

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

EXHIBIT A

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 2 3 4 5 6

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

REPORT SOURCE 60 DOCKET NUMBER 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10
On June 23, 1983, with the unit at 100% power, 2CV-1511-1, service water tank isolation valve to reactor building cooling loop I, failed to open during its 14-day surveillance test. Reactor building cooling loop II remained operable. A similar event was reported by (50-368) LER-81-012. This is reportable per Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b.

SYSTEM CODE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

ACTION TAKEN 33 FUTURE ACTION 34 EFFECT ON PLANT 35 SHUTDOWN METHOD 36 HOURS 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27
The cause of this event was the manual closing of the valve to prevent leakage which over-tightened the valve. When called upon to open during the surveillance test, the motor operator tripped on overload before the disk was able to move from its seat. Corrective action has been to adjust the limit switch on the operator to allow the valve to fully close without manual tightening. The carbon steel valves and their operators for 2CV-1511-1, 2CV-1519-1, 2CV-1510-2 and 2CV-1513-2 were replaced with stainless steel valves (Continued)

FACILITY STATUS 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

PUBLICITY ISSUED 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

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ATTACHMENT

LER NO. 50-368/83-027/03X-1

Cause Description and Corrective Actions (Continued)

and new operators during the last refueling outage. These are service water inlet and outlet isolation valves for reactor building cooling loops I and II. This work was completed and the system returned to operations on 01/04/84. Since replacement, operation of these valves has been satisfactory.



ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
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February 25, 1985

2CAN028510


U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 2
Docket No. 50-368
License No. NPF-6
Licensee Event Report
No. 83-027/03X-1

Gentlemen:

In accordance with Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 2 Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b, attached is the subject report concerning failure of service water inlet isolation valve 2CV-1511-1 to open. This is a revision to a previous submittal dated July 18, 1983.

Very truly yours,


J. Ted Enos
Manager, Licensing

JTE:RJS:ds

Attachment

cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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