

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Browns Ferry - Units 1, 2, and 3	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 5 9	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2
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TITLE (4) Inadvertent Start of Diesel Generators C and D

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)												
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)										
0	20	5	8	5	8	5	0	0	3	0	0	0	3	0	5	0	0	0	2	6	0
										Browns Ferry - Unit 2	0	5	0	0	0	2	6	0			
										Browns Ferry - Unit 3	0	5	0	0	0	2	9	6			

OPERATING MODE (9) N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																			
	20.402(b)					20.406(c)					<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)					73.71(b)				
	20.405(a)(1)(i)					50.36(c)(1)					<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)					<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)				
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)					50.36(c)(2)					<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)					OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)				
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)					50.73(a)(2)(i)					<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)									
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)					50.73(a)(2)(ii)					<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)									
20.405(a)(1)(v)					50.73(a)(2)(iii)					<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)										

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																			
NAME Steve Jones										TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 2 1 0 5 7 2 9 - 1 2 5 3 1 8									

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)											
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

Common diesel generators C and D for units 1 and 2 started during functional testing of protective relays for the unit 2 station transformers A and B, unit 2 main transformer, and unit 2 generator. The initiations were the result of the 250 volt DC battery board 4 bus filter breaker being left open, allowing a voltage spike to trip the 161 KV lines.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)

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Browns Ferry - Units 1, 2, and 3

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 368A's) (17)

Unit 1 was operating at 98 percent power, unit 2 was in a refueling outage, and unit 3 was at 100 percent power. All three units were affected by the event.

On February 5, 1985, during functional testing of the protective relays (RLY) for the unit 2 station transformer A and B (XFMR), unit 2 main transformer (XFMR), and unit 2 main generator (TG), a voltage spike was generated when test equipment was connected to the unit 2 generator breaker (BKR) control circuit. The voltage spike traveled to the sensitive cooling tower transformer overpressurization relays (RLY) because breaker 211 (BKR) to the 250 volt DC battery board 4 bus filter (BYBD) had been left open. The voltage spike caused the cooling tower transformers overpressurization relays (RLY) to operate, tripping the 161 KV lines. This caused a brief undervoltage on the shutdown boards which initiated diesel generators C and D (DG). The diesels started but did not tie on to the shutdown board. Annuciations were immediately received in the control room where the licensed reactor operator verified no unusual event was present. The reactor operator then secured the affected equipment.

During the event, the safety functions of the diesel generators were unaffected. Therefore, no hazard existed to any safety related equipment.

The voltage spike affected the overpressurization relays because the 250 volt DC battery board 4 bus filter was inoperative. This inoperability was caused by breaker 211 being left open after Operations Section Instruction Letter (OSIL) 51, locating DC grounds, was performed. Caution signs have been installed next to breaker 211 on battery board 4 as well as the breakers on the other battery boards. OSIL-51 is being revised to include a caution on leaving the breaker open and to coordinate with the Division of Power System Operations. An evaluation is being made to determine the need for replacing or desensitizing the overpressurization relays in order to reduce the probability of voltage spikes from occurring in the future.

Responsible Plant Section - EM and OP

Previous Events - None

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
P. O. Box 2000
Decatur, Alabama 35602

March 5, 1985

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Sir:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) UNIT 1 -
DOCKET NO. 50-259 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-33 - REPORTABLE
OCCURRENCE REPORT BFRO-50-259/85003

The enclosed report provides details concerning the inadvertent start
of diesel generators C and D. This report is submitted in accordance
with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

G. T. Jones

G. T. Jones
Plant Manager
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

Enclosures

cc (Enclosures):

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region II
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Atlanta, Georgia 30303

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NRC Resident Inspector, BFN

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