

**GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY**



RIVER BEND STATION POST OFFICE BOX 220 ST. FRANCISVILLE, LOUISIANA 70775  
AREA CODE 504 635-6094 345-8001

January 4 , 1991  
RBG- 34266  
File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.3

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

River Bend Station - Unit 1  
Docket No. 50-458

Please find enclosed Licensee Event Report No. 90-046 for River Bend Station - Unit 1. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73.

Sincerely,

W. H. Odell  
Manager-Oversight  
River Bend Nuclear Group

*W. H. Odell*  
IAE/PDG/CAB/JCM/CLB/pg

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000  
Arlington, TX 76011

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Public Utility Commission of Texas  
7800 Shoal Creek Blvd., Suite 400 North  
Austin, TX 78757

IE22

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

RIVER BEND STATION

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

050004581 OF 03

PAGE (3)

TITLE (4)

Isolation of Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Valve due to Failure of a Differential Temperature Switch

EVENT DATE (5)

LER NUMBER (6)

REPORT DATE (7)

OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)							
1	2	0	5	9	0	9	0	0	4	6	0	5	0	0	0		
												0	5	0	0	0	

OPERATING MODE (9)

1

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5. (Check one or more of the following) (11)

POWER LEVEL (10)	20.402(b)	20.406(a)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
0.7	20.406(a)(1)(i)	50.35(a)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(a)
	20.406(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(a)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vi)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text NRC Form 366A)
	20.406(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)	
	20.406(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)	
	20.406(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

L. A. England, Director-Nuclear Licensing

TELEPHONE NUMBER

AREA CODE

504381-4145

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC
X	BIN	ITS	G0810	Y					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
	X				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)

At 0330 on 12/05/90 with the unit at 78 percent power in Operational Condition 1 (Power Operation), an unplanned engineered safety feature (ESF) actuation occurred when a spurious trip signal was received from the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) equipment room high differential temperature instrumentation. This caused the RCIC turbine main steam supply line inboard containment isolation valve, 1E51\*MOV063, to stroke closed. This condition is considered reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) since isolation of the RCIC turbine steam supply line constitutes an ESF actuation.

The RCIC equipment room differential temperature switch, 1E31\*N603B, was removed and will be returned to the vendor, General Electric Company, for repair or replacement. A new temperature switch was installed, calibrated and tested in accordance with STP-207-4243.

The safety implications of the described event are insignificant due to two factors. First, the RCIC system was not being relied upon as it was administratively inoperable and in compliance with the action statement of Technical Specification 3.7.3. Second, redundant safety systems required by Technical Specifications were available. Therefore, there was no impact on the health and safety of the public.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-630), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)  RIVER BEND STATION	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0 5 0 0 0 4 5 8 9 0	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		0 4	6	0	0	2	OF 0 3

TEXT (if more space is required, see additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

REPORTED CONDITION

At 0330 on 12/05/90 with the unit at 78 percent power in Operational Condition 1 (Power Operation), an unplanned engineered safety feature (ESF) actuation occurred when a spurious trip signal was received from the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) equipment room high differential temperature instrumentation. This caused the RCIC turbine main steam supply line inboard containment isolation valve (\*ISV\*), 1E51\*MOVFO63, to stroke closed.

This condition is considered reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) since isolation of the RCIC turbine steam supply line constitutes an ESF actuation.

INVESTIGATION

At the time of the event, the RCIC system (\*BN\*) was being tested in order to troubleshoot the RCIC turbine governor control system per maintenance work order R056717 and maintenance procedure MCP-4195, "Calibration of the RCIC Turbine Speed Controls."

At 0330 on 12/05/90 a Division II isolation trip signal was received, causing the RCIC turbine main steam supply line inboard isolation valve, 1E51\*MOVFO63, to stroke closed. The RCIC equipment room differential temperature switch, 1E31\*N603B, was in an alarm condition with a delta temperature reading of 12 degrees F. However, the setpoint for the isolation is 96 degrees F. The Division II isolation signal was reset and maintenance work order MWO 145788 was initiated to find the cause of the spurious trip.

A calibration check of the RCIC equipment room differential temperature switch (\*TS\*), 1E31\*N603B, which caused the isolation to occur, was indeterminate. The switch was tested satisfactorily in accordance with the applicable surveillance test procedure, (STP) 207-4243. However, as a precaution, temperature switch 1E31\*N603B was replaced.

A review of previous River Bend Station LERs found no similar events.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The RCIC equipment room differential temperature switch, 1E31\*N603B, was removed and will be returned to the vendor, General Electric Company, for repair or replacement. A new temperature switch was installed, calibrated and satisfactorily tested in accordance with STP-207-4243. The RCIC system has been returned to operation in accordance with the RCIC pump operability test, STP-209-3302.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-630), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1):  RIVER BEND STATION	DOCKET NUMBER (2):  0 5 0 0 0 4 5 8 9 0 - 0 4 6 - 0 0 0 3 OF 0 3	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

SAFETY ASSESSMENT

The safety implications of the described event are insignificant due to two factors. First, the RCIC system was not being relied upon as it was administratively inoperable and in compliance with the action statement of Technical Specification 3.7.3. Second, redundant safety systems required by Technical Specifications were available. The high pressure core spray (HPCS) system is a sufficient source of makeup at high pressure. Assuming HPCS failure, the operator could initiate the automatic depressurization system (ADS) or manually operate safety relief valves to reduce the system pressure in order to use the low pressure core spray (LPCS) system or the low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) system to mitigate the transient. Therefore, there was no impact on the health and safety of the public.

NOTE: Energy Industry Identification System Codes are identified in the text as (\*XX\*).