

**GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY**

RIVER BEND STATION POST OFFICE BOX 270 ST. FRANCISVILLE, LOUISIANA 70775
AREA CODE 504 635-6094 346 8851

December 27, 1991
RBG- 36,177
File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.3

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

River Bend Station - Unit 1
Docket No. 50-458

Please find enclosed Supplement 4 to Licensee Event Report No. 90-003 for River Bend Station - Unit 1. This revision is submitted to provide the current status of issues concerning Thermo-Lag fire barriers at River Bend Station.

Sincerely,

W. H. Odell

for W. H. Odell
Manager - Oversight
River Bend Nuclear Group

LAE PDG GAB DCH RJK KVM
LAE/PDG/GAB/DCH/RJK/KVM

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
Arlington, TX 76011

NRC Resident Inspector
P.O. Box 1051
St. Francisville, LA 70775

INPO Records Center
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, GA 30339-3064

NRC FORM 266 (8-89)										U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION										APPROVED DMS NO 3150-0104 EXPIRES 4/30/92																													
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)																														ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING P/R DEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, DC 20555 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104) OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON, DC 20503																			
FACILITY NAME (1): RIVER BEND STATION															DOCKET NUMBER (3): 050004518										PAGE (9): 1 OF 07																								
TITLE (4): INADEQUATE THERMO-LAG FIRE BARRIER ENVELOPES SURROUNDING SAFE SHUTDOWN CIRCUITS PER TS 3/4.7.7																																																	
EVENT DATE (5): MONTH DAY YEAR 02 06 90										LER NUMBER (6): SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER 003 04										REPORT DATE (7): MONTH DAY YEAR 12 27 91																													
OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (9): FACILITY NAMES DOCKET NUMBER (8) 050004518																																																	
OPERATING MODE (10): 1										THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11):																																							
POWER LEVEL (10): 110.0										<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b) <input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)(1)(i) <input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)(1)(ii) <input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)(1)(iii) <input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)(1)(iv) <input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)(1)(v)										<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(c) <input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(c)(1) <input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(c)(2) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 20.731(a)(2)(iii) <input type="checkbox"/> 20.731(a)(2)(iv) <input type="checkbox"/> 20.731(a)(2)(v)										<input type="checkbox"/> 20.731(b)(2)(iv) <input type="checkbox"/> 20.731(b)(2)(v) <input type="checkbox"/> 20.731(b)(2)(vi) <input type="checkbox"/> 20.731(b)(2)(vii) <input type="checkbox"/> 20.731(b)(2)(viii)																			
OTHER (Specify in Remarks below and in Text, NRC Form 266A)																																																	
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12): NAME: L.A. ENGLAND, DIRECTOR - NUCLEAR LICENSING																														TELEPHONE NUMBER: AREA CODE: 504 NUMBER: 381-1414																			
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13):																																																	
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC																				
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14): <input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO															EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (16): MONTH DAY YEAR 01 14 92																																		
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single spaced typewritten lines) (15):																																																	
<p>During the performance of Surveillance Test Procedure STP-000-3602 on 02/06/90 through 02/08/90 with the unit in Operational Condition 1 (full power), it was found that several minor deficiencies existed in the Thermo-Lag fire barrier envelopes around redundant safe shutdown circuits. These deficiencies consisted of small holes, cracks and unfilled seams in the Thermo-Lag material. A fire watch had already been established in areas utilizing Thermo-Lag as a fire barrier.</p> <p>GSU is currently working with the vendor to resolve the identified discrepancies which occurred during construction and the deficient Thermo-Lag barriers. Fire tests were conducted during November and December 1990 on typical configurations of installed barriers used in the plant. Repair methods were developed where applicable. This supplement to LER 90-003 is submitted to provide a status of the Thermo-Lag issue at River Bend Station.</p> <p>The combination of the cable jacket properties, the control of transient combustibles, the use of suppression systems in the plant and the use of compensatory fire watches provides assurance that plant safety and the health and safety of the public has not been jeopardized.</p>																																																	

NRC FORM 388A
(8-89)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED DMR NO 3150-0104

EXPIRES 4/30/92

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATIONESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS
INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 600 HRS. FORWARD
COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS
AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-330) U.S. NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, DC 20555 AND TO
THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104) OFFICE
OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON, DC 20503

