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Docket No.: STN-52-003

October 30, 1995

Mr. Dennis Crutchfield
Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

SUBJECT: AP600 DESIGN CERTIFICATION REVIEW PRIORITIES

Dear Mr. Crutchfield:

As a followup to our meeting on October 12, 1995, Westinghouse is providing you with the areas where the near term focus should be placed for the AP600 design certification review.

The most immediate need continues to be completion of the supplemental draft safety evaluation report that addresses the acceptability of the testing program, the validation and verification of the computer codes and the application of the safety analysis codes to the AP600 design. Completion of this activity will ensure that there are no modifications to the AP600 design necessary to compensate for difficulties encountered as a part of the safety analysis calculation review. This activity includes the review of the NOTRUMP, LOFTRAN, WCOBRA/TRAC long term cooling, W GOTHIC and the WCOBRA/TRAC code applicability document as well as the requisite ACRS meetings.

Progress must continue in implementing the path to resolution for Regulatory Treatment of Nonsafety Systems. Presently the focus is on how the uncertainty in the thermal hydraulic computer codes would affect the determination of the success criteria for the probabilistic risk assessment. This activity, along with a review of the revised AP600 level 1 probabilistic risk assessment, is essential to determining how regulatory control will be applied to the nonsafety systems in the AP600 that were safety related systems in conventional plant designs. The post-72 hour and adverse systems interaction subissues need to also be worked as a part of this review. A number of design related activities depend on resolution of this issue. Westinghouse will submit the PRA insights and fire PRA for NRC review.

The review of the safety system function, design and performance (Chapters 6, 7 and 15) is necessary to finalize a number of the other design certification review activities, such as support system design, initial test program and the inspections, tests, analyses and acceptance criteria (ITAAC).

While the final ITAAC cannot be developed until the system design review is completed, it is prudent that Westinghouse receive staff feedback on the pilot ITAAC that are being developed for several sample systems. This feedback will be factored into the final ITAAC development program which will be initiated once the design of the systems is assured.

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Westinghouse is continuing to develop responses to the NRC letters concerning the classification of proprietary information in the AP600 Standard Safety Analysis Report (SSAR), PRA, responses to NRC requests for additional information and presentation material. This activity will be completed to support NRC requirements and to allow Westinghouse to initiate development of the AP600 Design Control Document.

The requests for additional information on the severe accident mitigation design alternatives (SAMDAs) should be completed and transmitted to Westinghouse. The MELCOR, hydrogen control, in-vessel retention and shutdown risk areas of Chapter 19 should be brought to closure to assure that any impacts on the design are accounted for in a timely manner.

Providing a near term focus on these areas will optimize the use of resources for both Westinghouse and the NRC staff.

Areas of review not specifically mentioned above should be addressed as discussed with your staff during our meeting on October 23, 1995.

Please contact me if you require further information concerning these review priorities.



Brian A. McIntyre, Manager
Advanced Plant Safety and Licensing

/nja

cc: H. J. Bruschi, Westinghouse