

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)  
EDWIN I. HATCH, UNIT IDOCKET NUMBER (2)  
050003211 OF 02TITLE (4)  
T41-F040A and B Actuators Set Up Improperly

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0	1	3	0	8	5	0	0	0			050003211
0	1	3	0	8	5	0	0	0			050003211

OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)									
POWER LEVEL (10)	090	20.402(b)	20.406(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)						
		20.406(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)						
		20.406(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	X 50.73(a)(2)(vi)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)						
		20.406(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)							
		20.406(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)							
		20.406(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)							

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)  
NAME  
T. L. Elton, Acting Superintendent of Regulatory ComplianceTELEPHONE NUMBER  
AREA CODE  
912 367-1785

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)										
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 01/30/85 at approximately 1230 CST with the reactor mode switch in the RUN position and the reactor at 760 MWt (approximately 30% power) engineering personnel determined that the control circuit logic for T41-F032A and B (Standby Gas treatment system supply dampers from the reactor building) would cause them to fail closed on a loss of electrical power.

The Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) stipulates only that Standby Gas treatment (SBGT) system valves fail open on loss of air to the actuators and T41-F032A and B met this requirement.

T41-F040A and B (SBGT supply dampers from the refueling floor) were checked and found to close on loss of electrical power also. Their actuators, however, were set up to fail closed on a loss of air. This conflicts with the FSAR paragraph 5.3.3.3.

The actuators of T41-F040A and B were reversed to allow them to fail open on a loss of air and a DCR was implemented to change the control circuit logic of T41-F032A and B and T41-F040A and B to allow them to fail open on a loss of electrical power.

The valves were satisfactorily functionally tested and declared operable on 02/08/85.

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PDR ADOCK 05000321  
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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)  EDWIN I. HATCH, UNIT I	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0 5 0 0 0 3 2 1 8 5	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		— 0 0	4	— 0 0	0 2	OF	2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

This 30 day LER is required by 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(vii)(C) since a loss of air to the actuators of T41-F040A and B (Standby Gas treatment system supply dampers from the refueling floor) would have rendered the Standby Gas treatment (SBGT) system incapable of taking suction from the refueling floor.

On 01/30/85 at approximately 1230 CST with the reactor mode switch in the RUN position and the reactor at 760 MWt (approximately 30% power) engineering personnel determined that the control circuit logic for T41-F032A and B (SBGT system supply dampers from the reactor building) had been designed to fail closed on a loss of electrical power.

T41-F032A and B did, however, meet the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) requirement of failing open on a loss of air to their actuators. In the interest of consistency and good engineering practice, engineering personnel initiated a DCR to modify the control circuit logic of T41-F032A and B to allow them to fail open on a loss of electrical power.

Further investigation revealed that the control circuit logic for T41-F040A and B would cause those dampers to fail closed on loss of electrical power. It was also discovered that the actuators for T41-F040A and B had been set up improperly during initial installation and would fail closed on a loss of air. This conflicts with the FSAR, paragraph 5.3.3.3.


Although the Unit 1 SBGT system would have been incapable of taking a suction from the refueling floor in the event that air was lost to the actuators of T4-F040A and B, the Unit II SBGT system would have remained able to do so.

The action of the actuators for T41-F040A and B was reversed so that they would fail open on a loss of air and a DCR was implemented to change the control circuits of T41-F032A and B and T41-F040A and B to allow them to fail open on a loss of electrical power.

T41-F032A and B and T41-F040A and B were successfully functionally tested and the system was returned to service on 02/08/85.

No actual or potential safety consequences resulted from these events nor was the health and safety of the public affected.

Georgia Power Company  
Post Office Box 439  
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Telephone 912 367-7781  
912 537-9444




Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant

February 26, 1985  
GM-85-172

PLANT E. I. HATCH  
Licensee Event Report  
Docket No. 50-321

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Attached is Licensee Event Report No. 50-321/1985-004. This report is required by 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii).

  
H. C. Nix  
General Manager

*see*  
HCN/TLE/vlz

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11