

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)										DOCKET NUMBER (2)										PAGE (3)									
Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1										0 5 0 0 0 4 4 0										1 OF 0 3									
TITLE (4)										Operation of Wrong Sliding Link While Performing Surveillance Testing Results in Inadvertent Start of the RHR B Pump.																			
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)																			
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES					DOCKET NUMBER(S)															
														0 5 0 0 0															
1	2	0	9	9	0	9	0	0	0	3	7	0	0	0	1	0	7	9	1	0 5 0 0 0									
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)																											
4		20.402(b)				20.405(c)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)															
POWER LEVEL (10)		0 0 0				20.405(a)(1)(i)				50.38(a)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)											
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)				50.38(a)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vi)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)															
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)																			
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)																			
		20.405(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(a)																			
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																													
NAME										TELEPHONE NUMBER																			
Henry L. Hegrat, Compliance Engineer, Extension 6855										2 1 1 6 2 1 5 1 9 1 - 1 3 1 7 3 1 7																			
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																													
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS																			
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)																			
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO																			

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On December 9, 1990 at 0643 during performance of surveillance testing, two unexpected automatic starts of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump B occurred during the timing portion of the test. For each start, operators verified adequate water level and secured the pump in accordance with approved operating instructions. At the time of occurrence, the plant was in Operational Condition 4 (Cold Shutdown). Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) temperature was 135 degrees Fahrenheit and reactor pressure was atmospheric.

The root cause of this event was personnel error. The surveillance instruction requires a sliding link to be opened prior to the timing portion of the test, to prevent an automatic pump start. Although the sliding links are adequately identified, and the technicians were following the procedures as written, the technicians identified and opened the wrong sliding link.

The corrective actions taken for this event include appropriate counseling and disciplinary action for the I&C technicians involved. Additionally, this event will be discussed during I&C Section continuing training and all licensed operators will review this event during operator requalification training.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 800 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1	0 6 0 0 0 4 4 0 9 0	—	0 3 7	—	0 0 0	2 OF 0 3	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On December 9, 1990 at 0643 during performance of surveillance testing, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump B automatically started unexpectedly during the timing portion of the test. At the time of occurrence, the plant was in Operational Condition 4 (Cold Shutdown). Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) temperature was 135 degrees Fahrenheit and reactor pressure was atmospheric.

On December 9, 1990, I&C technicians were performing Surveillance Instruction (SVI-1E12-T5368), "ECCS/LPCI Pump B Start Time Delay Relay Channel Functional/Calibration for 1E12A-K70B." This surveillance requires that sliding link [HS] MMA-4 be opened to prevent RHR [BO] pump [P] B from starting during the timing portion of the test. The I&C technicians performing the surveillance identified and opened the sliding link which they thought to be MMA-4. The test switch was closed to begin the timing sequence; however, the expected indications were not received and the technicians reopened the test switch [HS]. After attempting to verify appropriate test connections, the technicians closed and opened the test switch two additional times. During the performance of these steps, RHR pump B automatically started twice. After both actuations, control room operators verified the initiation to be inadvertent and secured the pump in accordance with approved operating instructions. This entire sequence occurred between 0643 and 0645. The RHR injection valves did not open and therefore, no flow to the reactor vessel occurred from this event. Operations personnel stopped the surveillance testing and directed the I&C technicians to determine the problem with the test. It was determined that sliding link MMA-5 had been opened rather than MMA-4. MMA-5 was closed, MMA-4 was opened and the testing was allowed to proceed. MMA-5 controls other start circuitry associated with the B RHR pump. System engineering personnel inspected the affected lines following this event. It was concluded that no water hammer damage had occurred.

The root cause of this event was personnel error, inattention to detail. SVI-1E12-T5368 requires one person to locate sliding link MMA-4 and another person to independently verify that the correct sliding link has been located. It then requires one person to open sliding link MMA-4 and another to independently verify that sliding link MMA-4 has been opened. Observation showed the identification of the sliding links to be adequate. Although following the procedure as written, the technicians identified and opened the wrong sliding link.

The RHR shutdown cooling mode of operation is designed to remove decay heat from the reactor pressure vessel during shutdown conditions. The plant had been in Operational Condition 4 (Cold Shutdown) and 5 (Refuel) for greater than 90 days prior to this event; thus, decay heat was minimal. During this event, RHR pump A was running, supplying shutdown cooling flow. Therefore, this event is not considered to be safety significant. There have been no previous events caused by operating the wrong sliding links.

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TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-630), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (8)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 4 4 0 9 0 - 0 3 7 - 0 0 0 3 OF 0 3					

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

The corrective actions taken for this event include appropriate counseling and disciplinary action for the I&C technicians involved. Additionally, this event will be discussed during I&C Section continuing training and all licensed operators will review this event during operator requalification training.

Energy Industry Identification System Codes are identified in the text as [XX].