



Carolina Power & Light Company

Brunswick Nuclear Project  
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D. C. 20555

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT 1 AND 2  
DOCKET NO. 50-325 AND 50-324  
LICENSE NO. DPR-71 AND DPR-62  
SPECIAL REPORT PER TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.8A AND  
PURSUANT TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 6.9.2 (1-SR-92-004)

Gentlemen:

The following fire protection Limiting Condition for Operation informational summaries are the result of major outage modifications being performed on both Units.

At 0915 on July 6, 1992, the Control Building Unit 1 computer room fire door (221) was declared inoperable. The fire door was to be propped open to support temporary ventilation of the computer room. This was required to support changes to the Heating Ventilation Air Conditioning (HVAC) system by Plant Modification (PM) 87-0125. At 2100 on July 9, 1992 the Control Building Unit 2 computer room fire door (222) was also declared inoperable to support this PM. The PM was expected to take longer than the 7 days specified by the Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO), requiring this Special Report. With the fire detectors operable on at least one side of the doors, an hourly fire watch was stationed and remains in place pending restoration of the fire doors. The PM is expected to allow restoration of the fire doors in August 1992.

At 1030 on July 9, 1992, the Unit 1 Reactor Building 20' elevation Secondary Containment airlock doors were both opened (including fire door 203). This was done with Unit 1 in Cold Shutdown to support the Unit outage started on April 21, 1992. Opening these doors increases ventilation air flow into the building and supports the increased traffic of a Unit outage. With the fire detectors operable on at least one side of the doors, an hourly fire watch was stationed and remains in place pending restoration of the fire door. The doors were expected to be open longer than the 7 days specified by the Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO), requiring this Special Report. The doors will remain open to support the Unit 1 outage.

On July 14, 1992, generic LCOs were written to cover the block walls, with expansion gaps at the top, in the Control Building (CB), Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Building, and the adjoining four day (fuel oil) tank rooms. On July 15, 1992, an additional LCO was written to include the Service Water Building block walls with expansion gaps. With the fire detectors operable on


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at least one side of the walls an hourly fire watch was stationed and remains in place pending restoration of the walls.

The additional block walls were declared inoperable as a precautionary response to findings originally reported in LER 1-92-012. This LER initiated an investigation when 2 Control Building masonry block walls were found with non-fire rated sealing material in the expansion gap at the top of the walls. These walls had not been identified as fire barriers on the prints and indices. There are 71 additional block walls with gaps similar to the original Control Building block walls. A walkdown of each gap will be conducted as part of the Fire Barrier Reinspection Project currently in progress. The project has inspected 11 walls and found 3 walls with non-qualified gap seals. One block wall is located in the Control Building 49' elevation, and the other 2 are in the EDG building 50' elevation. Inspection of the remaining fire barriers is continuing with repair of deficiencies to be completed prior to the end of each affected Unit's next refueling outage.

Very truly yours,



J. W. Spencer, General Manager  
Brunswick Nuclear Project

cc: Mr. S. D. Ebner  
Mr. R. H. Lo  
BSEP NRC Resident Office