

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)  
Davis-Besse Unit 1

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

0 5 0 0 0 3 4 6 1 OF 0 2

PAGE (3)

TITLE (4)  
INOPERABLE FIRE BARRIER PENETRATION INTO CHANNEL 2 CABINET OF REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM.

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)		REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)								
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)						
0	8	2	1	8	4	8	4	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)										0	5	0	0	0	0	0
OPERATING MODE (9)			20.402(b)		20.405(c)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)							
POWER LEVEL (10)			20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(e)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(a)							
19			20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(e)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)							
4			20.405(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)									
			20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)									
			20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(ix)									
			20.405(a)(1)(vi)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(x)									

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Jan Stotz, Ext. 372	AREA CODE 4 1 9 2 5 9 - 5 0 0 0

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	
X	M	D	P	E	N	Z	9	9	9	N	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On August 18, 1984 at 0140 hours, an operator performing ST 5099.01, Miscellaneous Instruments Shift check, noticed light coming through the floor around a conduit going into the bottom of Reactor Protection System Channel 2 cabinet. The light was coming from the cable spread room one floor level below. It appeared that part of the temporary Kaowool packing around the conduit had fallen out. On duty electricians immediately stuffed additional Kaowool in the penetration to ensure compliance with the action statement of Technical Specification 3.7.10. On August 21 Engineering determined that the penetration had been inoperable in the previous as found condition.

8410020011 840920  
PDR ADDCK 05000346  
S PDR

IE22

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)  Davis-Besse Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0 5 0 0 0	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
						OF

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 368A's) (17)

Description of Occurrence: On August 17, 1984 at 0140 hours, a control room operator performing ST 5099.01, Miscellaneous Instruments Shift Check, noticed light coming through the floor around a conduit going into the bottom of the Reactor Protection System, RPS, (JD) Channel 2 cabinet. It was a 2½ inch conduit through a 3½ inch hole and did have some Kaowool packed in it. The station complied with the action statement of Technical Specification by having additional Kaowool stuffed into the penetration within one hour.

The condition was reported to Facility Engineering for their determination of operability of the barrier in the as-found condition. They concluded on August 21, 1984, that they had no criteria to use to call it operable. Therefore, the barrier should be considered to have been inoperable.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The exact cause cannot be determined. It appeared that Kaowool had fallen out of sections of the penetration. This penetration along with others in the wall separating the cable spread room and the cabinet room had been previously temporarily sealed and were identified as needing permanent sealing. However, the work had not been allowed during normal plant operations because it would require work in the safety system cabinets. Any such work is normally reserved for plant outages. It appears that the Kaowool may have fallen out due to inadequate initial installation. Additional cabinets were inspected and no similar problems were found.

Analysis of Occurrence: Both the control room and the cable spread room contain numerous smoke detectors which would provide early warning of fire problems. This penetration only affected one RPS Channel and the remaining channels would still have been capable of protecting the reactor.

Corrective Action: The penetration was stuffed with additional Kaowool within one hour by on duty electricians under generic Maintenance Work Order (MWO) 1-84-0008-02. This removed the station from the action statement.

This penetration had been previously identified as needing permanent sealing under FCR 79-184, and is planned to be sealed during the 1984 refueling outage.

Failure Data: Previous findings of inadequately sealed fire barriers were reported in NP 33-84-11 (LER 84-011) and NP 33-83-79 (LER 83-058.)

Report No: NP-33-84-12

DVR No(s): 84-135



September 20, 1984

Log No. K84-1173  
File: RR 2 (NP-33-84-12)

Docket No. 50-346  
License No. NPF-3

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

LER No. 84-012  
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1  
Date of Occurrence: August 21, 1984

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report 84-012, which is being submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73, to provide 30 day written notification of the subject occurrence.

Yours truly,

Stephen M. Quennoz  
Plant Manager  
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

SMQ/bec

Enclosure

cc: Mr. James G. Keppler,  
Regional Administrator,  
USNRC Region III

Mr. Walt Rogers  
DB-1 NRC Resident Inspector

JCS/001

IE22  
11