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August 10, 1992

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Mail Station P1-137  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Attention: Document Control Desk


SUBJECT: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station  
Unit 1  
Docket No. 50-416  
License No. NPF-29  
Automatic Isolation of RWCU System  
LER 92-015-00

GNRO-92/00104

Gentlemen:

Attached is Licensee Event Report 92-015-00 which is an interim report.

Yours truly,


  
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NRC Form 366  
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0106

EXPIRES 6-31-88

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1): <b>Grand Gulf Nuclear Station</b>										DOCKET NUMBER (2): <b>0 5 0 0 0 4 3 6 1 OF 0 3</b>										PAGE (3): <b>6 1 OF 0 3</b>																			
TITLE (4): <b>Automatic Isolation of RWCU System</b>																																							
EVENT DATE (5): MONTH: <b>0 7</b> DAY: <b>0 9</b> YEAR: <b>9 2</b>										LER NUMBER (6): YEAR: <b>9 2</b> SEQUENTIAL NUMBER: <b>0 1 5</b> REVISION NUMBER: <b>0 0</b>										REPORT DATE (7): MONTH: <b>0 8</b> DAY: <b>1 0</b> YEAR: <b>9 2</b>										OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8): FACILITY NAMES: _____ DOCKET NUMBER(S): <b>0 5 0 0 0</b>									
OPERATING MODE (9): <b>1</b>										THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11):																													
POWER LEVEL (10): <b>1 1 0 0</b>										20.402(b) _____ 20.405(c) _____ <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 60.73(a)(2)(iv) _____ 73.71(b) _____ 20.405(a)(1)(i) _____ 60.36(a)(1) _____ 60.73(a)(2)(v) _____ 73.71(c) _____ 20.405(a)(1)(ii) _____ 60.36(a)(2) _____ 60.73(a)(2)(vi) _____ OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Test, NRC Form 355A) _____ 20.405(a)(1)(iii) _____ 60.73(a)(2)(i) _____ 60.73(a)(2)(vii)(A) _____ 20.405(a)(1)(iv) _____ 60.73(a)(2)(ii) _____ 60.73(a)(2)(vii)(B) _____ 20.405(a)(1)(v) _____ 60.73(a)(2)(iii) _____ 60.73(a)(2)(ix) _____																													
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12):																																							
NAME: <b>Bruce A. Burke / Licensing Engineer</b>																				TELEPHONE NUMBER: AREA CODE: <b>6 0 1</b> NUMBER: <b>4 3 7-161313</b>																			
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13):																																							
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC. TUBER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC. TUBER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC. TUBER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC. TUBER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC. TUBER	REPORTABLE TO NRC															
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14):																				EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15):																			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)																				<input type="checkbox"/> NO																			
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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 words, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

Automatic actuation of the reactor water cleanup (RWCU) system inboard containment isolation valves occurred on July 9, 1992. The leak detection system (LDS) RWCU heat exchanger room high temperature annunciator alarmed simultaneous to the isolation. No leakage of RWCU or other systems was observed.

Investigation is continuing to determine exact cause(s) of the isolation. LDS features sensitive Riley Panalarm temperature switches. It is believed that this spurious isolation was actuated by an LDS trip signal generated by a Riley Panalarm switch. The leak detection logic actuates RWCU containment isolation valves on a single channel trip signal. A final report will be submitted after the investigation has determined the cause(s).

The actuation of the RWCU isolation system did not compromise the safe operation of GGNS. All safety related equipment operated as designed. The safety and health of the general public was not affected by this event.

NRC Form 306A  
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104  
EXPIRES 8/31/95

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station	0500041692	015	00	02	OF 03

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 306A's) (17)

**A. Reportable Occurrence**

Automatic actuation of reactor water cleanup (RWCU) system [CE] Division 1 containment isolation valves [NH] occurred at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) on July 9, 1992 at approximately 0422 hours. Automatic actuation of these RWCU system valves by a leak detection system (LDS) [JM] signal is an engineered safety feature (ESF) [JE] actuation. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).

**B. Initial Conditions**

The plant was in Operational Condition 1 at approximately 100 percent power with reactor water at approximately 532 degrees F and 1020 psig. The RWCU system was in steady state operation with both cleanup pumps in service upon isolation.

**C. Description of Occurrence**

RWCU inboard isolation valves closed automatically. This occurred simultaneous to a RWCU heat exchanger room high temperature alarm in the control room.

LDS temperature switch E31-TS-N620A or differential temperature switch E31-TDS-612A would have initiated the alarm. Neither trip unit switch nor any other switch in either division of LDS was found to be in the trip condition upon inspection following the isolation. No leakage of RWCU or other systems was observed during inspection following the isolation. Temperatures were normal in the RWCU heat exchanger room. RWCU operation was restored on July 9, 1992 at 1722 hours.

**D. Apparent Cause**

Investigation has not determined the exact cause(s) of the isolation signal. It is believed that this actuation of the RWCU inboard isolation valves was triggered by an LDS trip signal. The cause of the signal is unknown, although spurious operation of temperature switch E31-TS-N620A or E31-TDS-N612A is suspected.

Trip logic for actuation of RWCU containment isolation valves requires only a single channel (i.e., non-coincident) trip signal from LDS. LDS features Riley Panalarm temperature switches. These sensitive switches have caused numerous RWCU isolations due to spurious operation. No other system transient which preceded or coincided with the isolation is known to have initiated the event.

A final report will be submitted after the investigation has determined the cause. Recent RWCU isolation events attributed to spurious operation of temperature switches were reported in LER 91-006, LER 91-015, and LER 92-014.

NRC Form 385A  
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104  
EXPIRES 8/31/98

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station	0 6 0 0 0 4 1 6 9 2	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		— 0 11 5	— 0 0 0 3	OF 0 3			

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 385A's) (17)

**E. Safety Assessment**

The actuation of the RWCU isolation system did not compromise the safe operation of GGNS. The RWCU outboard isolation valves were operable and not affected by this transient. Safety systems functioned as designed upon receipt of the isolation signal. Other ESF systems were available to perform their intended function and responded as designed. The safety and health of the general public was not compromised by this event.

**F. Additional Information**

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text within brackets [ ].