

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)  
LaSalle County Station Unit 2

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

0 5 0 0 0 3 7 4 1 OF 0 3

PAGE (3)

TITLE (4)

Failure of "B" RHR Full Flow Test Valve to Close

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)																
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)														
0	8	1	8	8	4	8	4	-	0	5	5	-	0	0	0	9	1	4	8	4	0	5	0	0	0

OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5 (Check one or more of the following) (11)									
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 0 0	20.402(b)		20.406(a)(1)(i)		20.406(c)		80.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)	
		20.406(a)(1)(ii)		20.406(a)(1)(iii)		80.36(c)(1)		80.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)	
		20.406(a)(1)(iv)		20.406(a)(1)(v)		80.36(c)(2)		80.73(a)(2)(vi)		OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)	
		20.406(a)(1)(vi)		20.406(a)(1)(vii)		80.73(a)(2)(ii)		80.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)			
		20.406(a)(1)(viii)		20.406(a)(1)(ix)		80.73(a)(2)(iii)		80.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)			
		20.406(a)(1)(x)		20.406(a)(1)(xi)		80.73(a)(2)(iv)		80.73(a)(2)(ix)			

NAME		TELEPHONE NUMBER	
AREA CODE		NUMBER	
Aras R. Lintakas, extension 324		8 1 5 3 5 7 1 - 6 7 6 1	

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)									
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC
X	B	O	V	A 3 9 1	N				

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO					

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

While cycling the 2B Residual Heat Removal (BO) Full Flow Test Valve, 2E12-F024B, after maintenance activities on the 2B RHR pump, the valve failed to close on demand. The interface between the valve stem and disc was loose, allowing the disk to tilt excessively. This allowed the disk to jam into the side guides of the valve, forcing it to fail. The consequences of the incident were minimal since all other ECCS systems were operable.

Immediately upon determining that a problem existed, Maintenance personnel were dispatched to troubleshoot it. When the cause was determined, a skirt was added to the disk to increase the area contacting the side guides, which could keep the disk from cocking and jamming.

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
LaSalle County Station Unit 2	05000374	84	055	00	02	OF 03

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 388A's) (17)

I. EVENT DESCRIPTION

On August 18, 1984, at 0200 hours, the Residual Heat Removal system (BO) Full Flow Test Valve, 2E12-F024B, failed to close while cycling the valve after maintenance activities on the 2B RHR pumps. At 0415 hours, a GSEP Unusual Event was declared due to the implementation of the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.6.3. At 0240 hours on August 19, 1984, the reactor was brought to Cold Shutdown, thus ending the GSEP Unusual Event.

II. CAUSE

This valve is manufactured by Anchor Darling Valve Company.

The interface between the valve stem and disk was loose, allowing the disk to move excessively. When the valve was opened partially, to full flow at 7200 gpm, and the NSO tried to electrically close the valve, the disk would cock and jam into the side guides. As the valve was taken to 8000 gpm, the valve was allowed to float and even out (i.e., moves to the horizontal position). Thus, it was possible to bring the valve closed from this flow.

III. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE EVENT

The significance of the event was minimal for three reasons. Firstly, the valve was closeable from a position greater than that required for full flow of the RHR pump. So in the event of an accident, the valve could be closed.

Secondly, the RHR system is part of the Primary Containment during an accident which requires the use of this system. The failure of the 2E12-F024B valve to close did not, therefore, compromise the integrity of Primary Containment.

Thirdly, all other ECCS systems were operable at the time of the incident.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Immediately upon determining that a problem existed, Mechanics were sent to investigate and attempt a repair or reset the limits under Work Request L40098. Work Request L40158 was written to remove the motor and to disconnect the limitorque so that the Mechanics could go in and disassemble the valve.

Modification M-1-2-84-150 was generated to add a skirt above the disk, so that there would be more surface area in contact with the side guides, thereby eliminating the possibility of the disk cocking.

# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 386A's) (17)

## V. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES

None.

## VI. NAME AND TELEPHONE NUMBER OF PREPARER

Aras R. Lintakas, 815/357-6761, extension 324.



**Commonwealth Edison**  
LaSalle County Nuclear Station  
Rural Route #1, Box 220  
Marseilles, Illinois 61341  
Telephone 815/357-6761

September 14, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

Reportable Occurrence Report #84-055-00, Docket #050-374 is being submitted to your office in accordance with 10CFR 50.73.

*for* *CE Sargent*  
G. J. Diederich  
Superintendent  
LaSalle County Station

GJD/MLD/kg

Enclosure

xc: NRC, Regional Director  
INPO - Records Center  
File/NRC

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