

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--------|---|----------------|---------------------|-----------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------|-----------------------|---|--|--|---------------------------------|--|-----|------|
| FACILITY NAME (1) Calvert Cliffs, Unit 2 | | | | | | | | | | DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 1 1 8 | | | | PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 3 | | |
| TITLE (4) Power Operated Relief Valve override handswitches left in override position. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| EVENT DATE (5) | | | LER NUMBER (6) | | | | REPORT DATE (7) | | | OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) | | | | | | |
| MONTH | DAY | YEAR | YEAR | SEQUENTIAL NUMBER | REVISION NUMBER | MONTH | DAY | YEAR | FACILITY NAMES N/A | | | | DOCKET NUMBER(S) 0 5 0 0 0 0 | | | |
| 0 8 | 2 4 | 8 4 | 8 4 | 0 0 7 | 0 0 | 0 9 | 2 0 | 8 4 | | | | | 0 5 0 0 0 0 | | | |
| OPERATING MODE (9) | | THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| POWER LEVEL (10) 1 0 0 | | 20.402(b) | | | | 20.406(c) | | | | 50.73(a)(2)(iv) | | | | 73.71(b) | | |
| | | 20.406(a)(1)(i) | | | | 50.36(c)(1) | | | | X 50.73(a)(2)(v) | | | | 73.71(c) | | |
| | | 20.406(a)(1)(ii) | | | | 50.36(c)(2) | | | | 50.73(a)(2)(vi) | | | | OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A) | | |
| | | 20.406(a)(1)(iii) | | | | 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | | | 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | | | | | |
| | | 20.406(a)(1)(iv) | | | | 50.73(a)(2)(ii) | | | | 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | | | | | |
| | | 20.406(a)(1)(v) | | | | 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | | | | 50.73(a)(2)(ix) | | | | | | |
| LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| NAME Michael A. Junge, Operations Engineer | | | | | | | | | | TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 3 0 1 2 6 0 - 4 9 6 9 | | | | | | |
| COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| CAUSE | SYSTEM | COMPONENT | MANUFACTURER | REPORTABLE TO NPDOS | | CAUSE | SYSTEM | COMPONENT | MANUFACTURER | REPORTABLE TO NPDOS | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) | | | | | | | | | | | | EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15) | | MONTH | DAY | YEAR |
| <input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) | | | | | | | | | | | | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO | | | | |

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At 0530, on 8-24-84, the Power Operated Relief Valve override handswitches were discovered to be in the "OVERRIDE" position. With the Power Operated Relief Valve override handswitch in the "OVERRIDE" position, the Power Operated Relief Valves will not open rendering them inoperable. The Power Operated Relief Valve override handswitches were immediately placed in the "AUTO" position. Technical Specifications require the block valves associated with each inoperable Power Operated Relief Valve be shut and power removed within one hour. The Power Operated Relief Valve override handswitches were placed in the "OVERRIDE" position, as permitted by operating procedures, during the last reactor cooldown on 8-8-84. On 8-12-84, at 1750, the reactor entered Mode 3 with the Power Operated Relief Valve override handswitches in the "OVERRIDE" position. The Power Operated Relief Valve override handswitches remaining in the "OVERRIDE" position as the reactor entered Mode 3 was due in part to a procedural inadequacy as the operating procedure in use did not require the operator to verify the Power Operated Relief Valve override handswitches in the "AUTO" position. The procedure contained a "NOTE", which was overlooked by the Control Room Operator, to ensure the override handswitches are in the "AUTO" position. The procedure has been changed to require the operator to verify the Power Operated Relief Valve override handswitches are in the "AUTO" position.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

| FACILITY NAME (1) | DOCKET NUMBER (2) | LER NUMBER (6) | | | PAGE (3) | | |
|------------------------|-------------------|----------------|-------------------|-----------------|----------|----|----|
| | | YEAR | SEQUENTIAL NUMBER | REVISION NUMBER | | | |
| Calvert Cliffs, Unit 2 | 05000318 | 84 | 007 | 00 | 02 | OF | 03 |

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

On 8-24-84, at 0530, during normal power operation, both Power Operated Relief Valve (PCV) override handswitches were discovered to be in the "OVERRIDE" position. With the Power Operated Relief Valve override handswitches (HS) in the "OVERRIDE" position, the Power Operated Relief Valves will not open on high Pressurizer pressure rendering the valves inoperable. The Power Operated Relief Valve override handswitches were immediately placed in the "AUTO" position returning the valves to operable status. The "AUTO" position allows the Power Operated Relief Valves to open on Pressurizer high pressure, approximately 2385 psi. The Power Operated Relief Valves were not required to open and remained shut throughout the event. The Pressurizer Code Safety Valves remained operable throughout the event.

Technical Specifications require that the block valves associated with each inoperable Power Operated Relief Valve be shut and power removed within one hour. Shutting the block valves prevents Reactor Coolant System (AB) depressurization if the Power Operated Relief Valve were to open. With the Power Operated Relief Valve override handswitches in the "OVERRIDE" position, the Power Operated Relief Valves will not open, fulfilling the function required of the block valves, therefore, no actual or potential safety consequences were associated with this event.

The fact that the block valves associated with the inoperable Power Operated Relief Valves were not shut and power removed within one hour after entering Mode 3 is a violation of Technical Specification 3/4.4.3.a.

The Power Operated Relief Valve override handswitches were placed in the "OVERRIDE" position in accordance with operating procedures during the last reactor cool-down on 8-8-84. Since no record exists of the handswitches being returned to the "AUTO" position, prior to the reactor entering Mode 3 and no evolution requiring the placement of the handswitches to the "OVERRIDE" position occurred during the interim period, it is surmized that the Power Operated Relief Valve override handswitches were in the "OVERRIDE" position since 8-8-84.

Failure to return the Power Operated Relief Valve handswitches to the "AUTO" position resulted in part from an inadequacy in OP-1, Plant Startup from Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby which did not contain a step to direct the operator to return the handswitch to the "AUTO" position. The operating procedure did contain a "NOTE" to ensure the Power Operated Relief Valve override handswitches were placed in the "AUTO" position but the note was apparently overlooked by the Control Room Operator. The operating procedure has been changed to require the Power Operated Relief Valve override handswitches be in the "AUTO" position prior to entering Mode 3.

All applicable operating procedures were reviewed to ensure other functions are not bypassed unless the bypass is annunciated or the operating procedures contain specific steps to return the bypasses to normal. It appears that Technical Specification 3/4.4.3 may unnecessarily require the block valves be shut when the associated Power Operated Relief Valve is failed shut.

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DOCKET NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER (6)

PAGE (3)

Calvert Cliffs, Unit 2

0500031884-007-C003 OF 03

TEXT (If more space is required use additional NRC Form 388A's) (17)

Consideration will be given to requesting revision or deletion of this on
of the Technical Specification.

No similar events have previously been reported.

BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

P.O. BOX 1475

BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21203

NUCLEAR POWER DEPARTMENT
CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
LUSBY, MARYLAND 20657

September 20, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Docket No. 50-318
License No. DPR 69

Dear Sirs:

The attached LER 84-07 is being sent to you as required by
10 CFR 50.73.

Should you have any questions regarding this report, we would
be pleased to discuss them with you.

Very truly yours,

L B Russell

L. B. Russell
Plant Superintendent

LBR:MAJ:mdh
Attachment

cc: Dr. Thomas E. Murley
Director, Office of Management Information
and Program Control
Messrs: A. E. Lundvall, Jr.
J. A. Tiernan

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