ii)	20.406(a)(1)(iii)	20.406(a)(1)(iv)	20.406(a)(1)(v)	20.406(c)	50.36(c)(1)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(vi)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)	73.71(b)	73.71(c)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)  
NAME  
Glenn E. Duggin, Compliance Section Engineer

TELEPHONE NUMBER

AREA CODE

6 1 1 5 8 1 7 1 0 - 6 1 1 4 6

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)									
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)  
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) ☒ NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH DAY YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

During performance of Surveillance Instruction (SI)-9, "Actuation of Automatic Valves via SI Signal for Non-Testable Boric Acid and ECCS Flow Path Valves," essential raw cooling water (ERCW) valve FCV-67-66 to diesel generator (D/G) 2A-A was found in its normally closed position, but its thermal overload was not reset. This ERCW valve ('A' train) supplies cooling water for D/G 2A-A and would not have opened if required. The thermal overload was found 'not reset' from a previous SI (251.2). The thermal overload was reset and the valve operated correctly. SI-251.2 was revised to check the thermal overloads before the actual performance of the SI, but the revised SI had not yet been issued to personnel to use. All other overloads that had been tested per SI-251.2 before it was revised were verified to have reset properly.

8411290613 841121  
PDR ADOCK 05000327  
S PDRIE22  
11

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104  
EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)  Sequoyah, Unit 1	DOCUMENT NUMBER (2)  0506032784	LER NUMBER (8)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		84	069	000	2	OF	02

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 386A's) (17)

During performance of Surveillance Instruction (SI)-9, "Actuation of Automatic Valves via SI Signal for Non-Testable Boric Acid and ECCS Flow Path Valves," essential raw cooling water (ERCW) valve FCV-67-66 to diesel generator (D/G) 2A-A was found in its normally closed position, but its thermal overload was not reset. The thermal overload not resetting resulted in the inoperability of the valve's motor (actuator). This ERCW valve ('A' train) supplied cooling water for the D/G and would not have opened if required. The 'B' train valve was still operable. The valve was found inoperable while unit 1 was in mode 1 (100 percent power, 578 degrees F, 2235 psig) and unit 2 was in mode 6 (0 percent power, 0 psig, 70 degrees F). The valve was found inoperable at 1035 CST on 10/23/84 and was returned to operable status at 1120 CST on 10/23/84.

The performance of SI-251.2, "Channel Calibration of Class 1E Motor Operated Valve Overload Relay Heaters," for FCV-67-66 was completed on 10/12/84. SI-251.2 tested the thermal overloads on the valve by verifying their opening times under high current conditions. The overloads tested good. The testing heats the overloads, causing them to open. A mechanical device holds the overload open, even after it has cooled, until it is manually reset. Personnel normally allow time for the overloads to cool before resetting them. Upon completion of SI-251.2 on FCV-67-66, the overloads may not have cooled sufficiently to reset when the reset button was pushed, or the reset button may not have been pushed in all the way either of which would leave the overload open. No actuations of this valve were required or attempted between 10/12/84 and the 10/23/84 date.

On 10/23/84, the performance of SI-9 required the valve to operate upon receiving a safety injection (SI) signal. The valve, FCV-67-66, did not operate and the operator opened the 'B' train ERCW valve immediately upon discovering that the 'A' (67-66) train valve failed to open, since D/G 2A-A was running as part of SI-9. The D/G still started and ran normally with the ERCW valve closed. The cooling of the D/G was not affected due to the immediate operator action taken. Investigation revealed that the overloads were open. The overloads were reset, then the valve was tested and returned to service.

SI-251.2 has a signoff to check the overloads for damage and requires the overloads to be reset, but it did not require verification of the position of the overloads. SI-251.2 had been revised to make a continuity check of the overloads but the revised SI had not yet been issued to personnel to use. All other overloads that had been tested per SI-251.2, before it was revised, were verified to have reset properly. This revision will prevent personnel from leaving the overloads in the open position after the SI is completed.

There was no effect on public health or safety, and no plant safety margins were exceeded.

Previous occurrences - none.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant  
Post Office Box 2000  
Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379

November 21, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555


Gentlemen:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET NO.  
50-327 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT  
SQRO-50-327/84069

The enclosed licensee event report provides details concerning the essential raw cooling water valve ('A' train) for diesel generator 2A-A cooling that was found inoperable. This event is reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, paragraph a.2.i.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



P. R. Wallace  
Plant Manager

Enclosure  
cc (Enclosure):

James P. O'Reilly, Director  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Suite 2900  
101 Marietta Street, NW  
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Records Center  
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations  
Suite 1500  
1100 Circle 75 Parkway  
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

NRC Inspector, NUC PR, Sequoyah

IE22  
1/1