

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) DIABLO CANYON, UNIT 1										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 7 5 1										PAGE (3) 1 OF 02									
TITLE (4) INADVERTENT ESF ACTUATION DURING JUMPER INSTALLATION																													
EVENT DATE (5)						LER NUMBER (6)						REPORT DATE (7)						OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)											
MONTH		DAY		YEAR		YEAR		SEQUENTIAL NUMBER		REVISION NUMBER		MONTH		DAY		YEAR		FACILITY NAMES DIABLO CANYON UNIT 2						DOCKET NUMBER(S) 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 3					
0 7		1 4		8 4		8 4		0 1 9		0 0		0 8		1 3		8 4								0 5 0 0 0					
OPERATING MODE (9) 5						THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 8: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																							
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0						20.402(b)						20.405(c)						<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(iv)						73.71(b)					
						20.406(a)(1)(i)						80.36(c)(1)						80.73(a)(2)(v)						73.71(c)					
						20.403(a)(1)(ii)						80.36(c)(2)						80.73(a)(2)(vii)						OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 306A)					
						20.406(a)(1)(iii)						80.73(a)(2)(i)						80.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)											
						20.405(a)(1)(iv)						80.73(a)(2)(ii)						80.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)											
20.406(a)(1)(v)						80.73(a)(2)(iii)						80.73(a)(2)(ix)																	
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																													
NAME DAVID P. SISK, REGULATORY COMPLIANCE ENGINEER																TELEPHONE NUMBER 8 0 5 5 9 5 - 7 3 5 1													
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																													
CAUSE		SYSTEM		COMPONENT		MANUFACTURER		REPORTABLE TO NRC		CAUSE		SYSTEM		COMPONENT		MANUFACTURER		REPORTABLE TO NRC											
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)																EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH		DAY		YEAR							
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE:)																<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO													

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

While in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown), the control room ventilation system, an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), was actuated and transferred to the pressurization mode. The event was initiated while installing jumpers in preparation for the performance of Unit 2 start-up procedure TP 35.1 (response time testing). The cause of the event was determined to be an error on Drawing No. 458828 that showed slave relay K605 as a normally closed contact when in fact it is a normally open contact. A Field Change Transmittal (FCT) has been issued to correct the affected drawing. In addition, wiring schematics for all Unit 2 solid state protection system output contacts have been checked and verified against the diagrams of connection.

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PDR ADOCK 05000275
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1) DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0500027584-019-0002 OF 02	LER NUMBER (8)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On July 14, 1984 at 1417 PDT, the Control Room Ventilation System (CRVS) for both units switched from normal mode to the pressurization mode. The event occurred while installing jumpers in preparation for Unit 2 start-up test TP 35.1 (response time testing).

The cause of this event was determined to be a drawing error. Drawing No. 458828 showed the CRVS contact for slave relay K605 (RLY) as normally closed (NC) when, in fact, it is a normally open (NO) contact. Installing of the jumper completed the circuit for a phase "A" signal to the CRVS.

The jumper was removed and the CRVS was returned to normal operation.

To prevent future activations of the CRVS for Unit 2, the relay that initiated the ESF actuation has been isolated until fuel loading in Unit 2.

A Field Change Transmittal (FCT) has been issued to correct the affected drawing. In addition, wiring schematics for all Unit 2 solid state protection system output contacts have been checked and verified against the diagrams of connection.

The switching of the CRVS from normal mode to pressurization mode does not affect the health and safety of the public.

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PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

PG&E

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JAMES D. SHIFFER
MANAGER

DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATIONS
NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION

August 13, 1984

PGandE Letter No.: DCL-84-284

Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555


Re: Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-76
Diablo Canyon Unit 1
Licensee Event Report 84-019-00
Inadvertent ESF Actuation During Jumper Installation

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), PGandE is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report concerning an actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) system (control room ventilation system).

This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.

Sincerely,


J. D. Shiffer

Enclosure

cc: J. B. Martin
Service List

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