

Southern California Edison Company

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

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
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Subject: Docket No. 50-361
30-Day Report
Licensee Event Report No. 90-015
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(d), this submittal provides the required 30-day written Licensee Event Report (LER) for an occurrence involving an auxiliary feedwater pump support system piping mis-assembly. Our investigation into the root cause of this occurrence is continuing. The results of this investigation, including the root cause and corrective actions to prevent recurrence, will be provided in a supplement to this LER. Neither the health nor the safety of plant personnel or the public was affected by this condition.

If you require any additional information, please so advise.

Sincerely



Enclosure: LER No. 90-015

cc: C. W. Caldwell (USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, Units 1, 2 and 3)

J. B. Martin (Regional Administrator, USNRC Region V)

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)

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On 12/04/90, with Unit 2 at 100% power, during a routine annual auxiliary feedwater pump (AFWP) gravity feed lube oil cooling system (GFLCS) functional test, the lube oil cooling system storage tank contents drained into the AFWP P-504 motor bearings in less than the required 30 minutes. This system, which is not required for normal lubrication, was designed to provide supplementary cooling to the motor bearings following the unlikely occurrence of a high energy steam line break (HELB) inside the AFWP room coincident with an event requiring emergency feedwater. The HELB is assumed in the accident analysis to be isolated within 30 minutes after the break occurs.

A subsequent investigation revealed that the GFLCS supply line to the outboard end motor bearing had been mis-assembled following a motor inspection during the previous refueling outage (11/89). The mis-assembly connected the GFLCS supply line in a location which did not contain a necessary flow restricting orifice. Consequently, the oil flow rate was much greater than designed, thus emptying the supply tank in less than the minimum 30 minutes. On 11/23/89, Unit 2 had entered Mode 3 and proceeded to power operation. Technical Specifications require operability of the AFWP in Modes 1, 2 and 3. Following proper assembly of the GFLCS, the system was tested satisfactorily and the pump was declared operable on 12/6/90.

The investigation of the cause of the incorrect installation is continuing. The results of this investigation, including the root cause and corrective actions to prevent recurrence, will be provided in a supplement to this LER.

As a result of this event, SCE has re-evaluated the performance of the bearings at HELB temperatures in the pump room without the GFLCS. This preliminary evaluation indicates that the AFWP would remain operable during and after the steam line break. Therefore, this event has no direct safety significance.