NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Nine Mile Point Unit #1	0 5 0 0 0 2 2 0	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)

Both Fuel Zone Water Level Monitoring System Channels Inoperable Simultaneously

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 7	1 3	8 4	8 4	— 0 0 9	— 0 0	0 8	1 3	8 4		0 5 0 0 0
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)							
POWER LEVEL (10)	1 0 0		20.402(b)		20.405(c)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)
			20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)
			20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)	XX	50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
			20.405(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		
			20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)		
			20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE
R. Randall, Supervisor Technical Services	3 1 6 — 3 4 9 - 2 4 4 5

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

ABSTRACT

During normal operations on 7/13/84, at approximately 0750 hrs, there was a short loss of the plant process computer. When the computer went down, it caused each Acurex channel to become inoperable. Each channel was disconnected from the computer, and manually restored to an operable status approximately 15 minutes after the event occurred. Software changes have been implemented to prevent this type of event from recurring.

IE22
1/1

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Nine Mile Point Unit #1	0 5 0 0 0 2 2 0	8 4	— 0 0 9	— 0 0	0 2 OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

TEXT

During normal operations on 7/13/84, at approximately 0750 hrs, there was a short loss of the plant process computer. At the time the computer went down, both channels of the Acurex Fuel Zone Water Level Monitoring System were linked to the computer to allow special troubleshooting and diagnosis activities on the data communication link to be performed which began on 7/12/84. Normally only one channel of Acurex is linked to the computer. These activities were all performed in compliance with the plant's Technical Specifications. Since the data link was operating in a remote enable mode, a halt command was sent by the computer to each channel in preparation for data collection; however, the command to have each channel transmit its data to the computer was not sent before the computer went down. As a direct result of this computer loss, each channel remained locked up in the halt state, making each channel inoperable simultaneously.

ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL SAFETY CONSEQUENCES

With each channel of the Fuel Zone Water Level Monitoring System inoperable, there was no longer any way to monitor the parameters which are monitored by the Acurex. However, other accurate water level indicators in the plant were available and operable. These indicators could have been used as a backup to accurately monitor these parameters. In this incident, the Acurex channels were inoperable for approximately 15 minutes. During this event, there were no transients or actuations of any of the plant's Engineered Safety Features. The Acurex is designed to be used during post-accident conditions; therefore, there was no immediate need for its post-accident monitoring capabilities. Therefore, the potential safety consequences arising out of this event were minimal.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Each channel was disconnected from the computer, and was manually restored to an operable status approximately 15 minutes after the event occurred. A data flow mode for the data link was substituted in place of the remote command enable mode. This substitute mode allows each Acurex channel to operate independently of the computer. In this mode, the Acurex channels do not receive any commands from the computer. As a result, if the computer were to go down in the future, it could not directly cause each channel of Acurex to halt or become inoperable, as it did in this incident.

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

NIAGARA MOHAWK

300 ERIE BOULEVARD, WEST
SYRACUSE, N. Y. 13202

August 13, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

RE: Docket No. 50-220
LER 84-09

Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, we hereby submit the following Licensee Event Report:

LER 84-09 which is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (vii) (D), "Any event where a single cause or condition caused at least one independent train or channel to become inoperable in multiple systems or two independent trains or channels to become inoperable in a single system designed to mitigate the consequences of an accident."

The report was completed in the format designated in NUREG-1022, dated September 1983.

Very truly yours,

C. V. Mangan
Vice President
Nuclear Engineering & Licensing

Attachments (3 copies)
cc: Dr. Thomas E. Murley

IE22
1/1