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
RIVER BEND STATION	0 5 0 0 0 4 5 8 9 0	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	0 2	OF 0 1
			- 0 1 0 3	- 0 4		

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 388A's) (17)

REPORTED CONDITION

During the performance of Surveillance Test Procedure STP-000-3602 on 02/06/90 through 02/08/90 with the unit in Operational Condition 1 (full power), it was found that several minor deficiencies existed in the Thermo-Lag fire barrier envelopes around redundant safe shutdown circuits. These deficiencies consisted of small holes, cracks and unfilled seams in the Thermo-Lag material. Condition reports (CR) 90-0094, 90-0095, 90-0101, and 90-0106 were initiated to evaluate the conditions according to 10CFR50, Appendix R, fire barrier requirements. A fire watch had already been established in areas utilizing Thermo-Lag as a fire barrier, thus Technical Specification Section 3/4.7.7 action statement requirements had already been fulfilled. Since these deficiencies rendered the fire barrier inoperable and the unfilled seams existed since construction, this event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.

This supplement to LER 90-003 is submitted to provide a status of the Thermo-Lag issue at River Bend Station.

INVESTIGATION

Thermo-Lag fire barriers have been under review at River Bend Station since late 1989. Potential discrepancies between the installation manual of Thermal Science Incorporated (TSI) (a GSU subcontractor during construction) and the actual site installation practices, and discrepancies between TSI installation manual and the qualification fire test results were discovered at that time. Due to these issues, the fire barriers were indeterminate for operability and firewatches were established for all areas utilizing Thermo-Lag as a fire barrier. An Informational Report was submitted to the NRC on 01/09/90 concerning this subject.

The performance of STP-000-3602 was intended to identify conditions in fire barriers where normal wear and tear had caused damage to the barriers. The small holes and miscellaneous cracks that were identified during the performance of the STP fall into this category. Normally a fire watch would be established and the holes and cracks would be repaired. However, the unfilled seams in the Thermo-Lag installations that were identified during the performance of the STP are a condition that must have existed from the time of initial construction and are not in accordance with either the vendor installation manual, nor normal site practices. In accordance with the vendor manual, the seams between boards of Thermo-Lag were to be prebuttered with a trowel grade material and then joined, or

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104

EXPIRES 4/30/93

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IF 8301, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, DC 20549. A-40 TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 3150-0104, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (3)			PAGE (3)	
RIVER BEND STATION	0 8 0 0 0 4 5 8 9 0	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	0 1 0 3	0 1 4 0 3 OF 7

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 2054-9/ (17)

alternatively, dry fitted together with trowel grade material then applied to the joint. In either case, the seams were to have been grouted with the trowel grade material and they were not. The preexisting firewatches satisfy the action statement of section 3/4.7.7 of the Technical Specifications. Eight fire areas were identified by the condition reports as having Thermo-Lag barriers exhibiting the unfilled seams. A brief description of each area follows.

Fire area C2A is the southeast cable chase at elevation 70 feet of the control building (*NA*). Fire area C2C is in the same cable chase but located at elevation 115 feet. These areas have safety related cabling feeding through up to the termination cabinets in the main control room. The areas have sprinkler suppression systems (*KP*) on the cable trays, which comprise the exposed fixed combustible in the areas. Area C6 is adjacent to area C2A on the west side. The area contains safety related air accumulators as well as safety related cabling. The exposed cables in cable trays, which comprise the exposed fixed combustible in the area, are protected by a sprinkler suppression system.

Fire area AB2/Z2 is located in the auxiliary building (*NF*) at elevation 95 feet in the southeast corner of the building. The area contains safety related instruments, piping and safety related cables. The cabling, which makes up the fixed combustible in the area, represents a fire loading of 1.0 hour. Fire area AB7 is the "D" tunnel located at elevation 70 feet on the south end of the auxiliary building. Safety related piping and motor operated valves (MOV) (*FCV*) are located in the area in addition to the safety related cabling. The cable trays and the MOVs are protected by a water deluge sprinkler system (*KP*).

