

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)										DOCKET NUMBER (2)										PAGE (3)	
Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant										0 5 0 0 0 3 0 5 1										OF 0 2	
TITLE (4)																					
Inadvertant Initiation of the Auxiliary Building Special Vent																					
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)											
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES						DOCKET NUMBER(S)						
									NA						0 5 0 0 0						
0 6	2 8	8 4	8 4	0 1	2	0 0	0 7	2 7	8 4						0 5 0 0 0						
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)																			
N		20.402(b)				20.406(c)				X				50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)			
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.406(a)(1)(i)				50.36(e)(1)								50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)			
1 0 0		20.406(a)(1)(ii)				50.36(e)(2)								50.73(a)(2)(vi)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)			
		20.406(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)								50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)							
		20.406(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)								50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)							
		20.406(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)								50.73(a)(2)(ix)							
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																					
NAME										TELEPHONE NUMBER											
Sherry Bernhoft - Plant Technical Support Engineer										AREA CODE 4 1 4 3 8 8 - 2 5 6 0											
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																					
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS											
A																					
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)				MONTH		DAY		YEAR			
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										X NO				NA							

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)

With the Plant at 100% power operation both trains of the Auxiliary Building Special Vent System (ABSV) were inadvertently started during the performance of an I & C procedure to place train B of the Steam Exclusion System back in service. The I & C person mistakenly requested the Control Room Operator to depress the "Zone SV Area Steam Exclusion Train B" pushbutton instead of the "Steam Exclusion Train B Reset" pushbutton. As designed, this action started both trains of ABSV. Minutes into the event the error was recognized, both trains were secured and realigned for normal plant operating conditions.

The personnel involved were made aware of their error. A copy of this incident has been circulated to Operations, I & C and the Training Group for their information. No further action is required.

Because the system performed as designed, this event resulted in no impact on the health and safety of the public.

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant	0500030584	—	012	—	00	02	OF 02

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

With the Plant at 100% power operation both trains of the Auxiliary Building Special Vent System (VJ) were inadvertently started during the performance of an I & C procedure to place train B of the Steam Exclusion System (IM) back in service. The I & C person mistakenly requested the Control Room Operator to depress the "Zone SV Area Steam Exclusion Train B" pushbutton (HS) instead of the "Steam Exclusion Train B Reset" pushbutton. As designed, this action started both trains of ABSV.

The ABSV system is designed to collect any potential containment vessel (VSL) leakage that might bypass the Shield Building Annulus (VC) and cause it to pass through charcoal filters (FLT) before reaching the environment. It also provides emergency ventilation in certain zones of the Auxiliary Building. The system will automatically start on a safety injection signal, high radiation signal from the Auxiliary Building Vent Stack Monitor (MON), and a steam exclusion signal.

The steam exclusion system is designed to detect high energy line breaks in the Auxiliary Building. The system consists of RTD's (DET) mounted at the Auxiliary Building SV boundaries. On high temperature a trip signal is generated which closes the isolation dampers (CDMP) and generates a steam exclusion signal. Train B of this system had been removed from service to perform design change work on the relays (RLY). Prior to declaring the system operational, I & C was performing a system retest when the error occurred.

Train B of the steam exclusion system was in the test mode. An I & C person was working in the relay rack (RK) with headset communication to an I & C person in the Control Room. Following a logic train test the person working in the relay rack asked the person in the Control Room to have the train reset. The I & C person pointed to the "Zone SV Area Steam Exclusion Train B" pushbutton, which is located right above the "Steam Exclusion Train B Reset" pushbutton, and asked the Control Room Operator to depress it. The operator questioned the I & C person, knowing that both trains of ABSV would start, if he was sure that was the button he wanted. The I & C person, without consulting a procedure, said yes that was the button he wanted. The Operator depressed the button and observed the Zone boundary dampers shut, the filter inlet and outlet dampers open and both ABSV fans (FAN) start.

The I & C person working in the relay rack asked over the headset why the ABSV system had started. At that time, the I & C person in the Control Room realized that he had pointed to the wrong button. The operator secured the system and realigned it for normal plant operation.

The person involved was made aware of his error. A copy of this incident has been circulated to I & C, Operations and Training to remind them of the importance of adhering to the procedure. No further action is required.

Because the system performed as designed, this event resulted in no impact on the health and safety of the public.

## WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION



P.O. Box 1200, Green Bay, Wisconsin 54305

July 27, 1984


U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Docket 50-305  
Operating License DPR-43  
Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant  
Reportable Occurrence 84-012-00

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 "Licensee Event Report System", the attached Licensee Event Report for reportable occurrence 84-012-00 is being submitted.

Very truly yours,

  
Don C. Hintz  
Manager - Nuclear Power

JGT/js

Attach.

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11