



NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION / 300 ERIE BOULEVARD WEST, SYRACUSE, N.Y. 13202 / TELEPHONE (315) 474-1511

August 10, 1984
(NMP2L 0123)

Mr. R. W. Starostecki, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
Division of Project and Resident Programs
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Re: Nine Mile Point Unit 2
Docket No. 50-410

Dear Mr. Starostecki:

Enclosed is a final report in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e) for the problem concerning service life of relays in safety-related systems. This problem was reported via telecon to W. Lazerus of your staff on June 13, 1984. Via telecons with S. Collins of your staff, the final report was initially scheduled for July 30, 1984 and subsequently rescheduled for August 10, 1984.

Very truly yours,

C. V. Mangano
Vice President
Nuclear Engineering & Licensing

GAG/ca

Enclosure

xc: Director of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Project File (2)

8408300362 840810
PDR ADOCK 05000410
S PDR

1/1 E27

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION
NINE MILE POINT UNIT 2
DOCKET NO. 50-410

Final Report for a Problem Concerning the
Service Life of Relays in Safety-Related Systems
(55(e)-84-21)

Description of the Problem

The problem concerns the earlier than anticipated end-of-service life failures for relays in energized applications used in safety-related systems. The relays identified in NRC IE Information Notice 84-20 are Agastat GP series relays manufactured by Amerace Corporation and GTE Sylvania ac relays manufactured by GTE Sylvania Corporation. Only Agastat GP series relays are used in Nine Mile Point Unit 2 design.

Review of Nine Mile Point Unit 2 design revealed that Agastat GP series relays have been used throughout the plant in both energized and deenergized applications in safety-related Class IE circuits.

Analysis of Safety Implications

The qualified end-of-service life for these relays has not been established for the Nine Mile Point Unit 2 design. However, earlier-than-anticipated end-of-service life of these relays could have prevented the safety-related circuits in which they are located from performing their design function prior to detection by surveillance. Therefore, if this problem were to have remained uncorrected, it could have adversely affected the safe operations of the plant.

Corrective Action

To correct the problem, a replacement parts program will be developed for Nine Mile Point Unit 2 to replace these relays in an interval based on the service life determined by General Electric Company and Amerace. The corrective action will be implemented by July 15, 1985.

REF ID: A5 3 02