Fire area FB1/Z1 is located at elevation 70 feet of the fuel building (*ND*). The area contains fuel pool cooling piping (*DA*) and equipment, reactor plant component cooling water piping (*CC*) and MOVs as well as safety related cabling. The crescent area, near the reactor building shield wall (*NH*), contains the major portion of the cable trays in the area. The cable trays represent a fire loading of 21 minutes and are the fixed combustible in the area. Fire areas FB3 and FB4 are the charcoal filter rooms located at elevation 148 feet of the fuel building. The ventilation system charcoal filters and fans are contained in the area. All cabling is routed in conduit in these areas. The charcoal filters are the fixed combustible for this area. They are protected by manually actuated water spray systems. The charcoal in each area is a fire loading of 45 and 46 minutes respectively for areas FB3 and FB4.

NRC FORM 305A (1-89) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION		APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 300 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (F-30), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20545, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.	
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION			
FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (3)	PAGE (2)
RIVER BEND STATION	0 5 0 0 0 4 5 8 9 0	0 0 3	0 4 OF 0 7

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 305A's) (17)

Fire area PT1 is the pipe tunnel at elevation 70 feet which extends from the standby cooling tower (*CTW*) to the fuel building. The area contains piping, MOVs, and instrumentation in addition to the safety related cabling. The cable trays are the only fixed combustible in the area and are protected by a sprinkler suppression system. The cable trays represent a fire loading of 29 minutes.

In addition to the Informational Report submitted on 01/09/90, LERs 87-005 and 89-009 were reviewed for similarity. This is the first time unfilled seams have been identified.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

GSU has conducted a series of fire endurance tests in accordance with ASTM E119, followed by water hose stream tests, using American Nuclear Insurer's Bulletin B.7.2, 11/87, Attachment B. Electrical circuit integrity monitoring was also performed throughout the fire endurance and water hose stream tests. These tests were done with the cooperation of the vendor, Thermal Science Incorporated. The tests were performed in two stages. The first stage consisted of duplicating the installation process that was used at River Bend for barriers on conduit, cable tray, supports and enclosures. Each item was tested in both a one hour and a three hour barrier configuration.

The results of the in situ tests are as follows:

<u>Test Article</u>	<u>Duration of Test</u>	<u>Test Results</u>
1 Hour Conduit	25 minutes	Fail
3 Hour Conduit	1 hour : 25 minutes	*
1 Hour Cable Tray	15 minutes	Fail
3 Hour Cable Tray	56 minutes	Fail
1 Hour Unistrut Support	1 hour : 5 minutes	Pass
3 Hour Unistrut Support	3 hour : 0 minute	Pass
1 Hour Vault Enclosure	1 hour : 2 minutes	Pass
3 Hour Vault Enclosure	2 hour : 37 minutes	Fail

* Test stopped at GSU request.

Three (3) Thermo-Lag test articles successfully passed in their in situ configuration. Rework will not be required for these barriers.

The second stage consisted of additional tests of upgraded configurations of the failed in situ articles. The results of the upgraded tests are as follows:

NRC FORM 158A
(8-89)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 4/30/97LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATIONESTIMATED BURDEN FOR RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS
INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST 500 HRS. FORWARD
COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS
AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, DC 20555 AND TO
THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE
OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (3)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
RIVER BEND STATION	0 5 0 0 0 4 5 8 9 0	- 0 0 3	- 0 4	0 5	OF	0 7	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 158A's (117))

Test Article	Duration of Test	Test Results
1 Hour Conduit	1 hour : 5 minutes	Pass
3 Hour Conduit	3 hour : 4 minutes	Pass
1 Hour Cable Tray	1 hour : 0 minutes	Pass
3 Hour Cable Tray	1 hour : 45 minutes	Fail
3 Hour Vault Enclosure	3 hour : 0 minutes	Pass

The tests of the upgraded configurations were successful, with the exception of the 3 hour cable tray test article. Based on the successful tests of the upgraded Thermo-Lag barriers, rework will be performed as follows:

Configurations Needing Upgrade

1 Hour Conduit
3 Hour Conduit
1 Hour Cable Tray
3 Hour Vault Enclosure

The rework of the above Thermo-Lag configurations will be included in the scope of work of the fire barrier task force. The fire barrier task force was formed in response to Corrective Action Report (CAR)-5-8901 to address the problem of deficient fire barrier penetration seals. As described in revision 3 to LER 89-010, inspection, evaluation and corrective actions for safety-related fire barrier penetration seals are scheduled to be completed prior to January, 1994. However, engineering evaluation of the proposed upgrades show that there is a potential to exceed existing cable ampacity ratings by applying additional Thermo-lag material. If it becomes necessary to revise cable size or reroute cables this activity may require implementation past the presently scheduled implementation date of January 1994.

