



Northeast  
Nuclear Energy

Rope Ferry Rd. (Route 156), Waterford, CT 06385

Millstone Nuclear Power Station  
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company

P.O. Box 128

Waterford, CT 06385-0128

(203) 444-4300

Fax (203) 444-4277

The Northeast Utilities System

Donald B. Miller Jr.,

Senior Vice President - Millstone

Re: 10CFR50.73(-)(2)(i)(B)

November 20, 1995

MP-95-338

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Reference: Facility Operating License No. DPR- 65  
Docket No. 50-336  
Licensee Event Report 95-040-00

This letter forwards Licensee Event Report 95-040-00 required to be submitted within thirty (30) days pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

Very truly yours,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

Donald B. Miller, Jr.  
Senior Vice President - Millstone Station

DBM/PJL:ljjs

Attachment: LER 95-040-00

cc: T. T. Martin, Region I Administrator  
P. D. Swetland, Senior Resident Inspector, Millstone Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3  
G. S. Vissing, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 2

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY FOR COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT.

FACILITY NAME (1) Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000336 PAGE (3) 1 OF 3

TITLE (4) Power Range Safety Channel and Delta T Power Channel Calibration, Performed Beyond the Required Frequency

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
10	22	95	95	040	00	11	20	95	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER

OPERATING MODE (9)	1	THIS REPORT IS BEING SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)							
POWER LEVEL (10)	100	20.2201(b)	20.2203(a)(2)(v)	X	50.73(a)(2)(f)	50.73(a)(2)(vi)			
		20.2203(a)(1)	20.2203(a)(3)(f)		50.73(a)(2)(g)	50.73(a)(2)(x)			
		20.2203(a)(2)(f)	20.2203(a)(3)(f)		50.73(a)(2)(h)	73.71			
		20.2203(a)(2)(f)	20.2203(a)(4)		50.73(a)(2)(v)	OTHER			
		20.2203(a)(2)(f)	50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A			
		20.2203(a)(2)(v)	50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(v)				

## LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Philip J. Lutz, Nuclear Licensing TELEPHONE NUMBER (include Area Code) (203) 440-2072

## COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDs	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDs

## SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X NO EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15) MONTH DAY YEAR

## ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On October 22, 1995, with the plant in Mode 1 at 100% power, it was determined that Technical Specification daily surveillance SP 2601D, "Power Range Safety Channel and Delta T Power Channel Calibration," had not been performed within its required frequency. The surveillance had been performed several hours after the time it was required to be performed.

Previously, this type of event has occurred twice during August of 1995 and actions to prevent recurrence including shift briefings, and procedure changes were implemented. In response to this event, Operations management discussed this event with the shift personnel involved to ensure they fully understand the nature of this event, the adequacy of their response to plant conditions, and the Technical Specifications requirements.

All licensed Operators will be briefed on this event as a part of ongoing Operator training.

This event is being reported pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), a condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specification.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (5)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 2	05000336	95	-- 040 --	00	02 OF 03

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

I. Description of EventEvent Summary

On October 22, 1995, at the beginning of swing shift, while reviewing the Shift Supervisor's (SS's) Log, the Control Room operating shift discovered that Technical Specification daily surveillance SP 2601D, "Power Range Safety Channel and Delta T Power Channel Calibration," had not been performed within its required frequency. The surveillance, which exceeded its required frequency, had been performed earlier on October 22, 1995, and the acceptance criteria had been met, however, more than 30 hours had elapsed prior to that surveillance being performed.

Background Information

Surveillance Procedure SP 2601D, "Power Range Safety Channel and Delta T Power Channel Calibration," is usually performed daily at the beginning of mid shift to meet the requirements of Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.3.1.1.1. This surveillance requirement states that "each reactor protective instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performing the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION, and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations during the operating modes and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-1." SP 2601D provides instructions for the adjustment of the linear range nuclear instrumentation to ensure agreement with the calorimetric calculation, to null nuclear power - delta T power and provide instructions for the adjustment of T-Cold Calibrate.

Technical Specification Table 4.3-1 lists the power level high trip CHANNEL CALIBRATION as a daily surveillance. Additionally, Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.0.2 states that a surveillance requirement shall be performed within the specified time interval with a maximum allowable extension not to exceed 25% of the surveillance time interval. Therefore, the shift has 30 hours from the last time the surveillance was performed to complete the surveillance to meet Technical Specification Requirement 4.3.1.1.1.

