

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)  
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station - Unit No. 1

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

0 5 0 0 0 2 9 3 1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)

Inadequate Surveillance Procedure

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)		REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)									
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)							
0	1	2	8	5	8	5	0	0	2	0	5	0	0	0			

OPERATING MODE (9)	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)											
POWER LEVEL (10) 1, 0, 0	20.402(b)			20.406(a)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)			73.71(b)		
	20.406(a)(1)(i)			50.38(c)(1)			50.73(a)(2)(v)			73.71(e)		
	20.406(a)(1)(ii)			50.38(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)			OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 355A)		
	20.406(a)(1)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)					
	20.406(a)(1)(iv)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)					
	20.406(a)(1)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(ix)					

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Paul J. Hamilton, Sr. Plant Engineer	AREA CODE 61117 714161-17191010

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
	X				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 1/28/85 the implementing procedures for two surveillance tests, required by the Technical Specifications (T.S.), were determined to be inadequate. The T.S. surveillances require a functional test of the MSIV and turbine stop valve reactor protection system (RPS) instrument channels and valve closure alarms. The problem was that the T.S. implementing procedures did not test the closure alarm function. The alarms provide indication only in the control room.

Cause was determined to be a management deficiency which allowed inadequate T.S. implementing procedures. Corrective action was to revise existing procedures by adding provisions for functional testing of the subject alarms.

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station	0500029385	—	002	—00	02	OF	02

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 362A's) (17)

On 1/28/85, during steady state operation, Station personnel identified two implementing procedures of Technical Specification (T.S.) surveillance tests which were inadequate. The T.S. surveillances, listed in T.S. Table 4.1.1, are a functional test of the Main Steam Line Isolation Valve and Turbine Stop Valve instrument channels and valve closure alarms. The problem was that T.S. implementing procedures did not test the closure alarm function at the required 1-month interval. These alarms provide indication only on Panel 905 in the control room and have no logic function.

The problem was discovered by Station personnel when investigating a Quality Assurance Department finding, which stated that Station procedures, for functional testing of the above-mentioned alarms, could not be located. Further investigation showed that a functional test of the valve closure alarms is performed semi-annually as part of Procedure 8.M.1-25, MSIV Logic Channels, and 8.M.1-26, Turbine Stop Valve Closure. Cause of the problem was determined to be a management deficiency in that the two T.S. surveillance tests were not adequate.

Corrective action was to revise T.S. implementing Procedures 8.M.1-14 and 8.M.1-11, which are the MSIV and Turbine Stop Valve closure functional test procedures, to include provisions for functional testing of the valve closure alarms. In addition, a Temporary Modification (#85-11), was implemented to allow functional testing of the alarms. The MSIV and Turbine Stop Valve functional alarm tests were successfully completed on 2/14/85 and 2/19/85, respectively. These procedures, which now include the alarm functional test, will be performed in accordance with the T.S. as part of the master surveillance tracking program.

To preclude recurrence, BECo will continue with the increased effort, such as the QA audit which identified this problem, to improve the quality of the PNPS procedures that implement the Technical Specifications. Included in this effort is the development of a computerized procedure/T.S. cross reference matrix and a revision to the QA audit program which was made to expand the scope of T.S. audits.

There were no system or component failures identified during this event. This event did not impact the health and safety of the public.

A similar event was identified in LER 83-057.

BOSTON EDISON COMPANY  
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WILLIAM D. HARRINGTON  
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT  
NUCLEAR

February 28, 1985  
BECO Ltr. #85-044

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555


Docket Number 50-293  
License DPR-35

Dear Sir:

The attached Licensee Event Report 85-002-00, "Inadequate Surveillance Procedure," is hereby submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.73.

If there are any questions on this subject, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Respectfully submitted,

  
W. D. Harrington

PH:caw

Enclosure: LER 85-002-00

cc: Dr. Thomas E. Murley  
Regional Administrator, Region I  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Standard BECO LER Distribution

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1/1