

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 3 7					PAGE (3) 1 OF 6 2				
TITLE (4) Reactor Scram																			
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)									
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)						
0 7	0 9	8 4	8 4	0 1 2	0 0 0	7	1 7	8 4					0 5 0 0 0						
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																	
R		20.402(b)				20.406(e)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)					
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.406(a)(1)(i)				50.36(e)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)					
0 9 18		20.406(a)(1)(ii)				50.36(e)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)					
		20.406(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)									
		20.406(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)									
		20.406(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(x)									
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																			
NAME Timothy J. Wojtulewicz (X-523)										TELEPHONE NUMBER									
										AREA CODE 8 1 5 9 4 2 - 2 9 2 1 0									
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																			
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC									
A																			
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR			
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)												<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO							

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

While performing the Main Steam Line Log Radiation Monitoring System Calibration (DIS 1700-1) the reactor scrambled from 98 percent power. With hydrogen addition system on a half scram occurred when an Instrument Mechanic mistakenly turned RPS Channel B hydrogen addition switch to off instead of RPS Channel A hydrogen addition switch.

Before correcting the mistake a voltage spike tripped RPS Channel A on main steam line high high radiation causing a full reactor scram and a Group I isolation.

The isolation condenser automatically initiated causing a small amount of radioactivity to be released within the security fence boundary. All appropriate protective systems functioned as designed in response to this event and the radioactivity release was below 10 CFR 20 limits.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 9/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Dresden Nuclear Power Station Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 2 3 7	8 4	— 0 1 2	— 0 0	0 2	OF	0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

With the reactor at 98 percent power, calibration of the Main Steam Line Log Radiation Monitoring System (DIS 1700-1) was being conducted. While the equipment was connected to conduct the calibration of the C Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor (MSLRM) RPS Channel A the Instrument Mechanic mistakenly turned the RPS Channel B hydrogen addition switch to off. Since hydrogen addition was on, a high high radiation trip of Channel B occurred. The Instrument Mechanic was informed of this fact by his assistant and attempted to lower the input signal into the C MSLRM. However, before it was lowered, a voltage spike tripped RPS Channel A on high high main steam line radiation. With both RPS channels tripped a full reactor scram occurred. Therefore, the scram was the result of the Instrument Mechanic failing to properly follow an approved procedure. The Instrument Mechanic was disciplined and all Instrument Mechanics will be reminded to properly follow this procedure.

This event was of minimal safety significance since all appropriate protective systems functioned as designed. This event is the first occurrence of a scram while performing DIS 1700-1 since hydrogen addition has been installed on Unit 2.

Main steam line radiation monitor high high trips initiated a full reactor scram and a Group I isolation. Subsequent to the Group I isolation the isolation condenser automatically initiated. A small concentration of radioactivity (330 pico curies/liter, Cobalt 60 being the most restrictive isotope) was released with steam and water carryover through the isolation condenser vent. Contamination on the shell side of the isolation condenser has existed since condensate water was used as primary makeup. The radioactive release was of minimal safety significance since isotopic concentrations were below 10 CFR 20 limits for restricted areas and all contamination was contained within the security fence south of the Unit 2 and 3 Reactor Building. Surveys subsequent to the drying of wet areas below the isolation condenser vent did not detect any radioactivity and no cleaning was necessary.



Commonwealth Edison

Dresden Nuclear Power Station

R.R. #1

Morris, Illinois 60450

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August 7, 1984

DJS Ltr #84-772

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
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D.J. Scott
Station Superintendent
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

DJS/kjl

Enclosure

cc: J.G. Keppler, Regional Administrator, Region III
File/NRC
File/Numerical

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