NRC FORM 366
(7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

Line	Field	Entry
0 1	LICENSEE CODE (2)	O H D B S 1
	LICENSE NUMBER (3)	Ø Ø - Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø - Ø Ø
	LICENSE TYPE (4)	4 1 1 1 1
	CAT (5)	
CON'T 0 1	REPORT SOURCE (6)	L
	DOCKET NUMBER (7)	Ø 5 Ø Ø Ø 3 4 6
	EVENT DATE (8)	1 2 2 4 8 3
	REPORT DATE (9)	0 8 0 9 8 4

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 (NP-33-83-104) On 12/24/83 at 0625 hours, the operators received the Borated Water
0 3 Storage Tank (BWST) HI FAIL alarm for Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) Channel
0 4 1. The operators tripped the BWST low level bistable for SFAS Channel 1 as required
0 5 by Action Statement 9 of T.S. 3.3.2.1. After the installation of additional heaters,
0 6 the transmitter indication returned to normal. Surveillance Tests ST 5099.01 and
0 7 ST 5099.05 were performed on 12/25/83 at 1250 hours, and the transmitter was declared
0 8 operable. There was no danger. Three remaining BWST channels were operable.

1 0 9

SYSTEM CODE (11)	CAUSE CODE (12)	CAUSE SUBCODE (13)	COMPONENT CODE (14)	COMP. SUBCODE (15)	VALVE SUBCODE (16)
I B	A	C	H E A T E R	Z	Z

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(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
	8 3	—	Ø 7 4	/	Ø 3	X	—	1

ACTION TAKEN (18)	FUTURE ACTION (19)	EFFECT ON PLANT (20)	SHUTDOWN METHOD (21)	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED (23)	NPRD-4 FORM SUB. (24)	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER (25)	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER (26)
G	Z	Z	Z	Ø Ø Ø Ø	Y	Y	Z	Z 9 9 9

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 A followup investigation found that the heat trace was not properly installed on the
1 1 transmitter piping following work on the transmitter. Instrument & Control mechanics
1 1 2 were reminded of their responsibilities to restore affected equipment to operable
1 3 status. Surveillance Test ST 5031.05 was also modified to ensure proper sequence
1 4 verifies that the freeze protection is properly installed.

Line	Field	Entry
1 5	FACILITY STATUS (28)	E
	% POWER (29)	Ø 2 4
	OTHER STATUS (30)	NA
	METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31)	A
	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)	Operator observation
1 6	ACTIVITY RELEASED (33)	Z
	CONTENT OF RELEASE (34)	Z
	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	NA
	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)	NA
1 7	PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER (37)	Ø Ø Ø
	TYPE (38)	Z
	DESCRIPTION (39)	NA
1 8	PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER (40)	Ø Ø Ø
	DESCRIPTION (41)	NA
1 9	LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE (42)	Z
	DESCRIPTION (43)	NA
2 0	PUBLICITY ISSUED (44)	N
	DESCRIPTION (45)	NA
	NRC USE ONLY	

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DVR 83-194

NAME OF PREPARER: Tom Isley

PHONE: 419-259-5000, Ext. 230

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-83-104

DATE OF EVENT: December 24, 1983

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) Level for Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) Channel 1 failed high

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 1, with Power (MWt) = 195 and Load (Gross MWe) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: On December 24, 1983 at 0625 hours, Control Room operators received the BWST HI FAIL alarm for SFAS Channel 1. A check of the indication showed Channel 1 was failed high. The operators tripped the BWST low level bistable for SFAS Channel 1, per Action Statement 9 of Technical Specification 3.3.2.1.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The apparent cause was personnel error. A followup investigation found the freeze protection heat trace was not properly installed on the transmitter piping. A check of the records showed that the last work done on that transmitter was to install a new transmitter and run Surveillance Test ST 5031.05.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or station personnel. The three remaining BWST level channels were operable and able to perform their design functions.

Corrective Action: The operators had additional heaters installed in the building housing the transmitters. The transmitter indication returned to normal on December 25, 1983 at 1250 hours. Surveillance Tests ST 5099.01 and ST 5099.05 were performed, and the transmitter was declared operable, removing the unit from the action statement of Technical Specification 3.3.2.1. At the weekly shop meeting, all Instrument and Control mechanics were reminded of their responsibility to be sure all support equipment disturbed during maintenance is in proper working order after maintenance is complete. Surveillance Test ST 5031.05 was also modified to change the wording and sequence of verification to ensure that the freeze protection heat trace is properly installed and working.

Failure Data: There have been no previous similar occurrences due to personnel error.

TOLEDO EDISON

August 9, 1984

Log No. K84-1073
File: RR 2 (NP-33-104)

Docket No. 50-346
License No. NPF-3

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

LER No. 83-074
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1
Date of Occurrence: December 24, 1983

Enclosed is Revision 1 to Licensee Event Report 83-074, including revised supplemental information sheet. The revisions to the report are indicated by a "1" in the left margin of each page.

Please replace your previous copy of this report with the attached revision.

Yours truly,

Stephen M. Quennoz

Stephen M. Quennoz
Acting Station Superintendent
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

SMQ/ljk

Enclosure

cc: Mr. James G. Keppler,
Regional Administrator,
USNRC Region III

Mr. Walt Rogers
DB-1 NRC Resident Inspector

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