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November 28, 1995

Docket No. 50-366

HL-5073


U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant
Special Report 2-95-003
Fire Barrier Assembly Inoperable for Greater Than 14 Days

Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of the Fire Hazards Analysis, Georgia Power Company is submitting the enclosed Special Report concerning a fire rated assembly which was inoperable for longer than 14 days as the result of planned activities.

Sincerely,



J. T. Beckham, Jr.

JKB/eb

Enclosure: Special Report 2-95-003

cc: Georgia Power Company
Mr. H. L. Sumner, Nuclear Plant General Manager
NORMS

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C.
Mr. K. Jabbour, Licensing Project Manager - Hatch

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II
Mr. S. D. Ebnetter, Regional Administrator
Mr. B. L. Holbrook, Senior Resident Inspector - Hatch

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Enclosure

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Special Report 2-95-003
Fire Barrier Assembly Inoperable for Greater Than 14 Days

A. Requirement for Report

This report is required by the Plant Hatch Unit 1 and Unit 2 Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA), Appendix B, Section 1.1.1.

FHA Appendix B, Section 1.1.1, states:

Fire-rated assemblies and sealing devices in fire-rated assembly penetrations separating portions of safety-related fire areas or separating redundant systems important to safe shutdown within a fire area shall be OPERABLE.

Furthermore, action statement (a) of Appendix B, Section 1.1.1, allows the fire rated assembly and/or sealing device to be inoperable for up to 14 days provided, within 1 hour, a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected assembly(ies) and/or sealing device(s) is established, or fire detectors are verified operable on at least one side of the inoperable barrier and an hourly fire watch patrol is established. Action statement (b) states that, if the barrier is not returned to operable status within 14 days, a special report must be submitted to the Commission within the next 30 days. In the event described in this report, fire door 2L48-2R23 had been inoperable for greater than 14 days.

B. Unit Status at Time of Event

On October 29, 1995 Unit 2 was in a planned refueling outage with the reactor vessel in refuel mode.

C. Description of Event

This report describes an event in which a fire rated assembly was breached in a controlled manner to support work activities during the Unit 2 refueling outage and, as a result, was required to remain inoperable for more than 14 days. On September 24, 1995 at 0732 EDT, fire door 2L48-2R23 was blocked open, Fire Action 2-95-031 was entered, and an hourly fire watch was established as required by the FHA, Appendix B, Section 1.1.1, action statement (a). On October 2, 1995, off load of the nuclear fuel from the reactor vessel was completed and fire door 2L48-2R23 was no longer required to be operable. On October 24, 1995, fuel reload was initiated which again made fire door 2L48-2R23 inoperable. On October 29, 1995, fire door 2L48-2R23 had remained inoperable for longer than 14 days. The fire door was restored to an operable status on October 31, 1995.

D. Cause of the Event

The fire rated assembly was breached in a controlled manner to support scheduled refueling outage work. Fire door 2L48-2R23 serves as an entrance between the Turbine Building and Reactor Building 130 foot elevation and as such is located in a high personnel traffic area. Fire door 2L48-2R23 was blocked open in a controlled manner during the Unit 2 refueling outage to prevent damage to the door and to allow easier access.

E. Analysis of Event

In this event, Operations personnel declared fire door 2L48-2R23 inoperable on September 24, 1995. Appropriate fire detectors were verified to be operable and an hourly fire watch patrol was established as required by the FHA, Appendix B, Section 1.1.1, action statement (a).

F. Corrective Actions

Fire door 2L48-2R23 was declared inoperable. Fire Action 2-95-031 was initiated, appropriate fire detectors were verified to be operable, and an hourly fire watch was established as required by the FHA, Appendix B, Section 1.1.1, action statement (a). These actions were taken on September 24, 1995 when the door was blocked open in a controlled manner.

Fire door 2L48-2R23 was restored to operable status on October 31, 1995, and Fire Action 2-95-031 was terminated.