Following resolution of the ampacity issues, GSU will issue a procedure to instruct persons in the application of the upgrade process which was successfully tested in the fall of 1990. Until the improvements are in place, roving one-hour fire watches will remain.

As previously described, the only failure of the upgraded test articles was the three-hour cable tray. Following the initial tests a third three-hour cable tray test article was constructed using information obtained during the evaluation of the two previous failures. When tested, this configuration failed in 2 hours and 55

(6-29)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

PROVED ONE NO 3150-0104

EXPIRES 4/30/92

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS
INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST 500 HRS FORWARD
COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS
AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-330) U.S. NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, DC 20555 AND TO
THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104) OFFICE
OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
RIVER BEND STATION	0 6 0 0 0 4 5 8	9 0	— 0 0 3	— 0 4	0 6	OF	0 1 7

TEXT (if more space is required see additional NRC Form 205A (1/17))

minutes. After two unsuccessful attempts to design an acceptable upgrade for the three-hour cable tray, methods other than applying additional layers of Thermo-Lag to the in situ enclosures were explored. As a result of this investigation, the 3M Interam protective envelope system has been selected as the method to protect three-hour Appendix R cable trays. The existing Thermo-Lag 330 system will be removed and replaced with the 3M Interam system. Currently, GSU is reviewing 3M qualification test reports and installation instructions in order to prepare a site specific procedure for installation.

Due to the higher ampacity derating of the Interam system when compared to Thermo-Lag, GSU will evaluate the cables within the affected raceways to determine if the installed cables can carry their designed current and re-rate cables as required. GSU will also review the structural adequacy of the cable trays due to the greater weight of the 3M Interam material. If it becomes necessary to revise cable size or reroute cables this activity may require implementation past the presently scheduled implementation date of January 1994.

SAFETY ASSESSMENT

The primary fixed combustible at River Bend in the areas containing the Thermo-Lag fire barrier material is cable jacketing on the electrical cables. The predominant type of cable used at River Bend is IEEE 383 rated which is resistant to ignition and is fire retardant.

Automatic fire detection systems are located in all areas, providing early detection if a fire should occur. Detection is provided by ionization and/or thermal type detectors.

Procedure FPP-0040 establishes controls for the use of transient combustibles throughout the protected area. The hot work permit procedure, FPP-0060, establishes controls associated with ignition sources.

In the areas containing one-hour rated barriers, automatic fire suppression systems are in place. Actuation of sprinkler systems in areas with open heads would occur upon a signal given by the detection system. In areas protected by a wet pipe system, sprinkler heads are fused to actuate at a temperature of 165 degrees Fahrenheit. The Thermo-Lag barrier failed in the fire test at a furnace temperature of approximately 1400 degrees Fahrenheit. Actuation of the sprinkler

NRC FORM 388A
(6-89)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES 6/30/92

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATIONESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS
INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD
COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS
AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (PS-80), U.S. NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, DC 20548 AND TO
THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104) OFFICE
OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
RIVER BEND STATION	0 1 5 1 0 0 0 4 5 8	9 0	- 0 1 0 3	- 0 4	0 7	OF 0 7

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 388A's) (17)

systems would be expected well before temperatures could rise to the 1400 degrees Fahrenheit range and provide protection for the required circuits.

Also, as compensatory action in accordance with Technical Specification Section 3/4.7.7, a one-hour fire watch patrol has been in effect for the areas containing Thermo-Lag barriers since November 1989 as a result of Condition Report (CR) 89-1144. The actions of the fire watch are two fold. First, the patrols are to monitor an area for conditions likely to start and/or spread fire and for compliance with housekeeping requirements. These actions are designed to maintain the combustible loading in each area at the acceptable levels. The second function is to inspect for evidence of fire. The objective is to discover indications of a fire prior to activation of the detection system. Based on the discussion above, the defense-in-depth approach utilized on-site provides assurance that plant safety and the health and safety of the public is not compromised.


