

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Browns Ferry - Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 2 5 9	1 OF 0 2

956-8141

High-Pressure Coolant Injection Inoperable Due to Valve Automatic Transfer Failure

EVENT DATE (6)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)																
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES					DOCKET NUMBER(S)											
0	7	1	0	8	4	8	4	—	0	2	8	—	0	0	0	8	0	8	8	4	0 5 0 0 0				
																	0 5 0 0 0								

OPERATING MODE (B)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § 1.1206 (Check one or more of the following) (1)			
N		20.406(a)	20.406(a)(1)	20.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(a)
POWER LEVEL (10)	11010	20.406(a)(1)(i)	20.406(a)(1)	X 20.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(a)
		20.406(a)(1)(ii)	20.406(a)(2)	20.73(a)(2)(vi)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 306A)
		20.406(a)(1)(iii)	20.73(a)(2)(i)	20.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.406(a)(1)(iv)	20.73(a)(2)(ii)	20.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.406(a)(1)(v)	20.73(a)(2)(iii)	20.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)					
NAME				TELEPHONE NUMBER	
				AREA CODE	
David L. Smith					

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)											
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO				

[illegible]

During surveillance test 4.2.B-26, "Functional Test for Condensate Storage Level," the automatic discharge transfer logic for the high-pressure coolant injection (HPCI) from discharging to the condensate storage tanks to the reactor vessel failed to work. HPCI maintained its ability to inject into the reactor vessel. The HPCI was declared inoperable and all required redundant systems were proven operable. The problem was a dirty contact on a limit switch. The limit switch contact was cleaned and the surveillance instruction was satisfactorily rerun within six hours.

This event was random thus requiring no further corrective action.

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PDR ADOCK 05000259
B PDR

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Browns Ferry - Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 2 5 9	8 4	— 0 2 8	— 0 0	0 2	OF	0 2

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 388A's) (17)

During normal operation, unit 1 was at 100 percent power, unit 2 was at 60 percent power, and unit 3 was in a refueling outage. This event affected unit 1 only.

Surveillance test 4.2.B-26 was being performed on the high-pressure coolant injection system when the automatic transfer from the condensate storage tanks (KA) to the reactor vessel (RPV) failed. The high-pressure coolant injection maintained its ability to inject into the reactor vessel. The high-pressure coolant injection was declared inoperable. All redundant systems required to be operable by the technical specifications were proven operable.

Upon investigation, a dirty contact on a limit switch (ZIS) was found which prevented the high-pressure coolant injection test line to condensate from isolating. FCV 73-35 and -36 (FCV) were the isolation valves to go closed as the torus suction valve, FCV 73-26, opened. (The other suction valve FCV 73-27 would have closed FCV 73-35 and -36.) The limit switch contact was cleaned and surveillance instruction 4.2.B-26 was successfully performed.


If an accident signal had initiated with the dirty limit switch contact, then as condensate storage level reached its preset low level, FCV 73-26 and -27 would have opened as required. FCV 73-35 and -36 would have closed, but FCV 73-40, the high-pressure coolant injection condensate suction valve, would not have closed as both torus suction valves fully opened. A separate contact on both torus suction valves gives a signal in series to the condensate suction valve. One signal from one valve would not have completed the logic to isolate the condensate suction valve; thus water from condensate would add to torus (PT) volume. The licensed reactor operator would have less than one minute to respond to close FCV 73-40 from the control room from the time of receiving the alarm "suppression chamber high water level" until the technical specification upper water level limit was reached. (Alarm setpoint -1.75 inches; technical specification limit -1 inch.)

No further corrective action is needed.

Responsible Section - None

Previous Similar Events

BFRO-50-259/79028



TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
P. O. Box 2000
Decatur, Alabama 35602

August 8, 1984

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555


Dear Sir:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET
NO. 50-259 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-33 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE
REPORT BFR0-50-259/84028

The enclosed report provides details concerning high-pressure coolant
injection inoperable due to valve automatic transfer. This report is
submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(v).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



G. T. Jones
Plant Manager
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):
Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 2900
Atlanta, GA 30303

INPO Records Center
Suite 1500
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, GA 30339

NRC Resident Inspector, BFN

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