

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)
SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 3DOCKET NUMBER (2)
0 5 0 0 0 3 6 2PAGE (3)
1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)

MISSED CONDENSER EVACUATION SYSTEM SAMPLE

EVENT DATE (5)
MONTH DAY YEAR
0 5 2 7 8 4LER NUMBER (6)
YEAR SEQ. NUMBER REV. NUMBER
8 4 0 2 0 0 1REPORT DATE (7)
MONTH DAY YEAR
0 1 0 8 0 1 8 4OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)
FACILITY NAMESDOCKET NUMBER (5)
0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)
1

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

POWER LEVEL (10)
1 0 0

20.402(b)

20.405(c)

50.73(a)(2)(iv)

73.71(b)

20.405(a)(1)(i)

50.36(c)(1)

50.73(a)(2)(v)

73.71(c)

20.405(a)(1)(ii)

X

50.36(c)(2)

50.73(a)(2)(vii)

OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)

20.405(a)(1)(iii)

X

50.73(a)(2)(i)

50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

20.405(a)(1)(iv)

50.73(a)(2)(ii)

50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

20.405(a)(1)(v)

50.73(a)(2)(iii)

50.73(a)(2)(x)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME
J. G. HAYNES, STATION MANAGER

TELEPHONE NUMBER

AREA CODE

7 1 4 4 9 2 - 7 7 0 0

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NRC
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NRC

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH DAY YEAR

Abstract (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 5/27/84, with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at 100% power and with Condenser Evacuation System Radiation Monitors 3RT-7818 and 3RT-7870 out of service, 8-hour grab samples were being taken in accordance with Limiting Condition for Operation 3.3.3.9, Action 37. However, the grab sample due at 0800 was not taken until 0945.

Subsequent investigation determined that low range flow at the sample conditioning skid had been diverted from filter A to filter B, isolating the sample path at the discharge from the temporary sample pump. The flow blockage caused the temporary sample pump to blow a power supply fuse. Although the actual cause of the flow diversion cannot be definitely established, it appears a remote/local control interlock was actuated while closing the junction box door at the sample conditioning skid. When the junction box door was closed, system control automatically reverted to the remote mode, irrespective of the position of the remote/local selector switch inside the local junction box. The remote filter selector switch, aligned to the "Filter B" position, then initiated the filter lineup change from filter A to filter B, deadheading the temporary sample pump.

An alternate discharge path is in place to prevent deadheading the temporary sample pump in the future.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQ. NUMBER	REV. NUMBER			
SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 3	0 5 0 0 0 3 6 2	8 4	- 0 2 0	- 0 1	0 2	OF	0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On May 27, 1984, with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at 100% power and with Condenser Evacuation System (EIIS System Code SH) Radiation Monitor 3RT-7818 (EIIS Component Code MON) out of service for implementation of design modifications and redundant monitor 3RT-7870 out of service for performance of the 92-day surveillance, 8-hour grab sampling of the Condenser Evacuation System was being performed in accordance with Limiting Condition for Operating 3.3.3.9, Action 37. However, the 8-hour grab sample due by 0800 was not taken until 0945.

Subsequent investigation determined that low range flow at the sample conditioning skid had been diverted from filter A to filter B (EIIS Component Code FLT), isolating the sample path at the discharge from the temporary sample pump. The flow blockage caused the temporary sample pump to blow a power supply fuse (EIIS Component Code FU). Although the actual cause of the flow diversion cannot be definitely established, it appears a remote/local control interlock was actuated while closing the junction box door at the sample conditioning skid. When the junction box door was closed, system control automatically reverted to the remote mode, irrespective of the position of the remote/local selector switch (EIIS Component Code 33) inside the local junction box. The remote filter selector switch, aligned to the "Filter B" position, then initiated the filter lineup change from filter A to filter B, deadheading the temporary sample pump.

An alternate discharge path is in place to prevent deadheading the temporary sample pump in the future.

There are no credible circumstances that would have increased the severity of this event.

Southern California Edison Company

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

P.O. BOX 128

SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA 92072

J. G. HAYNES
STATION MANAGER

August 1, 1984

SCE

TELEPHONE
(714) 492-7700

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Docket No. 50-362
Licensee Event Report No. 84-020, Revision 1
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3

Reference: Letter, J. G. Haynes (SCE) to USNRC Document Control
Desk, dated June 26, 1984, "Licensee Event Report
No. 84-020"

The referenced letter provided the required 30-day written Licensee Event Report (LER) for an occurrence involving the Condenser Evacuation System. We reported that a follow-up LER would be issued to identify the cause and corrective action taken. Enclosed is LER 84-020, Revision 1. Neither the health and safety of plant personnel nor the public were affected by this event.

If you require any additional information, please so advise.

Sincerely,

J. G. Haynes/HEW

Enclosure: LER No. 84-020, Revision 1

cc: A. E. Chaffee (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 1, 2, and 3)
J. P. Stewart (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 2 and 3)

J. B. Martin (Regional Administrator, NRC Region V)

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)

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