

# NORTHEAST UTILITIES



The Connecticut Light and Power Company  
Western Massachusetts Electric Company  
Holyoke Water Power Company  
Northeast Utilities Service Company  
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company

General Offices: Selden Street, Berlin, Connecticut

P.O. BOX 270  
HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06141-0270  
(203) 865-5000

Re: 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)  
August 7, 1992  
MP-92-837

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Reference: Facility Operating License No. DPR-65  
Docket No. 50-336  
Licensee Event Report 92-011-00

Gentlemen:

This letter forwards Licensee Event Report 92-011-00 required to be submitted within thirty (30) days pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).

Very truly yours,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

  
Stephen E. Seace

Vice President - Millstone Station

SES/PL:ljs

Attachment: LER 92-011-00

cc: T. T. Marin, Region I Administrator  
P.D. Swetland, Senior Resident Inspector, Millstone Unit Nos. 1, 2 and 3  
G. S. Vissing, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 2

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## LICK/SEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

EVENT DATE (5)			SER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)																		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIA NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES																		
0	7	10	9	2	9	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	8	0	7	9	2	0   5   0   0   0									
																		0   5   0   0   0									

OPERATING MODE B:		THIS REPORT IS BEING SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §. (Check one or more of the following): (11)									
		5	20.402(b)		20.402(c)		50.73(a)(2)(vi)		73.71(b)		
POWER LEVEL (10)			20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(c)		
01010			20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, HRC Form 986A)		
			20.405(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)				
			20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)				
			20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ix)				

[illegible]

ABSTRACT (Limit to 400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines). 16

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

Estimated burden per response to comply with this information collection request: 30.0 hrs. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and Reports Management Branch (p-530), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20543, and to the Paperwork Reduction Project (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (3)			PAGE (5)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 2	0500033692	01	11	00	02	OF	04

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 356A-2) (17)

I. Description of Event

The plant was in Mode 5, shutdown for refueling operations and steam generator replacement. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) temperature was 103 degrees Fahrenheit and pressure was 0 psig. Type B and C leakage rate testing was in progress. On June 9, 1992, one of the two Containment Hydrogen Purge penetrations was being leak rate tested (see the attached diagram for the valve line-up). An attempt was made to pressurize the penetration volume to accident pressure ( $P_a = 54$  psig) through valve 2-EB-121. Test pressure could not be attained and the source of the leak was investigated. The plant leak test personnel identified a leak path through valve 2-EB-99 by observing flow indicated on FI 8.6 and by hearing air escaping through that valve. At the time of the test, the leakage integrity of the inner isolation valve, 2-EB-100, could not be confirmed due to the lack of other isolation valves in this line. This event was originally classified as not reportable but was re-classified on July 10, 1992, as being reportable because the penetration leak rate exceeded the measurement capabilities of the test equipment, thereby making it impossible to determine whether or not the combined leak rate limit (0.6 La) was exceeded.

II. Cause of Event

The root cause of this event is failure of the key connecting the air operator to the valve shaft, which allowed slight misalignment of the valve disc/seat interface, resulting in excessive leakage.

The suspected causes of the failure are either over-tightening of the air operator return spring or improper engagement of the manual operator disengaging lever while positioning the valve with the air operator. It is believed that either of these could cause the damage to the valve operator connecting key and subsequent misalignment of the valve disc. The manual operator disengaging lever only applies to valve 2-EB-99, as valve 2-EB-100 has no manual operator.

Additional root cause investigation will be conducted should the post-repair LLRT indicate the need.

III. Analysis of Event

These valves are located on the Containment Hydrogen Purge line and are normally closed except during periodic containment venting operations. Since the leakage integrity of the inner isolation valve has not yet been quantified, it has not been determined if there are any safety implications as a result of this event. This event is reportable per the requirements of 10CFR50.71(j)(2)(i)(b).

IV. Corrective Action

Valve 2-EB-99 was disassembled and inspected. The inspection revealed the keys connecting the manual and air operators to the valve shaft had been sheared off. The air operator connecting key was wedged such that the valve still operated but the valve seat was misaligned. The damaged keys were replaced and the air operator linkage was properly adjusted. Valve cycling subsequent to repair has again resulted in shear of the keys. Investigation of the cause continues. Results will be addressed in the supplemental report.

Leak rate testing of the balance of the containment penetrations is continue and the overall results will be addressed in the supplemental report.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

Estimated burden per response to comply with this information collection request: 30.0 hrs. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and Reports Management Branch (p-530), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and to the Paperwork Reduction Project (P150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)	PAGE (3)
Millstone Nuclear Power Station		YEAR	
Unit 2		SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER
	0   5   0   0   0   3   3   6	9   2   0   1   1	0   0   0   3   OF   0   4

TEXT: If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A, s) (17)

V. Additional Information

## Valve information:

2-EB-99: Fisher 6" Class 2 - 150 lb. Offset Tee Ring valve with Fisher #656-40 actuator (power end) and Phil. Gear # HOB hand operator (back end).

2-EB-100: Fisher 6" Class 2 - 150 lb. Offset Tee Ring valve with Fisher #481-15-30 actuator.

Similar Events: 80-019, 89-003, 88-006, 86-012, 85-003, 84-005, 82-006, 80-032, 79-034


EHIS Code: BB



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

Estimated burden per response to comply with this information collection request: 50.0 hrs. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and Reports Management Branch (p-530), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and to the Paperwork Reduction Project (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)  Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  01500003J693	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR 93	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 0111	REVISION NUMBER 00	04 OF 04	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 355A's) (17)



- 3 Penetration must be drained prior to testing.
- 2  Signifies OPEN valve.  Signifies CLOSED valve.
- 1 Valves shown (#) must be stroked full open, then full closed in the normal operating manner (eg. MOV with control switch) prior to testing.

LOCAL LEAK RATE TEST  
VALVE LINEUP

Penetration L3  
2-EB-99, 100

P&amp;ID 26028

Figure 9.8