NOTE: Energy Industry Identification System Codes are identified in the text as (*XX*).

NRC FORM 305A (8-89)		U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION		APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 4/30/92	
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION				ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST 500 HAS FORWARDED COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-330) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON DC 20548 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104) OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503	
FACILITY NAME (1)		DOCKET NUMBER (2)		LER NUMBER (3)	
RIVER BEND STATION		0 8 0 0 0 4 5 8		9 1 0 1 7 0 1 1 3 OF 16	
				YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER	

TEXT OF THIS REPORT IS REQUIRED, USE ADDITIONAL NRC Form 305A (11/7)

"FIGURE 1"

Concentration, percent



U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION		APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104 EXPIRES 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IP-530, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, DC 20549 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104) OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON, DC 20503	
FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (3)	PAGE (3)
RIVER BEND STATION	0 5 0 0 0 4 58	9 1 - 01 7 - 0 1 1 4 OF 1 6	

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 285A (1-77))

Table 1
Post-LOCA Hydrogen Mixing
Sequence of Events

Time (minutes)	Event
0	LOCA
1	EOP-2 Entry Condition (> 0.5% H ₂)
2	End of metal-water reaction (Radiolytic decomposition and corrosion continues)
5	Drywell hydrogen > 2% and Reactor pressure < 30 psig
30	Operator unsuccessfully attempts to start hydrogen mixing
270 (4.5 hours)	Drywell hydrogen > 4% (possible ignition of pocket of hydrogen - No explosions)
1020 (17 hours)	Drywell hydrogen > 6% (possible global combustion - No explosions)

NRC FORM 206A (8-80)		U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION		APPROVED ONE NO 31900104 EXPIRES 4/30/97	
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION					
FACILITY NAME (1)		DOCKET NUMBER (2)		LER NUMBER (3)	
RIVER BEND STATION		0 5 0 0 0 4 5 8 9 1		YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER 1 0 1 7 0 1 1 5 OF 1 6	
TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 206A (1/77))					

TABLE 2

Cooling Mechanism	Mass of Hydrogen Generated from metal water reaction (lbs)*
Design Basis:	
HPCS + LPCS + LPCI (1)	0
Beyond Design Basis:	
LPCS + LPCI (1)	0
LPCS + LPCI (2)	0
LPCS (50%) + LPCI (1)	246
LPCS	273
LPCI (2)	650
CRD + LPCI (3)	654
HPCS	660

* Reg Guide 1.7 hydrogen due to MWR = 20.8 lbs

NRC FORM 258A 10-89		U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION		APPROVED DMS NO 3150-0104 EXPIRES 4/30/92	
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION				ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST AND HAS FORWARDED COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (PS-30) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON DC 20548 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104) OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503	
FACILITY NAME (1)		DOCKET NUMBER (2)		LER NUMBER (3)	
RIVER BEND STATION		0 5 1 0 0 0 4 5 8		YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION 9 1 0 1 7 0 1 2 6 OF 1 6	
TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 258A (1) (1))					

TABLE 3

ECCS Combinations	Conditional Probability
1 HPCS Pump, 2 LPCI Pumps, and 1 LPCS Pump Operating	1.09E-01
3 LPCI Pumps and 1 LPCS Pump Operating	5.29E-02
1 HPCS Pump and 3 LPCI Pumps Operating	4.90E-02
1 HPCS Pump and 2 LPCI Pumps Operating	6.06E-03
2 LPCI Pumps and 1 LPCS Pump Operating	5.93E-03
1 HPCS Pump, 1 LPCI Pump and 1 LPCS Pump Operating *	5.81E-03
3 LPCI Pumps Operating	2.69E-03
1 HPCS Pump and 1 LPCS Pump Operating	1.12E-03
1 HPCS Pump Operating	5.79E-04
2 LPCI Pumps Operating	3.19E-04
1 LPCI Pump and 1 LPCS Pump Operating	2.97E-04
1 HPCS Pump and 1 LPCI Pump Operating	2.75E-04
1 LPCS Pump Operating	4.97E-05
1 LPCI Pump Operating	4.53E-06

* ECCS DBA Configuration