



NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION / 300 ERIE BOULEVARD WEST, SYRACUSE, N.Y. 13202 / TELEPHONE (315) 474-1511

July 30, 1984  
(NMP2L 0114)

Mr. R. W. Starostecki, Director  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region I  
Division of Project and Resident Programs  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Re: Nine Mile Point Unit 2  
Docket No. 50-410

Dear Mr. Starostecki:

Enclosed is a final report in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e) for the problem concerning the swing check valve in the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) turbine exhaust. This problem was reported via telecon to Mr. S. Collins of your staff on April 27, 1984. An interim report was submitted via our letter dated May 23, 1984.

Very truly yours,

C. V. Mangan  
Vice President  
Nuclear Engineering & Licensing

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Enclosure  
xc: Director of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555

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NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION  
NINE MILE POINT UNIT 2  
DOCKET NO. 50-410

Final Report for the Problem Concerning  
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling  
Turbine Exhaust Check Valve (55(e)-84-16)

Description of the Problem

I.E. Information Notice 82-26 identified concerns with the reactor core isolation cooling turbine exhaust check valves encountered in some operating boiling water reactors. Correspondence with the Nine Mile Point Unit 2 supplier of the turbine exhaust check valves (Velan) has indicated that the standard swing check valve used at Nine Mile Point Unit 2 is not suitable for this application.

Analysis of Safety Implications

Failure of the subject valve could have caused water from the suppression pool to flood the turbine or block the exhaust line. As a result, the safety-related reactor core isolation cooling system could have been rendered inoperative. If this problem were to have remained uncorrected, it could have adversely affected the safety of operations of the plant. However, assuming loss of the reactor core isolation cooling system and a single failure, the reactor could be safely shut down.

Corrective Action

The problem will be corrected by replacing the standard swing check valve with a special design lift check valve. The replacement will be completed prior to preoperation testing.