Event

On October 22, 1995, during performance of SP 2619A-1, "Control Room Shiftly Checks," the mid shift identified that the Channel A reading for pressurizer pressure was outside its specification relative to the other 3 RPS channels. This was documented and the shift discussed calling in I&C personnel to investigate. The shift determined that the pressure reading could have an impact on the pressure signal sent to the RPS Channel A trip unit which monitors thermal margin/low pressure (TM/LP) and high pressurizer pressure. Consequently, the SS logged into Technical Specification Action Statement (TSAS) 3.1.1.1, Action 2b for RPS Channel A TM/LP and pressure pressure trip units. The trip units were subsequently bypassed in accordance with the TSAS.

The shift then performed SP 2601D, "Power Range Safety Channel and Delta T Power Channel Calibration." The Control Operator (CO) then entered section 6.2 of SP 2619A, "Power Range Safety Channel and Delta T Power Channel Calibration With One Power Associated Channel Inoperable," assuming that all of RPS Channel A was inoperable. The SCO authorized the associated surveillance form and the surveillance was performed for the other 3 RPS channels. The shift did not log into the TSAS which would have indicated that RPS Channel A was inoperable and that SP 2601D could not be performed in its entirety.

SP 2601D had been performed on October 21, 1995, during the mid shift and was accepted by the SS at 0114 hours. To meet the requirements of Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.0.2, SP 2601D needed to be performed by 0714 hours on October 22, 1995. Subsequent to the repair of the RPS Channel A, SP 2601D was performed and accepted by the SS at 0934 hours, therefore, the surveillance period was exceeded by approximately 2 hours and 20 minutes.

During swing shift, the event was identified when the Control Room operating shift determined that daily surveillance SP 2601D had not been performed within the frequency required by Surveillance Requirement 4.3.1.1.1 and that the maximum allowable extension of Technical Specification 4.0.2 had been exceeded.

No automatic or manually initiated safety responses resulted from this event.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION**

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Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 2	05000336	95	— 040 —	00	03 OF 03

**TEXT** (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)**II. Cause of Event**

This event occurred as a result of a personnel error because the operating shift did not assess all of the effects associated with pressurizer pressure channel deviations.

When the shift initiated their daily performance of SP 2601D, they inappropriately assumed that all of RPS Channel A was inoperable when only the pressurizer pressure inputs were considered to be inoperable. The shift entered the appropriate Technical Specification actions for the inoperable TM/LP and high pressurizer pressure trip units, however they did not enter a TSAS for the entire RPS channel. At the time the CO determined which section of SP 2601D to perform, he believed based on the title of section 6.2, "Power Range Safety Channel and Delta T Power Channel Calibration With One Power Associated Channel Inoperable" that the procedure was applicable for any or all of RPS Channel A. This misunderstanding was not caught by the SCO authorizing the surveillance or the Shift Supervisor who accepted it.

Additionally, the shift did not recognize that a TSAS needed to be entered when it was decided not to calibrate RPS Channel A. They also did not recognize that the surveillance period for performance of SP 2601D would be exceeded if the RPS Channel A surveillance was not performed by the end of the mid shift.

**III. Analysis of Event**

This event is being reported pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), a condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications. In accordance with Technical Specification 4.0.2, surveillance SP 2601D shall be performed within the specified time interval with a maximum allowable interval not to exceed 25% of the surveillance time interval. This surveillance period was exceeded by approximately 2 hours and 20 minutes.

At no time was safety compromised since the surveillance was performed shortly after the surveillance time interval had expired and the acceptance criteria were met.

**IV. Corrective Action**

SP 2601D, "Power Range Safety Channel and Delta T Power Channel Calibration," had been performed shortly after the surveillance time interval had expired and the acceptance criteria for the surveillance were met.

Operations management discussed this event with the shift personnel involved to ensure they fully understood the nature of a plant problem, the adequacy of their response to plant conditions, and the Technical Specifications requirements.

All licensed Operators will be briefed on this event as a part of ongoing Operator training.

**V. Additional Information**

Related events: A review was performed to identify similar LERs. This search was limited to LERs in which daily or shift specific surveillance requirements were not performed within the required surveillance time interval. This type of event has occurred on two previous occasions, during August of 1995, and are documented in LER 95-034-00. LERs related to missed surveillances which have longer surveillance time intervals are not included since different tracking methods are used to ensure these surveillances are completed within their required interval.

**EIS Codes**

None