



Donald C. Shelton  
Vice President - Nuclear  
Davis-Besse

300 Madison Avenue  
Toledo, OH 43652-0001  
(419) 249-2300

Docket Number 50-346

License Number NPP-3

Serial Number 2033

March 31, 1992

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555

Subject: Safety Evaluation of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,  
Unit Number 1, Station Blackout Rule 10 CFR 50.63 (TAC  
Number M68536)

Gentlemen:

By letter dated February 20, 1992 (Log Number 3682), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requested that Toledo Edison (TE) provide additional information regarding actions to be taken to implement the Station Blackout (SBO) Rule (10 CFR 50.63). Specifically, the NRC requested that TE provide a response to six recommendations made by the staff in TE's Safety Evaluation (SE) for SBO Rule compliance dated March 7, 1991 (Log Number 3421). The attachment to this letter provides the requested information.

Should you have any additional questions or comments regarding this issue, please contact Mr. R. W. Schrauder, Manager - Nuclear Licensing, at (419) 249-2366.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'D. Shelton', written over a horizontal line.

NKP

Attachment

cc: A. E. Davis, Regional Administrator, NRC Region III  
J. B. Hopkins, NRC/NRR DE-1 Senior Project Manager  
W. Levis, NRC Senior Resident Inspector  
Utility Radiological Safety Board

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Operating Companies  
Cleveland Electric Illuminating  
Toledo Edison

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RESPONSE TO RECOMMENDATIONS FROM DAVIS-BESSE  
UNIT 1 STATION BLACKOUT RULE NRC SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT

Recommendation 1: The capacity (KWs) of the proposed AAC power source (diesel generator) should have approximately the same capacity (KWs) as one of the existing EDGs. If the proposed AAC power source has less capacity, then the licensee should perform a coping analysis which shows that the plant can cope with and recover from a Station Blackout (SBO) for the required duration. Such an analysis should be included in the documentation supporting the SBO submittals that is to be maintained by the licensee.

Response: The capacity of the Station Blackout Diesel Generator (SBODG) is 2865 KW. The capacity of each existing Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) is 2600 KW. Since the SBODG capacity is larger than the capacity of the EDGs, no coping analysis is necessary.

Recommendation 2: The licensee should ensure that the battery charger associated with the battery supplying SBO loads is powered from the AAC power source during the SBO.

Response: The battery chargers required to supply loads during a SBO are powered from essential 4160V bus D1. Bus D1 will be powered by the SBODG through non-essential 4160V bus D2 in the event of a SBO.

Recommendation 3: The licensee should ensure that the emergency instrument air compressor is powered from the proposed AAC power source or show that compressed air is not required during an SBO event.

Response: The emergency instrument air compressor is powered from 480V bus F7, which is fed from 4160V bus D2. Bus D2 is the electrical bus that is fed by the SBODG. Thus, the emergency instrument air compressor can be powered by the SBODG during a SBO, if needed.

Recommendation 4: The licensee should include a full description, including the nature and objectives of all modifications necessary for compliance with 10 CFR 50.63 in the documentation supporting the SBO submittals that is to be maintained by the licensee.

Response: The only modification required for SBO Rule (10 CFR 50.63) compliance is the installation of the SBODG as described in TE's letter of April 17, 1989 (Serial Number 1651). The SBODG has been installed and is currently undergoing pre-operational testing. Pre-operational testing will be completed prior to completion of the eighth refueling outage, currently scheduled for the Spring of 1993.

Documentation supporting this modification is maintained by TE in accordance with the existing Quality Assurance Program.

Recommendation 5: The licensee should implement an EDG reliability program which meets the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.155, Section 1.2. If an EDG reliability program currently exists, the program should be evaluated and adjusted in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.155. Confirmation that such a program is in place or will be implemented should be included in the documentation supporting the SBO submittals that is to be maintained by the licensee.

Response: An EDG reliability program in accordance with NUMARC 87-00, Apperdux D has been implemented at Davis-Besse, Unit 1. This program meets the intent of the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.155, Section 1.2.

Recommendation 6: The licensee should verify that the SBO equipment is covered by an appropriate QA program consistent with the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.155. Further, this evaluation should be documented as part of the package supporting the SBO rule response.

Response: The SBODG and associated components have been incorporated into TE's existing Quality Assurance Program. The equipment directly needed to ensure operation of the SBODG was purchased as non-safety related and has been classified as Augmented Quality (AQ). The quality requirements applied during the manufacture, installation, and testing are defined by Regulatory Guide 1.155, Appendix A.