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DUKE POWER

February 28, 1992

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2
Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414
Station Blackout Analysis for Catawba Site
(TAC Nos. M68527 and M68528)

References: 1. Letter from NRC to M.S. Tuckman, dated January 10, 1992
2. Letter from M.S. Tuckman to NRC, dated February 7, 1992

Gentlemen:

Reference 1 transmitted the NRC Safety Evaluation for Duke Power Company's Station Blackout Evaluation for Catawba Nuclear Station. Duke Power Company has evaluated the recommendations contained in the Safety Evaluation and has determined that additional analysis is required to completely address several of the issues discussed in the Safety Evaluation. Attachment 1 to this letter provides a discussion of our response relative to each recommendation contained in the Safety Evaluation. We will complete the remaining required analysis and fully address the remaining recommendations by December 31, 1992.

Also, based on a February 24, 1992 telephone conversation between T.P. Harrall of Duke Power Company and D.B. Matthews of NRC, it is our understanding that the letter submitted by Duke Power Company in Reference 2 which identified a commitment date of February 29, 1992 for providing a response to the Safety Evaluation satisfied the 30-day commitment of 10 CFR 50.63(c)(4). If you have any questions, please call L.J. Rudy at (803) 831-3084.

Very truly yours,

M.S. Tuckman
M.S. Tuckman

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LJR/s

Attachment

xc (W/Attachment):

T.E. Murley, Director

ONRR

R.E. Martin, Senior Project Manager

ONRR

S.D. Ebnetter, Regional Administrator

Region II

W.T. Orders, Senior Resident Inspector

ATTACHMENT 1

DUKE POWER COMPANY RESPONSE TO NRC RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN STATION BLACKOUT SAFETY EVALUATION

Recommendations:

The licensee needs to provide assurance (1) that the Class-1E vital I&C battery loads that could occur during an SBO event would not exceed those measured during the blackout test, (2) ensure that the batteries have sufficient capacity for closing of the necessary circuit breakers to restore offsite power, and (3) ensure the EDG batteries have sufficient capacity for EDG field flashing. The licensee should retain all supporting documentation in the SBO file.

Response:

Duke Power Company is presently evaluating the actions that need to be accomplished in order to fully address this recommendation. All actions pertaining to this recommendation will be completed by December 31, 1992.

Recommendation:

The licensee should ensure the accessibility to the steam generator PORVs and auxiliary feedwater flow control valves and the habitability in the areas where these valves are located during an SBO event.

Response:

The steam generator PORVs are located in the doghouses at Catawba. The doghouses are not a dominant area of concern as they are vented to the outside environment and are not provided with forced ventilation. Therefore, the SBO environment would not be different from the normal operating environment. Duke Power Company considers the portion of this recommendation pertaining to the steam generator PORVs fully addressed and therefore closed.

Regarding the auxiliary feedwater flow control valves, the valves for steam generators A and D are located in the auxiliary feedwater pump room, while the valves for steam generators B and C are located in the mechanical penetration room. Per calculation CNC-1240.00-00-0006, a maximum temperature of 135F was assumed in the auxiliary feedwater pump room during an SBO event, hence this area is habitable. The habitability of the mechanical penetration room is still being evaluated and this portion of the recommendation will be completely addressed by December 31, 1992.

Recommendation:

The licensee should verify that power will be available for the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump pit ventilation fan during an SBO event.

Response:

A review of the appropriate electrical drawings indicates that this ventilation fan is a Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) load powered from the SSF diesel generator. Therefore, it can be taken credit for in exhausting air from this area and maintaining pit temperature at or below 160F. Duke Power Company considers this recommendation fully addressed and therefore closed.

Recommendation:

The licensee should provide a procedure which will require the operators to open instrument cabinet doors within 30 minutes following an SBO in accordance with the guidance described in NUMARC 87-00.

Response:

EP/1,2/A/5000/03, Loss of All AC Power, contains instructions for opening instrument cabinet doors within the required 30-minute period. Duke Power Company considers this recommendation fully addressed and therefore closed.

Recommendation:

The licensee should verify that no manual operation of SBO response equipment in the annulus and mechanical penetration rooms is required during an SBO event. The licensee should also verify that the calculation for the McGuire mechanical penetration room is applicable to Catawba.

Response:

Additional analysis is required to fully address this recommendation. All required work will be completed by December 31, 1992.

Recommendation:

The licensee should provide confirmation and include in the documentation supporting the SBO submittals that a program meeting as a minimum the guidance of RG 1.155, Position 1.2, is in place or will be implemented.

Response:

Duke Power Company currently has in place for Catawba a program which is designed to maintain the reliability of the emergency power sources. This program includes, among other things, maintenance, testing, surveillance, and root cause investigation. Additionally, Duke Power Company is closely following the progress of Generic Issue B-56. Upon resolution of this Generic Issue, Duke Power Company will review its emergency power source reliability program and make changes as necessary. Duke Power Company considers this recommendation fully addressed and therefore closed.