

CONTROL BLOCK:

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 (1)

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	G	A	E	I	H	1	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4			5		
7	8	9	LICENSEE CODE						14	15	LICENSE NUMBER										26	26	LICENSE TYPE					30	57	CAT	58

CON'T

REPORT SOURCE 0 1 7 8 L 6 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 1 7 1 1 1 4 8 3 6 1 0 2 5 8 4 9
60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 On 11/14/83, plant personnel determined that silicone foam had been

03 | applied as a substitute for nelson blocks in nelson frames 1R43-1Z2B1

0	4
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 and 1R43-1Z2B2, thus degrading the fire protection capability of both

0	5
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 | penetrations. This event is contrary to the requirements of Tech.

06 | Specs. section 3.13.6. A fire watch was established per Tech. Specs.

67 | section 3.13.6, ACTION a. The health and safety of the public were not

08 | affected by this non-repetitive event (refer to attached narrative).

0 9
 7 8

SYSTEM CODE
 E E 11

CAUSE CODE
 A 12

CAUSE SUBCODE
 C 13

COMPONENT CODE
 P E N T R 14

COMP. SUBCODE
 D 15

VALVE SUBCODE
 Z 16

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER EVENT YEAR
8 3 —
21 22 23

SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 1 0 9 /
24 25 26 27

OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3
28 29

REPORT TYPE X —
30 31

REVISION NO. 1
32

ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS				ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPR-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER				
D	18	Z	19	Z	20	Z	21	0	0	0	0	22	Y	23	N	24	Z	25	X	9	9	9
33		34		35		36		37			40		41		42		43		44			

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The cause of this event is personnel error. The silicone foam was removed from

the penetrations. They were then returned to their design configuration

and satisfactorily visually inspected per the "INSTALLATION AND REPAIR OF

1 2 FIRE BREAKS AND PENETRATIONS: FIRE BARRIERS AND SEALS" procedure (HNP-

6908) and returned to service on 12/06/83.

FACILITY STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)

1 5 G (28) 0 0 0 (29) NA A (31) Worker's Observation

ACTIVITY		CONTENT		RELEASED OF RELEASE		AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY		LOCATION OF RELEASE	
1	6	2	33	2	34	NA	35	NA	36

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES									
NUMBER			TYPE	DESCRIPTION					
1	7	0 0 0	(37) 2	(38) NA					

PERSONNEL INJURIES		DESCRIPTION	41
1	2	3	4
0	0	0	(40) NA

7 8 9 11 12
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)
TYPE DESCRIPTION
8411210082 841025
PDR ADOCK 05000321
IE 22
80

7 8 9 10 NA S PDR 11 80

PUBLICATION (42)

ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)

NRC USE ONLY

2 0 N 44 NA

NAME OF PREPARER T.L. Elton, Acting Supt. Reg. Comp. PHONE (912)367-7851

NARRATIVE REPORT
FOR LER 50-321/1983-109, Rev. 1
Updated Report - Previous Report Date 12/9/83

LICENSEE : GEORGIA POWER COMPANY
FACILITY NAME : EDWIN I. HATCH
DOCKET NUMBER : 50-321

Tech. Specs. section(s) which requires report:

This 30-day LER was previously required by Tech. Specs. section 6.9.1.9.b, because this event showed that the unit did not meet the requirements of Tech. Specs. section 3.13.6.

Plant conditions at the time of the event(s):

The unit was in cold shutdown for fuel re-constitution when this event occurred.

Detailed description of the event(s):

On 11/14/83, plant personnel determined that silicone foam had been applied as a substitute for nelson blocks in nelson frames 1R43-1Z2B1 and 1R43-1Z2B2, which degraded the penetrations' fire protection capability. This event is contrary to Tech. Specs. section 3.13.6 which requires that all penetration fire barriers protecting safety related areas be functional at all times. A fire watch was established per Tech. Specs. section 3.13.6, ACTION a.

Consequences of the event(s):

This event did not affect plant operation, because the plant was in cold shutdown when it was discovered. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.

Status of redundant or backup subsystems and/or systems:

There is no backup system for these penetration fire barriers.

Justification for continued operation:

No justification for continued operation is required, because the unit was in cold shutdown during this event. However, these penetration fire barriers were restored to an operable status before reactor startup.

If repetitive, number of previous LER:

This is a non-repetitive event.

Impact to other systems and/or Unit:

This event had no impact upon other systems in Unit 1, or Unit 2.

Cause(s) of the event(s):

As a result of an engineering review, the cause of this event has been attributed to personnel error in that contract personnel neglected to follow the prescribed procedure (HNP-6908).

Immediate Corrective Action:

The silicone foam was removed and nelson frames 1R43-1Z2B1 and 1R43-1Z2B2 were returned to their design configuration per the Nelson Electric Company's instruction manual. They were satisfactorily visually inspected per the "INSTALLATION AND REPAIR OF FIRE BREAKS AND PENETRATIONS: FIRE BARRIERS AND SEALS" procedure (HNP-6908) and returned to service on 12/06/83.

Supplemental Corrective Action:

The responsible personnel for this event were disciplined.

Scheduled (future) corrective action:

No future corrective action is required.

Action to prevent recurrence (if different from corrective actions):

N/A

Georgia Power Company
Post Office Box 439
Baxley, Georgia 31513
Telephone 912 367-7781
912 537-9444



Georgia Power

34 OCT 31 P 1:17

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant


October 25, 1984
GM-84-907

PLANT E. I. HATCH
Licensee Event Report
Docket No. 50-321

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region II
Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

ATTENTION: Mr. James P. O'Reilly

Attached is Licensee Event Report No. 50-321/1983-109, Rev. 1. This report was previously required by Hatch Unit 1 Technical Specifications Section 6.9.1.9.b.


H. C. Nix
General Manager

TLE
HCN/TLE/djs

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G. F. Head
J. T. Beckham, Jr.
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