

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:

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(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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7	8	9	LICENEE CODE					14	15	LICENSE NUMBER										25	26	LICENSE TYPE				30	57	CAT	58

CON'T

REPORT SOURCE: 0 1 7 8

DOCKET NUMBER: 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

EVENT DATE: 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

REPORT DATE: 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 (NP-33-83-41) On 7/6/83 at 1215 hours, door 306, the access door to the Fuel Handling
0 3 Area, was found partially ajar. This door is both a fire barrier and a negative pres-
0 4 sure boundary door. This occurrence is being reported under T.S. 3.7.10 and 3.9.12.
0 5 There was no danger to the public or station personnel. Smoke detector instruments
0 6 and sprinklers are located in the area and would have provided adequate protection had
0 7 a fire occurred. Also, both Emergency Ventilation System (EVS) trains were operable;
0 8 only the effectiveness of the EVS in drawing down the area was reduced.

0 9		SYSTEM CODE A B		11	CAUSE CODE E		12	CAUSE SUBCODE B		13	COMPONENT CODE Z Z Z Z Z Z						14	COMP. SUBCODE Z		15	VALVE SUBCODE Z		16				
7 8		9 10			11 12			12 13			13 18							19 20									
17		LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR 8 3		21 22		23		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 3 5		24 26		27		OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3		28 29		REPORT TYPE X		30 31		REVISION NO. 1		32	
ACTION TAKEN A		FUTURE ACTION X		EFFECT ON PLANT Z		33 34 35		SHUTDOWN METHOD Z		36 37		HOURS 0 0 0 0		22 40		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y		41 42		NPRD-4 FORM SUB. N		43 44		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER Z		45 47	
18 19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30		31		32	

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | The cause was equipment failure. It was found that the closure mechanism was in need
1 1 | of adjustment and that the coordinator of this double door was faulty, preventing the
1 2 | normally used door from closing completely. Upon discovery, the door was immediately
1 3 | closed, removing the unit from the action statements. The coordinator was replaced,
1 4 | and the closure mechanism adjusted.

FACILITY STATUS		% POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
1	5	E (28)	0 7 2 (29) NA	A (31)	Found by Operations personnel

ACTIVITY		CONTENT		RELEASED		OF RELEASE		AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY		LOCATION OF RELEASE	
1	6	Z	(33)	Z	(34)	NA				NA	

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES									
NUMBER		TYPE		DESCRIPTION (39)					
1	7	0	0	0	(37)	Z	(38)	NA	

7	8	9	11	12	13	80
PERSONNEL INJURIES						
NUMBER		DESCRIPTION		(41)		

7 8 9 10 11 12 NA
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)
TYPE DESCRIPTION

11/1

TYPE DESCRIPTION

1	9	Z	(42)	NA
7	8	9	10	

8408170066 840809
BACK 05000346

PUBLICITY
ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) PDR ADUCK 00000 PDR NRC USE ONLY

(2)(0) [N] (44) NA _____

8408170066 840809
PDR ADCK 05000346
S PDR

NRC USE ONLY

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-83-41

DATE OF EVENT: July 6, 1983

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Door 306 was found partially open

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 1, with Power (MWt) = 2005 and Load (Gross MWe) = 666.

Description of Occurrence: On July 6, 1983 at 1215 hours, an operator making his rounds found door 306, the access door to the Fuel Handling Area, partially ajar. This door is both a fire barrier and a negative pressure boundary door.

This occurrence is being reported under Technical Specifications 3.9.12 and 3.7.10. Technical Specification 3.9.12 requires two independent Emergency Ventilation System (EVS) trains to be operable whenever fuel is in the Spent Fuel Storage Pool. With door 306 partially open, the effectiveness of the EVS in the Spent Fuel Pool Area would be reduced in the event the EVS was activated. Technical Specification 3.7.10 requires all fire barriers to be functional at all times.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: It was found that the closure mechanism was in need of adjustment and that the coordinator of this double door was faulty, preventing the normally used door from closing completely.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or station personnel. Smoke detector instruments and sprinklers are located in the area and would have provided adequate protection had a fire occurred. Also, both EVS trains were operable and capable of drawing a suction in the Spent Fuel Pool/Fuel Handling Area. Only the effectiveness of the EVS in drawing down the area to 1/8" water gauge was reduced.

Corrective Action: Upon discovery, the operator immediately closed the door, removing the unit from the action statements.

Station Services replaced the coordinator and adjusted the closure to allow it to work properly. Under Maintenance Work Order 83-3871 a temporary audible alarm has been installed on door 306 to aid personnel in realizing when the door does not completely close.

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-83-41
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Failure Data: Previous similar occurrences of fire and negative pressure boundary doors being found open due to the failure of the closure mechanism have been reported in Licensee Event Reports NP-33-81-06 (81-007), NP-33-81-47 (81-042), NP-33-82-041 (82-003), NP-33-83-48 (82-043), NP-33-83-08 (83-006), and NP-33-83-29 (83-021).



August 9, 1984

Log No. K84-1072
File: RR 2 (NP-33-83-41)

Docket No. 50-346
License No. NPF-3

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

LER No. 83-035
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1
Date of Occurrence: July 6, 1983

Enclosed is Revision 1 to Licensee Event Report 83-035 including revised supplemental information sheets. The revisions to the report are indicated by a "1" in the left margin of each page.

Please replace your previous copy of this report with the attached revision.

Yours truly,

Stephen M. Quennoz
Acting Station Superintendent
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

SMQ/ljk

Enclosure

cc: Mr. James G. Keppler,
Regional Administrator,
USNRC Region III

Mr. Walt Rogers
DB-1 NRC Resident Inspector

JCS/001

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